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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to examine whether the aftermarket performance of 
Norwegian initial public offerings (IPOs) is consistent with market efficiency. Previous 
studies state that market efficiency can be disrupted by market anomalies. This study 
focuses on short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance of IPOs. The initial 
returns are measured by benchmarking IPOs against market indexes. Our results reveal 
that initial average abnormal returns fluctuate from 0.5% to 1.5%. The long-term 
underperformance anomaly is also present in the Norwegian stock market. Based on 
different benchmarks, we have found an average of three-year abnormal returns varying 
from -10% to -30%. We have found little empirical evidence as to why IPOs 
underperform in the long run, but our results indicate that aftermarket returns varies 
among sectors. Despite finding evidence of underpricing and long-term 
underperformance, it is unlikely whether investors can exploit these anomalies. This 
study concludes that these anomalies are difficult to exploit, which means that we have 
found few, if any, departures from market efficiency in the market for Norwegian IPOs. 
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Preface  
This thesis is the final step to completing our Masters of Science in Financial Economics 
from the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH).  
 
IPO performance was first brought to our attention during the “Corporate Finance”, 
course that both authors attended at NHH. Much has been written lately about the 
performance of IPOs, especially in regards to firms such as LinkedIn, Groupon and 
Facebook. This makes the topic both interesting and relevant to study.   
 
The writing process has been both educational and challenging. While writing this 
thesis, we have utilized the knowledge and analytical skills obtained during our five 
years at NHH. We have developed a good understanding of the IPO process; from listing 
to the aftermarket performance, as well as a better understanding of econometrics.  
 
We hope this thesis is of interest to the reader and will provide valuable information on 
IPO performance in Norway.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1  Description of topic 
The aftermarket performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) has puzzled investors for 
many years. The two main IPO puzzles are the positive abnormal first-day returns, 
referred to as underpricing, and the long-run underperformance. Several studies 
indicate that these anomalies are breaches of market efficiency (Ibbotson, 1975). In an 
inefficient market, one can exploit market anomalies in order to make a profit. 
 
It is well documented that IPOs tend to be underpriced1 and we have seen instances of 
extreme underpricing in recent years. For example, LinkedIn went public in 2011 and 
achieved an initial return of 106.87% (Baldwin & Selyukh, 2011). Since this market 
anomaly has been extensively studied, initial returns will not be the main focus in this 
thesis. 
 
Another IPO anomaly is the long-run underperformance of IPOs. It has been proven that 
IPOs consistently underperform during the first three years of listing (Ritter, 1991). A 
recent example is Groupon, which advanced 31% in its trading debut in November 2011. 
At the time of writing2, the share price is down by -61% from the close price on its initial 
trading day. This may indicate long-term underperformance. Since this anomaly is less 
studied than the underpricing phenomenon, particularly in Norway, we will focus on 
this market anomaly in our thesis.  
 
The fundamentals of equity trading have changed significantly since researchers first 
found proof of these anomalies in the 1960s and 1970s. The implementation of 
computerized trading services and robot trading has changed the dynamics of the stock 
market. Since most of the previous studies on this subject are based on relatively old 
data, especially in Norway, we wanted to examine these phenomena under prevailing 
market conditions. 
 
IPOs involve the sale of private companies where some of the firm owners may possess 
superior information relative to potential investors. This can be crucial to determine the 
                                                          
1
 High return from offer price to close price the first day 
2
 May 10
th
 2012 
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true value of a company. This information asymmetry results in different opinions about 
the valuation of companies going public. The uncertainty about the true value of the 
companies, as well as other features, makes initial public offerings especially interesting 
to study.  
 
1.2 Research question 
Empirical studies document the existence of anomalies in IPOs such as underpricing 
(short-term performance) and long-term underperformance. It can be inferred that the 
stock market is subject to market inefficiencies due to the existence of these anomalies. 
In order to examine if these anomalies are present in the Norwegian stock market, our 
study is founded on three objectives.  
  
The objectives of the study are: (1) to measure the initial price performance of 
Norwegian IPOs, from the offering price to the close price on the first day of trading; (2) 
to measure the three-year aftermarket performance subsequent to listing; (3) to study if 
external factors or firm characteristics can explain the aftermarket performance. 
  
By studying these objectives, we will be able to answer our research question; 
 
“Is the aftermarket performance of Norwegian IPOs consistent with market 
efficiency?”  
 
 
1.3 Approach 
We begin this thesis with a presentation of relevant theory around IPOs in chapter 3. 
Here, we describe what an IPO is and how a company goes public. Thereafter, results 
from empirical studies for the main IPO anomalies are presented in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
In chapter 4, we present the analysis for the long-term performance of IPOs. We have 
chosen to study Norwegian IPOs listed in the period 2000 to 2008, and we have 
analyzed their three-year abnormal returns compared to three different benchmarks. 
The benchmarks chosen are: market indexes, peer companies, and sector indexes.   
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After the long-term analysis, we have performed cross-sectional regressions in order to 
determine if aftermarket performance is related to specific firm characteristics or 
external factors. This analysis is presented in chapter 5. 
 
In chapter 6, we have analyzed the short-term performance of Norwegian IPOs from 
2000 to 2011. We have examined the short-term performance by calculating abnormal 
returns in excess of market indexes from the offer price to the close price the first day of 
trading.  
 
Our findings are then compared to other empirical studies and discussed in light of 
economic theories. We will only present the key findings from our analysis - the 
complete results are enclosed in the appendix in chapter 9.  
 
1.4 Scope limitations 
We have limited our analysis to the Norwegian market. Our background from a 
Norwegian business school has provided us with a better understanding of the 
Norwegian market than other markets and it was therefore natural for us to choose the 
Norwegian stock market as area of study. The majority of the empirical studies on this 
subject are based on data that is older to our study. Therefore, one must be cautious 
when comparing results, since the market dynamics might have changed over time. 
 
This thesis focuses more on the long-term IPO performance than on the short-term 
performance. As aforementioned, the anomaly of short-term underpricing is well 
documented. We have therefore chosen to study the long-term underperformance 
anomaly more thoroughly.  
 
The choice of a three-year aftermarket period limits us to study whether the IPO long-
term underperformance lasts for more than three years. Empirical studies reveal that 
the duration of IPO underperformance varies from three to five years (Ibbotson, 1975), 
(Ritter, 1991). Since we have chosen to study IPOs issued from 2000 to 2008, some of 
the IPOs have not yet been listed for five years. We have therefore limited our 
aftermarket period to three years. The fact that Rao (1991) and Ritter (1991) found that 
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underperformance is isolated to the first three years post listing gives support to our 
choice of aftermarket period. 
2  Market efficiency and anomalies 
Market efficiency suggests that prices on traded assets fully reflect all available 
information at any given time. Eugene Fama (1970) expressed this idea through the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The idea is that if the EMH holds, no investor can 
beat the market by predicting a return on a stock because all investors will have the 
same information (Fama, 1970).  
 
Investors and researchers have questioned the validity of the EMH. Empirical support 
for the theory is mixed, but the strong form of market efficiency3 has generally not been 
supported. Some have found market anomalies with specific characteristics of stocks - 
for instance that low P/E stocks produce greater returns than high P/E stocks (Dreman 
& Berry, 1995). “Anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with 
maintained theories of asset-pricing behavior. They indicate either market inefficiency 
(profit opportunities) or inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model” (Schwert, 
2002, p.939). Academics have found anomalies related to IPOs. According to Berk & 
DeMarzo (2007), there are four characteristics that puzzle financial economists: 
 
1. Underpricing: The closing price the first day of trading is often substantially 
higher than the offer price. 
2. Cyclicality: Both the number of IPOs and the average initial returns tend to follow 
market cycles. 
3. Long-run underperformance: The returns of an IPO investment with a three to 
five year holding period is on average negative. 
4. High costs: It is unclear why firms willingly incur the high costs associated with 
an IPO. 
 
                                                          
3 The “strong form” of market efficiency assumes that all information, public and private, is available to all 
investors. This implies that no one can consistently produce excess return. This form of market efficiency 
is impossible if there are legal barriers preventing information for being made public. An example of a 
legal barrier is laws preventing insider trading (Jensen, 1978). 
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Puzzle number one, two and three can be viewed as anomalies and are signs of market 
inefficiency. Each puzzle will be discussed and/or studied in this thesis, but we will focus 
on the long-run underperformance anomaly.  
 
Ibbotson (1975) argued that an IPO is market-efficient if the IPO’s long-run performance 
is not significantly different from zero. He also claim that a market anomaly is only 
market inefficient if an investor is able to make profit from it after transaction costs are 
incurred. 
 
By transaction costs, Ibbotson referred to the bid-ask spread and the brokerage 
commission. Bid-ask spread is the difference in price between the highest price a buyer 
is willing to pay for a stock and the lowest price a seller is willing to sell for. Brokerage 
commission is the fee rendered to a broker for stock trading. Even if market anomalies 
exist, investors have to be able to exploit them in order for the market to be inefficient - 
a transaction cost is one obstacle which might hinder this.   
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3  Initial Public Offering theory 
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is the process of going public for the first time by selling 
stocks listed on a stock exchange to a large number of diversified investors (Ibbotson & 
Ritter, 1995). 
 
3.1 Reasons for going public 
Most startup companies finance their initial investments by raising capital from a small 
number of investors that are often private sources. If the investors or the entrepreneurs 
wish to sell their stock, they have no liquid market in which to sell them. This source of 
equity capital is therefore usually quite expensive because the investors need to be 
compensated for the lack of liquidity in their investment. The amount of money a startup 
company can get from private sources is often limited to the existing stockholders’ 
ability or willingness to inject more equity into the company. Without another source of 
financing, a startup company will therefore be hindered in their growth plans.  To 
finance future expansions, many companies find it more attractive to go public and raise 
capital at more favorable terms rather than financing through private sources.  
 
The key motivation for going public is to raise equity for the company and/or to work as 
an (partial) exit for current stockholders (Ritter & Welch, 2002). An IPO can be the best 
way to get funds for a strategic expansion or it can be a part of a financial strategy. 
Strategic expansion can be achieved through internal or external growth, where a 
hostile takeover is the most extreme form of expansion. When a company goes public, 
the liquidity in the stock will increase, which might lead to a lower weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) required by investors. Pagano et al. (1998) claim that the decision 
to go public is a result of value maximization for the original owners who are willing to 
sell down. When a company is (partly) sold to the public, more potential investors are 
involved than in an alternative trade sale4, where a company is sold to one or just a few 
investors. The price reached through an IPO is normally better than in a trade sale, and 
this is therefore another motivating factor for going through with an IPO.  
 
                                                          
4
 “A trade sale is a sale to shops or businesses, rather than to members of the public” (Financial Times Lexicon, 
2012). 
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Based on the Italian stock market, Pagano et al. (1998) found that the probability for 
going through with an IPO is correlated with the company and the industry’s price-to-
book ratio and its size. Ritter & Welch (2002) concluded that companies decide to go 
public when market conditions are good, but only after a certain stage in their life cycle. 
Figure 3.1 is showing that the most common stage to go public in a company’s life cycle 
is in the growth phase (Johnsen, 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: (Johnsen, 2011). 
 
3.2 Issues associated with an IPO 
Many companies have not started to generate a significant amount of income in their 
first years of existence, and most of the value of their company is therefore represented 
by their present value of future growth opportunities (PVGO). The PVGO is highly 
dependent upon the future decisions the managers choose to make, which are unknown, 
and it is hence difficult for investors to value startup companies before they go public. It 
is not only the potential investors who have trouble to determine the correct valuation, 
but the parties who determine the offer price may also be unsure. We will explain that 
this valuation problem can amount to a substantial cost for the company going public. 
There are many other one-time costs associated with an IPO. These costs can be 
categorized as direct and indirect costs.  
 
14 
 
The direct costs include auditing, legal, and underwriting fees. An underwriter is an 
investment bank, or often a syndicate of several investment banks, who manages the 
security issuance and designs its structure. The fee5 often charged by the underwriter is 
called the underwriting spread. This is the discount below the issue price at which the 
underwriter purchases the stocks from the issuing firm. A typical spread is 7% of the 
issue price (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007), which means that this cost could constitute a large 
amount. For instance, the underwriting spread of an issue of NOK 300 million amounts 
to NOK 21 million. 
 
The indirect costs are split into the costs associated with the time and the effort the 
management devotes to the preparation of the offer, and the indirect cost of 
underpricing. Underpricing is the anomaly associated with the dilution6 that occurs 
when stocks are sold at an offer price which is lower than the close price at the initial 
day of trading (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995). Underpricing costs may be substantial, and 
combined with the underwriting spread, the total one-time costs associated with going 
public can often end up with being over 10%. In addition to the one-time costs, there are 
regular costs for publicly traded firms associated with the need to supply regular 
information to investors and regulators. 
 
There are also other issues one has to have in mind before deciding to go public. Firstly, 
a firm runs the risk of being subjected to a hostile takeover, since regulations allow for 
increased insight into the company’s accounts and sources of revenues. Secondly, the 
owners will lose control of parts of the company. This is due to regulations on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange (OSE), which requires companies going public to sell minimum 25% of 
the stocks to new stockholders (Oslo Børs, 2012).  
 
3.3 The IPO process 
The IPO process on OSE is a formal stepwise process which is similar to the processes in 
most Nordic countries. The regulations comprise rules that have to be met prior to 
                                                          
5
This fee is used in a «Firm commitment» structure which is the most common structure. Different 
structures are described further down. 
6
The stock dilution is a consequence of a firm needing to issue additional stocks, in order to raise the same 
amount of equity as indicated by the market capitalization at the close of the initial day of trading.  
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listing7. The rules include criteria for market capitalization, business maturity, and 
number of stockholders et cetera. The underwriters have the responsibility for the legal 
and financial due diligence of the company. They control the budgets, accounts, 
compliance of accounting rules and are responsible for the development of a prospectus 
to potential investors. The purpose of this process is to learn about the company in 
order to give an accurate presentation of the company to the potential investors on the 
road show. Most importantly, the underwriter works closely with the company to 
determine a fair valuation of the company. The road show, where the underwriter and 
senior management travels around to promote the issue, can start once this is done. 
 
When the road show is finished, investors inform the underwriter how many stocks they 
intend to purchase. Although these commitments are not binding, they give a good 
indication of the demand and are therefore used to determine the final offer price. This 
process is called the book-building process.  
 
Thereafter, a transaction structure has to be chosen. The three most common structures 
are: 
 
 Auctions: Investors are allocated stocks according to the highest bids. In 
recent years, these have taken the form of online auctions where the offer 
price is determined by the market. This structure is not regularly used.  
 
 Best-Effort: The offer price is fixed before the book-building is initiated. 
The underwriter does not guarantee that the issue will be sold out, but 
tries to achieve the best possible price for the seller. This model is 
recommended in small transactions with few institutional investors.  
 
 Firm Commitment: This is the most commonly used transaction structure. 
The underwriter provides an indicative price interval before the book-
building starts. Institutional investors are picked to participate in the 
offering, which allows for price adjustment according to the market 
demand. Based on the result from the book-building, the final subscription 
                                                          
7Listing criteria found on Oslo Børs website (Oslo Børs, 2012) 
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price is determined before listing. The underwriter purchases the whole 
issue at a discount/spread, and is then responsible for selling out the 
stocks. This is therefore a large commitment for the underwriter and 
constitutes a huge risk for the underwriter.  
 
The last two transaction structures allow for over-subscription. Over-subscription 
occurs when the demand is higher than the supply, and implies that investors want to 
buy more stocks than the planned issue. The most common way of allocating stocks, in 
the case of over-subscription, is to allocate according to interest. In other words, the 
investors who signed up for the most stocks get the most.  
 
The underwriter has another option when there is excess demand; they may have the 
possibility of distributing 115% of the stocks offered. If this option is included and used, 
the underwriter normally borrows these stocks from the main stockholders of the 
company. This creates a short position for the underwriter, which can be covered in two 
ways. If the stock price increases above the offer price, the underwriter can use a Green 
Shoe Option (Berk & DeMarzo, 2007). A Green Shoe Option is an option for the 
underwriter to buy back the shorted stocks through the issuance of new stocks. In the 
opposite scenario, when the stock price falls below the offer price, the underwriter may 
buy back the stocks in the open market. Normally, the short position has to be covered 
within 30 days after listing8. For further information on this topic, “Going Public: What 
the CFO Needs to Know” (Zeune, 1994) presents an in-depth description on this subject. 
  
3.4 The underpricing phenomenon 
Underpricing refers to when the stock price for IPOs increases, on average, from the 
offer price to the closing price on the first day of trading.  
 
3.4.1 Empirical findings of underpricing 
The first study on this topic was done by the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in 1963, which found that the average initial return for IPOs was positive 
(Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995). Later, this phenomenon has been studied by many people in 
various countries. Although the size of the underpricing varies, the underpricing 
                                                          
8 Regulations described by The Committee of  European Securities Regulators (CESR, 2002) 
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phenomenon exists in every country with a stock market (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995). A 
summary of some of these studies can be viewed in table 3.2 below. The large variations 
in underpricing between the different countries in table 3.2 can be partly explained by 
differences between the countries in terms of rules, regulations, national and regional 
factors for listing, as well as random differences in data samples. The average return is 
also measured in different ways depending on the country, where some are adjusted for 
market movements and some are not. The chief reason for large variations in 
underpricing is probably because the studies are done in different time perspectives. We 
will later show that the degree of underpricing can change drastically from year to year9.  
 
                                                          
9
 See figure 3.5 and 3.6. 
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Table 3.2: Average initial returns for 36 countries - (Loughran, et al., 1994) (updated 2003). 
 
Despite the large variations in underpricing, there is evidence that the underpricing is 
substantial and consistent in the long run. Figure 3.3 below illustrates the abnormal 
short-run returns on IPOs in contrast to the pure market returns for companies in the 
U.S. from 1960 to 2001. With a strategy of investing $1000 in 1960 in a random sample 
of IPOs and then reinvesting in a new set of IPOs each month, the portfolio from this 
strategy would have been worth          . By comparison, a similar strategy with 
Country Source Size Time Average
number period return
Australia Lee, Taylor & Walter; Woo 381 1976-1995 12.1%
Austria Aussenegg 83 1984-2002 6.3%
Belgium Rogiers, Manigart & Ooghe; Manigart 86 1984-1999 14.6%
Brazil Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez 62 1979-1990 78.5%
Canada Jog & Riding; Jog & Srivastava;Kryzanowski & Rakita 500 1971-1999 6.3%
Chile Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez; Celis & Maturana 55 1982-1997 8.8%
China Datar & Mao; Gu & Quin (A-shares) 432 1990-2000 256.9%
Denmark Jakobsen & Sørensen 117 1984-1998 5.4%
Finland Keloharju; Westerholm 99 1984-1997 10.1%
France Husson & Jacquillat; Leleux & Muzyka; Paliard & 
Belletante;Muzyka; Paliard & Belletante;
571 1983-2000 11.6%
Germany Ljungqvist 407 1978-1999 27.7%
Greece Kazantis & Thomas; Nounis 338 1987-2002 49,0 %
Hong Kong McGuinnes; Zao & Wu; Ljungqvist & Yu 857 1980-2001 17.3%
India Krishnamurti & Kumar 98 1992-1993 35.3%
Indonesia Hanafi; Ljungqvist & Yu 237 1989-2001 19.7%
Israel Kandel, Sarig & Wohl;Amihud & Hauser 285 1990-1994 12.1%
Italy Arosio, Giudici & Paleari; Cassia, Paleari & Redondi 181 1985-2001 21.7%
Japan Fukuda; Dawson & Hiraki; Hebner & Hiraki; Hamao, 
Packer & Ritter; Kaneko & Petteway 
1 689 1970-2001 28.4%
Korea Dhatt, Kim & Lim; Ihm; Choi & Heo 477 1980-1996 74.3%
Malaysia Isa; Isa & Young 401 1980-1998 104.1%
Mexico Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez 37 1987-1990 33,0 %
Netherlands Wessels; Eijgenhuijsen & Buijis; Ljungqvist, Jenkinson 
& Wilhelm
143 1982-1999 10.2%
New Zealand Vos & Cheung; Camp & Munro 201 1979-1999 23,0 %
Nigeria Ikoku 63 1989-1993 19.1%
Norway Emilsen, Pedersen & Sættem 68 1984-1996 12.5%
Philippines Sullivan & Unite 104 1987-1997 22.7%
Polen Jelic & Briston 140 1991-1998 27.4%
Portugal Almeida & Duque 21 1992-1998 10.6%
Singapore Lee, Taylor & Walter; Dawson 441 1973-2001 29.6%
South Africa Page & Reynecke 118 1980-1991 32.7%
Spain Ansotegui & Fabergat 99 1986-1998 10.7%
Sweden Rydqvist; Schuster 332 1980-1998 30.5%
Switzerland Drobertz, Kammermann & Walchli 120 1983-2000 34.9%
Taiwan Lin & Sheu; Liaw, Liu & Wei 293 1986-1998 31.1%
Thailand Wethyavivorn & Koo-Smith; Lokani & Tirapat 292 1987-1997 46.7%
Turkey Kiymaz 163 1990-1996 13.1%
UK Dimson; Levis; Ljungqvist 3 122 1959-2001 17.4%
USA Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter 14 978 1960-2003 18.3%
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investments in the market portfolio would have been worth $74000 (Schwert, 2002). 
We have not found evidence of any investor who has been able to follow this strategy. 
We will present a few theories that try to explain why in the following. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The value of a portfolio from 1960 to 2001 after investments in IPOs or the market portfolio 
(Schwert, 2002). 
 
3.4.2 Explanations of underpricing 
There are many theories that try to explain underpricing. Most of the theories are linked 
to the information asymmetry problem as explained in the introduction. Rock (1986) 
assumes that some investors are better informed about the true value of the company 
going public than others. He claims that better informed investors only bid for the IPOs 
that are favorably priced and that less informed investors bid for all IPOs. This theory is 
referred to as “The winner’s curse”, where the less informed investors are allocated 
relatively more stocks in IPOs with unfavorable pricing than in favorably priced IPOs. 
This happens because the informed investors bid more heavily on the good IPOs and 
thus overbid the less informed investors during the auction process. In order to attract 
the less informed investors, IPOs have to be priced at a discount. This gives an 
explanation for the underpricing phenomena.  
 
Another example of information asymmetry is that the entrepreneurs are better 
informed than the potential investors. Only issuers with lower than average quality are 
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willing to sell their stocks at the average price. The result is that high quality companies 
do not find it beneficial to go public and only low quality firms decide to go public. This 
problem is referred to as “The Lemons problem” (Akerlof, 1970). High quality 
companies may have recognized that this problem could be present in the current 
market, as fewer companies decide to go public in the U.S. (Social Science Research 
Network, 2012).  
 
High quality companies can bypass the lemons problem by “leaving money on the table” 
in an IPO.  Leaving money on the table is the same as selling a stock at a discount, and 
can be viewed as a form of signaling of a company’s quality. This is lost capital for the 
entrepreneurs that could have been raised if the stock had been offered at a higher price. 
Welch (1989) claims that it can be rational to leave money on the table for high quality 
companies because they can regain the money in a subsequent directed stock issue. Low 
quality companies will reveal their true quality in the market before the directed stock 
issue is done and they will therefore not be able to recuperate the money left on the 
table. In other words; only high quality firms issuing equity will decide to sell their 
stocks at a discount in order to prove superior quality, compared to other new listings, 
since the true value of the company will be revealed in the aftermarket. Therefore, only 
high quality companies will achieve a beneficial price in a subsequent directed stock 
issue.  
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Figure 3.4: (Ritter, 2011) 
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates that average first day returns and the aggregate money left on the 
table for American IPOs are highly correlated. This proves that a lot of the “money left on 
the table” can be regained in a subsequent directed stock issue.  
 
Another explanation of the underpricing phenomena is that underwriters purposefully 
set the issue price low. They do that to control their own risk as the underwriter. The 
main risk for an underwriter, that has chosen a firm commitment structure, is to set a 
price which is too high to sell out the entire issue. The underwriter may also risk their 
reputation if they are not able to sell out the issue and may thereby potentially lose 
future customers. This is another example of problems with information asymmetry, 
where the underwriter is better informed than the issuer.  
 
Since the issuer cannot monitor the underwriter without costs, the underwriter has full 
control of the pricing of the issue. The entrepreneurs want the offer price to be set as 
high as possible, but they have little power to assure that the underwriter is setting the 
best price (Baron, 1982). Despite Baron’s argument, Muscarella & Vetsupiens (1989) 
found that IPOs are equally underpriced when issuers go public on their own, as 
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opposed to when they use underwriters. Beneviste et al. (1996) explain the 
underpricing phenomenon with the rationale that underwriters who have agreed to 
provide price support10 will underprice the issue on purpose in order to avoid losses. 
 
An example of the classical principal-agent problem is that underwriters may not always 
serve their clients’ best interests when they have the power to allocate stocks at their 
own discretion (Ritter & Welch, 2002). Underwriters may unnecessarily underprice 
IPOs and then allocate stocks to hand-picked investors or clients in order to make them 
rich. This will also benefit the underwriter as an investment bank because a part of the 
profit will be passed on to the brokers who charge for the use of their services. 
Stoughton & Zechner (1989) claim institutional investors are more valuable for 
underwriters than retail investors. This is due to the existence of the agency problem 
which occurs because only institutional investors are able to monitor the firm’s 
management, while retail investors are often not capable of these activities. Booth & 
Chua (1996) are on the other hand claiming that retail investors are more valuable (for 
an underwriter) because they consist of a broader investor base which creates higher 
liquidity in the stock. Either way, an underwriter may choose to underprice the issue to 
additionally serve their most valuable customers. Randall & McGee (2000) wrote that 
underwriters allocate stocks in an IPO first to large institutional investors. If these large 
institutional investors are able to distinguish between favorably and unfavorably priced 
IPOs, stocks available to retail investors are likely to produce lower returns compared to 
those available to institutional investors (Schwert, 2002).  
 
As explained earlier, the underwriter is using the book-building process to determine 
the final offer price. If the underwriter, for a fully subscribed issue, organizes the book-
building process such that investors are allocated stocks according to their bids, the 
bidders have to place realistic bids. The investors that are bidding aggressively are thus 
revealing that they think the IPO is underpriced. Beneviste & Spindt (1989) argues that 
the offer price has to be set low in order to compensate investors to reveal their 
information - underpricing is thus a consequence of asymmetric information. Hanley 
(1993) demonstrates that IPOs, which end up with a final offer price in the upper range 
                                                          
10 To buy stocks if the stock price falls below offer price. 
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of the pricing interval from the book-building process, will have a higher initial return 
than IPOs from the lower range. This phenomenon is called “partial adjustment”.  
 
Welch (1992) presents an explanation for the underpricing phenomenon based on 
behavioral factors. He argues that there is a “sheep mentality” amongst investors that he 
calls the “cascade effect”. He claims that investors may disregard their own information, 
even if they have superior information, and instead pay attention to whether other 
investors are buying or not. If no one else is buying, an investor may not decide to buy, 
and vice versa. To make sure that some investors are buying and to initiate the cascade 
effect, underwriters set the offer price low in order to attract buyers.  
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3.5 Cyclicality 
Another anomaly with IPOs is that both the issuing volume and the average initial return 
tend to follow market cycles. Figure 3.5 illustrates that there are large fluctuations in 
first-day return and number of IPOs in the U.S. 
 
Figure 3.5: (Ritter, 2011) 
  
It is not surprising that there are variations in the number of companies that go public. 
We would expect that companies, in general, will have greater need for capital in times 
characterized by more growth opportunities than in times with fewer growth 
opportunities. What is surprising about the cyclicality is how large the variations are. 
From the years 2000 to 2003, the dollar volume of new issues declined by 75%. Even 
though the growth opportunities declined over that period, this cannot wholly explain 
the change.  
 
Loughran et al. (1994) found that the IPO volume in both the U.S. and other countries 
tends to be high following periods of high stock market returns. Lerner (1994) 
concluded that venture capitalists tend to take companies public when equity valuations 
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are high, and that private financing is the most common practice when equity values are 
low.  
 
lbbotson & Jaffe (1975) were the first to document cyclicality of high initial returns, 
which they called “hot issue” markets. Academics have difficulty in finding rational 
explanations for this phenomenon. Rajan & Servaes (1993) assumes that there is 
positive autocorrelation for the initial return in IPOs and argues that some investors 
follow “positive feedback” strategies. They claim that investors may be especially 
tempted to invest in IPOs if other recent issues have risen in price. Ritter (1984) 
hypothesizes that the large fluctuations in initial returns could be explained by the 
riskiness of the issue. He has found some evidence that hot issue periods are dominated 
by risky issues, but the evidence is not strong enough to explain the whole phenomenon. 
The rationale behind this hypothesis is that riskier issues tend to be underpriced to a 
greater extent than issues with lower risk. Despite the absence of evidence with good 
explanations for the cyclicality anomaly, we can observe that there are large fluctuations 
in both the initial IPO returns and issuing volume. Figure 3.6 shows monthly IPO returns 
- we can observe that the initial return is even more volatile than the yearly returns. 
 
Figure 3.6: Monthly data on the average initial returns to IPO investors, U.S. data from January 1960 to 
December 2001 Source: (Ibbotson, et al., 1994) 
 
Lowry & Schwert (2002) claim that there are noticeable cycles in the returns from figure 
3.6, with high initial returns followed by high returns. They argue that companies are 
not able to use this information to time their IPO in order to minimize the initial return. 
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The same argument goes for investors; they are not able to time their purchases in IPOs 
in order to maximize their return. Although IPOs potentially can offer large abnormal 
returns to investors who are able to obtain stocks in IPO allocations, it is not clear that 
the cyclicality anomaly can be exploited by most investors.  
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3.6 Long-term performance of IPOs 
Long-term underperformance is referred to as the market anomaly that IPOs tend to 
underperform in their first three years of listing, relative to other benchmarks. Ritter 
studied this phenomenon first in 1991, and his article; “The long-run performance of 
initial public offerings” became the reference for most articles on this subject (Ritter, 
1991).  
 
3.6.1  Empirical findings of long-term IPO performance 
Prior to the 1990s, Stoll & Curley (1970), Ibbotson (1975) and Stern & Bornstein (1985) 
presented evidence of long-term IPO underperformance in the U.S., while Buser & Chan 
(1987) found no evidence of underperformance in a two year study of the NASDAQ 
Composite Index. Ritter (1991) explained that this result was due to the use of NASDAQ 
Composite Index as benchmark, which underperformed other markets during the 
observation period. In addition, they did not include the most speculative IPOs. 
 
Long-term IPO performance attracted more interest during the 1990s, after Ritter’s 
study. Despite prior studies, Ritter claim to be the first to confirm long-term 
underperformance of IPOs. Based on a study of 1526 U.S. IPOs between 1975 and 1984, 
Ritter found statistically significant results supporting the theory of underperformance. 
Ritter used two event-time approaches: cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). He then calculated abnormal return by matching 
IPOs against peer companies. Ritter found an average three-year abnormal return on -
29.13% (CAR) and -27.39% (BHAR).  
 
To prove that IPO underperformance is not a characteristic solely of the American 
market, Loughran et al. (1994) examined long-term IPO performance in nine different 
countries in Asia, South America and Europe. Based on this report, they found statistical 
evidence that IPOs tend to offer relatively low return in a three-year perspective. The 
three-year aftermarket performance for IPOs issued in Germany, between 1974 and 
1989, had an average adjusted return of -12.8% (Ljungqvist, 1993). Aftermarket 
performance in the U.K, for IPOs issued from 1980-88, had a three-year average adjusted 
return of -8.1% (Levis, 1990). However, a study performed on the Swedish stock market 
show a positive three-year average return of 1.2% based on IPOs issued in 1980-90 
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(Loughran et al., 1994). The returns for the abovementioned studies have been adjusted 
against the GSC100 index for actively traded small stocks. Unfortunately, Loughran et al. 
(1994) did not study long-term performance of Norwegian IPOs. However, the authors 
question the robustness of the studies of the Swedish and German markets. This is 
because the German and Swedish market analysis was based on a relatively small 
sample (119 and 162, respectively11). Regardless of the robustness of the different 
studies, Loughran et al.’s study shows that IPO underperformance is a global 
phenomenon.  
 
In terms of duration of the underperformance, Ritter (1991) argued that 
underperformance is confined to the initial three years after going public. This is 
supported by research conducted by Rao (1991). Ibbotson (1975) found 
underperformance up to the fourth year of going public, but no signs of 
underperformance in year five. Lerner (1993) reported that IPOs underperform in the 
five first years of listing. Based on Lerner’s study, Speiss & Affleck-Graves (1995) 
examined how seasoned equity offerings (SEO) performed five years after the equity 
offering. Their study found significant negative abnormal returns at the end of the fifth 
year. Based on this, they concluded that negative long-term returns are not specific for 
initial offerings, “but are a more pervasive feature found in all common stock offerings” 
(Speiss & Affleck-Graves, 1995). Hence, literature on SEOs can provide valuable insight 
into IPOs’ long-term performance as well.  
 
3.6.2 Empirical explanations of long-term underperformance 
By using cross-sectional regressions, Ritter (1991) explains that underperformance is a 
result of investor’s over-optimism in certain sectors of the market which he called 
“fads”. Despite high initial return of IPOs (the underpricing phenomenon), Ritter claims 
that long-term return will be lower than the return of comparable firms due to market 
adjustments of the initial over-optimism.  
 
Ritter also connects long-term underperformance and fads to market timing. He claim 
that companies use “windows of opportunity”, where issuers “time” their IPO issues to 
market peaks or industry fads. During market peaks, stock prices increase beyond their 
                                                          
11 In comparison, Levis’ (1990) study on the UK market is based on 712 observations. 
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fundamental values and managers and issuers take advantage of this overpricing by 
issuing equity. Over time, the market peaks or the industry fads will subside and the 
market adjusts for the initial overpricing, which in turn results in long-term 
underperformance of IPOs. Ritter (1991) found that IPOs issued during booms tend to 
yield lower long-term returns compared to average IPOs.  The theory of “window of 
opportunity” is supported by several other studies, such as Loughran & Ritter (1995, 
1998), Baker & Wurgler (2000) and Hirshleifer (2001). 
 
Schultz (2002) provides an alternative theory to market timing. Schultz acknowledges 
the underperformance tendency of equity offerings, but he concludes that this is not due 
to issuers using “windows of opportunity”. The paper questions how managers can 
correctly predict future earnings to evaluate whether their stock is overvalued. Instead, 
Schultz claims that firms decide to go public when they can receive a higher price of 
their company. As a result, there will be more issues during booms, when valuations 
generally are higher. This is referred to as “pseudo market timing”. Schultz (2002) 
explains underperformance by managers deciding to take their firms public during 
peaks. As stock valuations increase, more firms decide to issue equity. Issuers can get a 
higher stock price for equity offerings during peaks – consequently, the cost and risk of 
raising equity is reduced. Since the risk is reduced, more IPOs will follow suit.  The latter 
group of IPOs is comprised of companies with lower risk, and they are therefore yielding 
lower expected return. Schultz claims that the second group of IPOs consists of more 
listings than the initial group of IPOs and that the average return for all IPOs will be 
lower or in some cases negative as a result. 
 
IPO performance explained by firm characteristics 
Another interesting facet of IPOs is whether underperformance is linked to certain firm 
characteristics. Ritter (1991) found that young companies tend to yield lower long-term 
returns compared to average IPOs. 
 
Studies on seasoned equity offerings can also provide valuable information for IPO 
underperformance. Based on returns adjusted against specific benchmarks, Speiss & 
Affleck-Graves (1995) found evidence of long-term IPO underperformance. They 
calculated abnormal return against size, industry-and-size and book-to-market-and-size. 
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They proved long-term negative abnormal returns across all three benchmarks. The 
findings discussed are supported by Brav et al. (2000), who also found IPO and SEO 
underperformance in excess of market benchmarks. Speiss & Affleck-Graves (1995) 
conclude that underperformance is most severe among small issuing firms with low 
book-to-market ratios. However, Brav et al. (2000) did not find IPO or SEO 
underperformance when matched against size and book-to-market portfolios. Brav et al. 
(2000) explain the different findings by claiming to have used a superior matching 
technique to Speiss & Affleck-Graves (1995). 
 
IPO performance explained through risk 
An alternative explanation to the long-term underperformance of equity offerings is 
provided by Eckbo et al. (2000), who claim that IPO underperformance is related to 
differences in risk between IPOs and their matches. They claim that issuing firms (IPOs 
& SEOs) have lower systematic risk compared to non-issuing firms (matching firms) and 
that issuing firms therefore yield lower return than their non-issuing counterparts.  
 
Eckbo et al. (2000) argue that the matched firm technique used by Ritter (1991) and 
Speiss & Affleck-Graves (1995) does not account for differences in risk. Eckbo et al. use a 
different technique to expose risk difference by constructing zero investment portfolios; 
going short in stocks of equity issuers and long in stocks of similar firms matched on size 
and book-to-market ratio. Based on the portfolios, the issuing firms had a higher 
exposure towards macro-economic risks like unanticipated inflation, default spread and 
changes in the term structure compared to matched firms. Eckbo et al. (2000) suggest 
that the lower exposure to micro-economic risks exceed the higher exposure to macro-
economic risks and that IPOs thus have less systematic risk. This is because when a firm 
issues equity, with everything else constant, the total leverage of the firm is reduced. 
Therefore, the unanticipated inflation and default risks of the issuing firm are reduced. 
Due to the reduction in systematic risk, the issuing firm will yield a lower return relative 
to the non-issuer.  
 
Another study conducted by Eckbo & Norli (2000) discusses that IPO underperformance 
can be related to stock turnover. This is based on the negative relationship between 
average return and trading volume that Brennan et al. found in 1997. Eckbo & Norli 
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(2000) found that new listings are more traded, compared to peers, and they use this 
link to explain two to five year IPO underperformance. In the same study, they found 
that IPOs with a high stock turnover and less leverage12 tend to underperform. IPOs with 
these two characteristics have less systematic risk than the non-issuing counterparts. 
Eckbo & Norli confirm that long-term underperformance is due to lower systematic risk 
of new listings.  
 
In extension to the previous studies that explain equity performance through risk, 
Carlson et al. (2006) conducted a study on SEO underperformance. The framework used 
for this study is different from previous studies; they viewed SEOs as real options, rather 
than focusing on leverage and exposure to macro-economic risks. The principle behind 
the study is that firms issue equity in order to expand or invest. The expansions are 
viewed as growth options converted to assets in place. The authors argue that these 
assets are less risky than the growth options, which reduces the total risk of the firm. 
Lower company risk contributes to a reduction in expected return for the issuing firm.  
In other words: SEO underperformance is explained by the risk reduction which occurs 
when growth opportunities are converted to assets by raising equity.  
 
Carlson et al. (2006) argue that matching abnormal returns based on firm 
characteristics like size and book-to-market ratio does not account for the risk 
adjustments following an equity issue. They therefore claim that the real option 
framework provides a better explanation of the aftermarket performance. The intuition 
behind risk reduction for SEO can also be applied to IPO studies. The argument is that 
the reduction in risk after an equity issue is largest for firms with huge growth options - 
a characteristic which is often found for IPO firms.  
 
Summary of empirical explanations of long-term underperformance 
We have seen that there are several different empirical explanations of the long-term 
underperformance of IPOs. The most prominent explanations are related to market 
conditions, firm characteristics and differences in risk between IPOs and their matches. 
                                                          
12
Leverage of IPOs are measured against the leverage of peers (non- issuing firms), matched against size and 
book-to-market ratio.   
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We have used SEO literature to prove that underperformance is related to all equity 
offerings and that studies on SEO underperformance are transferable to IPOs. 
4 Analysis of long-term performance 
 
4.1 Sample selection 
We have collected data on IPOs issued on Oslo Børs from 2000 to 2008. We have chosen 
this observation period because we wanted to test IPO performance under prevailing 
market conditions. The implementation of internet trading and robot trading has 
changed the dynamics of the equity markets considerably in recent years. Many famous 
studies on this subject, such as Ritter (1991) and Ibbotson (1975), are done before the 
computerization of equity markets. A possible weakness with our chosen time horizon is 
that it is relatively short. External events, such as booms and recessions, may therefore 
have another impact on our sample data than with a longer time perspective. Despite 
this, the merit of examining the market under prevailing market conditions weighs 
heaviest. In addition, the chosen observation period of three year is commonly used for 
similar studies. 
 
We have used several sources for data collection. We have gathered data from 
Bloomberg and Factset13 terminal servers. In addition, we have used resources at NHH, 
namely Thompson Reuters Datastream and Amadeus14. Our initial dataset from this 
sample period consisted of 179 IPOs, but after extensive filtering (explained below) our 
final dataset comprises of 99 IPOs.  
 
During the filtering process, we cleaned all data which did not fit the interpretation of an 
IPO “as a company selling stocks to the general public for the first time” (Høiseth, 2004). 
Thus, we removed all IPOs that were a result of a merger or acquisition where one of the 
entities was previously listed on Oslo Børs. We have also removed relisted companies. 
We removed IPOs with these characteristics because they have previously been fully or 
partially valued by the market and are thus less subject to possible market anomalies.  
 
                                                          
13 Factset and Bloomberg were accessed from friends in DNB Markets and Credit Suisse. 
14 Amadeus is a database with historical prices from Oslo Børs. 
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Listings of large privatized companies were also removed. Large privatized public 
companies, such as Statoil ASA, Telenor ASA and Yara ASA, have already been subject to 
thorough valuations by many analysts before they go public. Hence, investors have 
better indices of their true value relative to other IPOs. A recent example of this is the 
Facebook IPO. Damodaran claim that this was “the most pre-priced IPO in history, with 
transactions in the private share market providing information on what investors would 
be willing to pay for the stock” (Damodaran, 2012). This prophecy came true, and the 
stock price remained virtually unchanged from the offer price to the close price on the 
first day of trading. We have also removed spin offs from listed companies. These are not 
included because the value of the new entity is already valued in the holding company.  
 
4.1.1 Length of aftermarket period 
We have chosen a three-year aftermarket period to evaluate long-term IPO performance. 
The return is calculated from the close price on the initial trading day to close price 
three years post-listing. The aftermarket period for the long-term analysis was chosen 
after reading similar studies performed on IPOs in the American market. Studies show 
that the underperformance trend lasts for the first three years post-listing (Ritter, 1991) 
& (Rao, 1991). Based on the observation period chosen (2000 to 2008), we had to end 
the sample period in 2008, since we needed a three-year aftermarket period to study 
long-term return. The decision to study IPO performance in recent time restricts us from 
expanding the observation period from three to five years, as done in Rao (1991).  
 
4.2 Methodology  
To analyze if there is a long-term trend in our data, we have used descriptive statistics. 
Descriptive statistics is the discipline of quantitatively describing the main features of a 
dataset (Mann, 1995). Descriptive statistics aim to summarize a dataset, and are not 
developed on the basis of probability theory (Dodge, 2003). 
 
When analyzing descriptive data, we have used statistical definitions like mean and 
median. The mean is referred to as the arithmetic average of the dataset. The mean is 
found by summing the number of variables, divided by the number of values. When a 
dataset is analyzed, the median is considered to be less efficient than the mean. 
However, the median is less sensitive to outliers (Weisstein, 2012). Outliers are defined 
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as observations that lie outside the overall pattern of a distribution (Moore & McCabe, 
1999). Therefore we will use both the median and the mean in our analysis. 
 
In order to measure long-term IPO performance, we have calculated abnormal returns in 
excess of three benchmarks (Index, Peer companies and Sector industries). Before we 
present the results of our analysis, we will explain the calculation methods used.  
 
In order to evaluate IPO returns, we have used monthly adjusted close prices and daily 
returns for the initial trading day. Mitchell & Stafford (2000) claim that monthly returns 
provide a better estimate when abnormal returns are calculated, because daily prices 
introduce too much noise to reliably measure abnormal returns .  
 
Adjusted close prices15 are used, as these are adjusted for stock splits and dividends 
payments. Adjusted close prices provide a better foundation for comparing different 
IPOs than pure close prices. This is because dividends and stock splits are also 
components to the total return of a stock, which is not accounted for when unadjusted 
stock prices are used. In the instances where a price on the last trading day of a month 
was missing, we have used the daily price closest to the end of the month in order to 
calculate monthly returns. 
 
For IPOs delisted prior to their three year anniversary, we have truncated the 
observation period accordingly. Consequently, the long-term performance for the 
respective IPO ends after delisting. In order to calculate the return for the initial month 
of trading, we have truncated the monthly return from the first day of listing to the last 
trading day of the respective month.  
 
4.2.1  Abnormal Return 
Abnormal return is defined as return to a portfolio/stock in excess of the return of a 
market portfolio (Brav et al., 2000). We have calculated abnormal returns relative to 
three benchmarks, which will be explained in depth later. Abnormal returns are 
calculated based on this formula: 
                                     
                                                          
15 Adjusted close prices were generated from Amadeus and Thompson Reuters Datastream.  
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Let       denote the return for a sample IPO for time t and let      denote the benchmark 
return for time t. Thus      is the abnormal return for IPOi, in excess of market return    .  
 
The reason for using abnormal return rather than simple return is because abnormal 
return measures return relative to a benchmark which accounts for external factors 
such as market cycles, and is therefore a better indicator of pure IPO aftermarket 
performance. When simple returns are used, one might find negative return during a 
period where the stock market is in recession because their stock prices are affected by 
general market movements rather than factors connected to the IPOs. Thus, if only 
simple returns are studied, one might conclude that underperformance exists 
irrespective of how the rest of the market fared in the same period.  
 
To measure the long-term performance of IPOs, we have calculated abnormal returns 
based on two event-time approaches: Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) (Ritter, 1991). 
 
BHAR is calculated as the percentage change of an IPO from the initial day of trading 
until three years post listing. The abnormal return is then calculated by subtracting the 
return for the benchmark used with the same time horizon.  
 
          ∏       
 
   
  ∏               
 
   
   
 
     is defined as the raw return for a sample       in month t. The benchmark is defined 
as              which indicates the corresponding return of the respective benchmark in 
month t.   
 
The mean BHAR is the arithmetic average of the individual BHARs, where N defines 
months, (36 months is equivalent to a three-year aftermarket period):  
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Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is the average benchmark adjusted return on an 
IPO. In order to calculate the CAR for each IPO, we first calculated the monthly abnormal 
return for each IPO based on the different benchmarks used. The calculation is based on 
the formula below: 
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Let      denote the monthly return for a sample IPO in month t, while        denotes the 
monthly return for the previous month (  -1). We calculated the percentage change in 
return for the sample IPO based on the change from the previous months return. The 
same percentage change is found for the benchmark, denoted by             , for month 
 . The abnormal return (     for a sample firm in month t is found by subtracting the 
percentage change of the benchmark return from the IPO return.  
 
     ∑     
 
   
 
 
      is the abnormal return for a sample       in month t.  
  
The cumulative abnormal return for the whole data sample is the arithmetic average of 
the      for all IPOs: 
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Let N denote the total number of IPOs in or sample. 
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4.2.2 Measurement biases with BHAR and CAR 
Existing studies show differences in preferred methodology for abnormal return 
calculations. Lyon et al. (1999) and Mitchell & Stafford (2000) conclude that CAR 
generates less skewed abnormal returns and is preferred over BHAR, which they claim 
has more statistical problems. The statistical problems with BHAR are related to the 
assumption of independence for multiple event-firm abnormal returns. In other words, 
the BHAR calculation assumes that the abnormal return calculation for two firms within 
the same calendar period will not be affected by each other. Mitchell & Stafford (2000) 
argue that this is very rarely the case, and that “major corporate events cluster through 
time by industry” (Mitchell & Stafford, 2000, p.290). This may lead to cross-correlation 
of abnormal returns, and they therefore argue that CAR is the preferred calculation 
method. Conrad & Kaul (1993) documented, on the other hand, that CAR tends to yield 
negatively biased abnormal returns over long periods. 
 
Other studies prefer the BHAR calculation. For instance, Barber & Lyon (1997) argue 
that CAR is a biased predictor of the BHAR calculation. Based on a study of the U.S. 
equity market, they document that a sample of firms which all have zero annual return 
calculated with BHAR, would on average have a corresponding 12 month mean CAR of 
+5%. In this case, one would reach an incorrect conclusion of positive abnormal returns 
by only reading the CAR results. The same study emphasizes that the bias stems from 
differences in calculation method. The study further argues that the BHAR gives a more 
precise return for a given time horizon than CAR, since BHAR measures the return from 
day one to the end of the holding period, and not from month to month. 
 
Barber & Lyon (1997) conclude that there are possibilities for biases with both BHAR 
and CAR calculations of abnormal return. They argue that this stems from the new 
listing bias, the rebalancing bias and skewness biases which affect the calculation 
methods differently. These biases will be described below.   
 
The new listing bias is defined as the positive abnormal return bias which occurs when 
the BHAR calculation is used (Barber & Lyon, 1997). Ritter (1991) argues that new 
listings are overrepresented by young and high growth firms. The difference between 
the two calculation methods can be illustrated by an example: consider an IPO with a ten 
38 
 
percent return in month one and two, while the benchmark has a zero percent return in 
the same months. CAR will then show a 20 percent return (10%+10%), while BHAR will 
show a 21 percent return (110%*110%-1). Hence, the BHAR calculation can be 
positively skewed (Barber & Lyon, 1997). 
 
The rebalancing bias is defined as the inflated market return which occurs when equally 
weighted indices are constantly rebalanced in order to hold their constraints of equal 
weights of the stocks in the portfolio (Barber & Lyon, 1997). Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) 
document the momentum effect whereby past winners empirically outperform past 
losers in the intermediate term. This leads to an inflated long-run return of the 
benchmark portfolios relative to the matched IPOs, and the result is a positive bias in the 
measurement of the long-run BHAR. The effect of rebalancing bias is severe when daily 
prices are used, but less of a problem when monthly returns are used. The rebalancing 
effect is stifled when CAR is used, since this calculation is based on monthly summed 
returns, rather than compounded returns (Cania et al., 1998).   
 
Skewness bias occurs because statistical tests assume normally distributed variables. 
Abnormal returns are often not normally distributed, but rather represent skewed 
distributions. With a positively skewed BHAR, we will get a negatively skewed test 
statistic because it is calculated by dividing the mean BHAR by the cross-sectional 
standard deviation of the sample IPOs. This bias is less severe in the CAR approach. 
 
As is made apparent in the discussion above, there is no infallible method to calculate 
abnormal return. We have therefore chosen to use both BHAR and CAR in our study. We 
have seen from the previous studies that there are possible biases with both methods, 
and one should be cautious of these when reading the statistics derived.  
 
4.2.3 Benchmark matching 
In order to calculate abnormal returns, we have compared the IPO returns to three 
benchmarks. The three benchmarks used are: 
 Market indexes: “Index” 
 Peer companies “Peers” 
 Sector indexes “Sector” 
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Index 
The index benchmark is used to measure abnormal return for an IPO. Based on market 
capitalization, a sample IPO is matched against one of Oslo Børs’ market indexes. BHAR 
and CAR is then calculated for each IPO based on its matching index.  
 
We have classified the IPOs into three categories based on their market capitalization; 
large capitalized firms (large cap), medium capitalized firms (mid cap) and small 
capitalized firms (small cap). This classification is based on a similar classification done 
by the internet stockbroker Nordnet (Nordnet, 2012). We classified each IPO after this 
classification, based on the market capitalization at the end of the first trading month, 
for each respective firm. Thus, our dataset was classified into two large cap, 33 mid cap 
and 67 small cap IPOs16. The classification system we have used is based on market 
capitalization in 2012. Unfortunately, Nordnet does not provide similar classifications 
for previous years. This means that all our IPOs (from 2000 to 2008) have been 
classified based on market capitalization sizes today. An obvious weakness with our 
classification method is that there is a possibility that the average market sizes have 
changed over the past decade, and that as a consequence our classifications can be 
incorrect. However, during our classification process, we noted that in most cases, the 
relative value differences between our IPOs (based on companies listed in the same 
year), coincided with the classification given by Nordnet. Despite the possibility of 
changes in the relative size differences, our size classification should be an adequate 
approach.  
 
For IPOs defined as large capitalized firms, we have used the OBX index as the 
benchmark. The OBX index is made up of the 25 most liquid equities on Oslo Børs. OBX 
is a total return index, meaning the index is adjusted for dividends and stock splits (Oslo 
Børs, 2003). While the index comprise the 25 most liquid stocks on OSE, the index is 
capital weighted, meaning that companies with large market capitalization is given a 
                                                          
16 Market capitalization are defined based on market capitalization; MNOK 1400< Small cap < MNOK 40. 
MNOK 1400< Mid cap<MNOK 40 000. Large cap >MNOK 40 000. 
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higher weight in the index. Although the weightings have some restrictions17, large 
capitalized companies as Statoil have larger weights than the smaller companies18. The 
OBX index is therefore highly sensitive to Statoil’s stock price development. One might 
argue that benchmarking large capitalized companies against the OBX index may cause a 
measurement bias, as the OBX index is mainly based on liquidity and not market 
capitalization. Nevertheless, the weighting of the index makes it highly correlated to the 
performance of large capitalized companies and the OBX index can therefore be used as 
a proxy for the price development of large capitalized companies on OSE.  
 
For IPOs defined as medium capitalized firms, abnormal returns are measured against 
the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX). The OSEBX index consists of the 65 
most-traded companies listed on OSE. The OSEBX index contains a representative 
selection of the companies listed on the stock exchange and will thus reflect the overall 
price development of the stocks on OSE. This index is also a total return index and is 
computed in the same way as the OBX index. Since OSEBX is computed in the same way 
as OBX, we have the same weighting bias problem as for the OBX index. Despite this, the 
index is mainly made up by companies which are comparable to our medium capitalized 
IPOs. 
 
For IPOs defined as small market capitalized companies, abnormal returns are measured 
against the Oslo Stock Exchange Small Cap Index (OSESX). The OSESX index is based on 
market capitalization and is made up by the small capitalized companies listed on OSE. 
This index should therefore be a good matching benchmark for small capitalized 
companies.  
 
An issue with liquidity weighted indexes is the constant revision of the indexes. This 
makes our results prone to the rebalancing bias discussed earlier, which can result in 
biased abnormal results. A weakness with market capitalization weighted indexes is the 
possibility of a high variance. This is because the index variance can be biased towards 
                                                          
17 “The capping rules restrict the weighting of the largest company in the index to a maximum of 30%, no 
other company can have a weighting of more than 15%, and the total weighting of non-EEA companies is 
limited to a maximum of 10%” (Oslo Børs, 2012).  
18
 Statoil accounted for 23.27% of the OSEBX index a last revision of the index May 14
th
 2012. (Oslo Børs 
Newsweb, 2012)  
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the risk of the single firm (Ritter & Loughran, 2000). This is the case with both the OBX 
and the OSEBX index, due to the high weighting of Statoil. Despite these weaknesses and 
due to a lack of a better alternative, we proceeded using the chosen indexes as 
benchmarks for abnormal returns.  
 
Another concern is that some companies, like Statoil, are included in both the OBX and 
the OSEBX index. This may cause an estimation bias. However, since we only have two 
IPOs classified as large cap, the effect of this should be marginal and is therefore ignored. 
The same concern goes for small capitalized companies such as Algeta, which is included 
in both the OSESX and the OBX index. This is because Algeta meets the requirements for 
both the OBX and the OSESX indices, as the firm is a heavily traded equity and a small 
capitalized company, respectively. However, this problem is only present for a few 
stocks, so this not a major concern. We simply acknowledge the weakness described and 
proceed with the index matching methods described above. Since only 35 of 99 IPOs are 
matched against liquidity based indexes and the rest (64 IPOs) are matched against a 
market capitalization based index, the problem with liquidity based indexes is subdued. 
 
Peers 
The second benchmark used is peer companies, where abnormal returns are calculated 
by subtracting the return of a peer company from an IPO. This technique is adopted 
from similar studies on American IPOs by Ritter (1991) and Speiss & Affleck-Graves 
(1995). 
 
The selection criteria for each peer company are based on sector and size. Firstly, we 
found matching firms within the same industry19. Secondly, we chose a peer company 
with the closest market size, based on market capitalization of the IPO, at the end of the 
issue month. 
 
The chosen matching firms are firms which were listed no less than three years prior to 
the IPO because we did not want to match two IPOs. We matched firms by market 
                                                          
19The sector classifications for sample IPOs and matching firms are from the Thompson Reuters 
Datastream terminal. 
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capitalization based on three benchmark dates; 31.12.1999, 31.12.2003 and 31.12.2007. 
We have used these three dates as intervals, and found the peer with firm value closest 
to the issue date. For instance, an IPO issued 01.03.2000 is matched against the peer 
with the closest market capitalization on 31.12.1999. We matched peers which fell 
between 70%-130% of the market capitalization value of the sample firm.  
 
During the matching process, we wanted to use unique peers for each IPO. However, due 
to few matching peers in some sectors, some peers are used for multiple IPOs. In the 
case where there was not a comparable company within the same sector, we chose a 
matching firm from a similar sector. To measure their comparability, we analyzed the 
historical price development of both stocks to make sure that a correlation existed. 
Matching by peers effectively eliminates the rebalancing bias, mentioned as a risk when 
matching by index, since a sample IPO is matched with one peer for the entire 
observation period (Barber & Lyon, 1997).  
 
After finding peers for the IPOs in the dataset, we have measured abnormal returns for 
each IPO based on monthly adjusted close prices of the matching firm. For IPOs delisted 
before three years, we truncated the observation period and used the prior time period 
to calculate the abnormal returns for the long-term analysis. 
 
Sector 
The third benchmark, Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry sectors 
(Sector), calculates abnormal return for each IPO based on its respective GICS index20. If 
an IPO is delisted before its three-year anniversary, we have truncated the observation 
period based on the period prior to delisting.  
 
GICS is a classification system introduced by MSCI and Standard & Poors. The system is a 
universally used system for classification of equities based on sectors, industries and 
sub-industries (MSCI, 2012). We have used the broad sector indices to classify our 
dataset. Our dataset consists of seven GICS sector indexes. The seven GICS sectors used 
and the number of IPOs matched are given in the table below: 
 
                                                          
20 The GSCI sector indexes returns were collected from the Amadeus data terminal. 
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GSCI Sector Matched IPOs 
Industry 15 
Health Care 11 
Finance 9 
Consumer Staples 9 
Consumer Discretionary 9 
IT 6 
Energy 16 
Table 4.1
21 
 
The reason for using broad sectors for matching instead of narrower categories, such as 
sub-industries, is because certain sub-industry categories would have contained only 
one or two companies. In some instances, the relevant IPO was also included in the sub-
industry. To avoid a measurement bias, we have therefore used the broader sector 
indexes for matching. 
 
The use of sectors for matching is not based on earlier studies. The reason for measuring 
abnormal returns based on sectors is because we wanted to compare IPOs to a broader 
segment of similar companies. By doing this, we wanted to capture the effects on 
abnormal returns for an IPO, from changes in micro- and macro-factors which affects the 
entire sector and not random events of a single firm. On the other hand, effects from 
events that only affect a few firms in a sector, as well as the sample IPO, are then 
reduced.  
 
Despite the fact that sector matching is a similar technique to peer matching, we believe 
that matching IPOs against sectors will provide a better measure of the effects of micro- 
and macro-incidents which affect an industry as a whole, compared to just matching 
against a single firm. The weakness of measuring excessive returns against broader 
sectors, rather than narrower industries categories, is a weakness. Due to the lack of 
matches on firm level, we have no option but to use the broad sectors. 
  
                                                          
21 A full description of the sectors used can be found in Appendix 9.1.  
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Another issue with sector matching is the rebalancing bias that follows. Many IPOs are 
included in the GSCI sector indexes, meaning that we match the abnormal returns 
against an index which includes the sample firm. However, the price effect from the 
sample IPO is somewhat reduced because the broad indexes consist of many companies. 
The overall rebalancing effect of a particular IPO on the index is therefore subdued. We 
view the effects of this problem to be small, but it is nevertheless a weakness with sector 
matching.  
 
Despite the weaknesses described above, we chose to proceed with sector matching, as 
we wanted to add some originality to our analysis. We acknowledge the weaknesses, but 
still hope sector matching will provide insightful results.  
 
4.2.4 Risk adjustment 
When abnormal return is calculated, one needs to account for differences in risk 
between the sample IPO and its benchmarks since risk and return are positively 
correlated (Brav et al., 2000).  
 
In order to adjust for risk between a sample IPO and its benchmarks, Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran & Ritter (1995) use size matching to control the systematic risk of IPO firms. 
Since both index and peer benchmarks are matched based on size22, the sample IPOs are 
matched against benchmarks with approximately similar systematic risk. This is not the 
case for sector matching, since size is not a criterion. The technique used accounts for 
sector-specific risks between the IPOs and their sector. Nevertheless, we acknowledge 
that this is not a solid risk adjustment, since it does not adjust for systematic risk.  
 
Adjusting for risk by size matching also has weaknesses. Eckbo et al. (2000) state that 
size matching does not effectively account for differences in risk. They argue that 
constructing zero investment portfolios, with short positions in IPOs and long positions 
in size-matched peers, is a better risk adjustment. Due to difficulties with constructing 
these portfolios, we have used Ritter (1991) and Loughran & Ritter’s (1995) method to 
account for risk. 
 
                                                          
22 Size is accounted for by matching index and peers based on market capitalization of the sample firms.   
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We have not adjusted the IPOs for beta values in our index matching procedure. Berk & 
DeMarzo (2007) define beta as “a measure of systematic risk, of a security or a portfolio 
in comparison to the market as a whole“. The reason for not adjusting for differences in 
beta values is firstly because IPOs do not have historical market prices which are needed 
to calculate a beta value. Secondly, it would be incorrect to use a company’s beta after 
the listing as a proxy. This is due to the fact that a beta value will be adjusted for 
abnormal returns. Consequently, we would not be able to identify abnormal returns for 
the respective IPOs. Ibbotson (1975), Chan & Lakonishok (1990) and Clarkson & 
Thompson (1990) all conclude that the average beta of IPOs fall significantly in the 
aftermarket period. To calculate a beta straight after listing is therefore not an option 
either. 
 
4.2.5 Data trimming 
A few observations, which may not be representative of the underlying area of study, 
can be highly influential in datasets with a small sample size. To avoid a wrongfully 
influenced dataset, a dataset can be trimmed. To trim a dataset is simply to remove a 
certain percentage of the most extreme data in each direction. It is usual to trim a 
dataset by 5% or 10%, but the most important aspect of data trimming is to remove 
unusual observations. If a dataset is trimmed by 10%, it means that the dataset is 
reduced by the 10% highest and 10% lowest observations (from the full sample).  The 
mean values derived after the trimming of the data are called the trimmed mean (or the 
truncated mean). 
 
The trimming of data is a useful tool when median values are calculated based on 
datasets with outliers. Bloch (1966) argues that the truncated mean is a robust 
estimator, since it is less sensitive to outliers compared to the full sample mean. Bloch 
further states that despite removing observations, the trimmed mean still provides 
useful insight on the central tendency of a dataset. 
 
Another advantage of using a trimmed mean is evident in the case of a Cauchy 
distribution - a bell shaped distribution with fatter tails than the normal distribution 
(Rothenberg et al., 1966). In the case of a Cauchy distribution, the trimmed mean 
46 
 
produces a better estimate for the population location parameter23 than the full sample 
mean. This result is based on a study with 38% trimming performed by Ferguson 
(1978). He points out that the use of a trimmed mean is not completely robust and 
suggests that a maximum likelihood estimator is a better option. However, a maximum 
likelihood estimator is difficult to compute and a trimmed mean can therefore be 
considered a useful substitute. We will not discuss the maximum likelihood estimator 
further, but for further references please see Ferguson (1978). In the extension of the 
Central Limit Theorem, Rosenblatt (1955) argues that a sample size greater than 40 and 
without outliers is large enough to approximate a normal distribution.  
 
The aim of trimming the data is to fit our datasets to a normal distribution, located 
around a center-value with even tails both left and right from the center-value. Hence, 
the observations should somewhat be grouped together.  
 
4.3 Results of the long-term performance analysis 
Based on the abnormal return calculation methods described above, we have calculated 
BHAR and CAR to identify abnormal returns for IPOs based on a three-year aftermarket 
period. In order to get a graphical overview of our dataset, we have run a boxplot 
diagram in Minitab (figure 4.2). The diagram plots abnormal return for each dataset in 
descending order. We will only present the most relevant results in the narrative of this 
thesis – the complete results are enclosed in appendix 9.2. 
                                                          
23 A location parameter test compares the location parameter of a statistical population to a constant. A 
location parameter test can also be used to compare location parameters of two statistical populations. 
Most commonly, location parameters are used to compare against expected values, but location tests can 
also be based on median (Gosh, 1973). 
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Figure 4.2  
 
In the boxplot diagram, the boxes indicate multiple observations with a similar value. 
The asterisks are single observations, whilst the lines are multiple observations, 
indicating a tail. Based on the boxplots for the raw data, we note that all six plots (full 
sample data) have extreme values. The problem with outliers is that these extreme 
values can adversely affect the analysis and can lead to misinterpretation of the statistics 
derived.  For this reason, we decided to trim our data to remove outliers.  
 
Both the index and peer adjusted returns have three outliers on both sides of zero. 
Based on these observations we decided to trim our data, by removing the three highest 
and lowest returns (3% trim, 
 
  
   ). Note that sector BHAR does not have extreme 
negative values, yet we chose to trim both positive and negative outliers in order to be 
consistent. The 3% trimmed datasets consist of 93 observations. 
  
The results of the 3% trimming are given in the same figure (figure 4.2). Despite the 3% 
trimming, the data still contains a few outliers. Following the same rationale as above, 
we trimmed further, trimming the ten highest and lowest observations from the raw 
data. The 10% trimmed data gives a dataset without outliers, and all our data are 
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centered on zero, with small tails. The 10% trimmed dataset contains of 79 
observations. 
 
One might argue that trimming what was a small dataset (99 observations) as 
extensively as we have done, might reduce the possibility of reaching a conclusive result. 
For this reason, we chose to proceed with all three datasets in our statistical analysis. 
Consequently, we performed statistical analysis for the raw data, the 3% trimmed and 
the 10% trimmed data. Since a trimmed dataset gives a better estimate of the mean and 
the median (Bloch, 1966), we will focus more on the results from the trimmed data than 
for the results from the full dataset. Since the full samples do not meet the full 
requirements of a Cauchy distribution, particularly when we take into account that the 
full samples do not have even and fat tails, we proceeded with the trimmed data, 
because the observations are located around a center-value.  
 
In general in this thesis, we will not label a result as statistically significant if the P-value 
is larger than 10%, in order to not make Type 1 errors (rejecting a true null hypothesis). 
We will be more confident in our results for lower P-values, since the possibility of 
making type II errors (failing to reject a false null hypothesis) is less. 
 
4.3.1  Results from market index matching  
Figure 4.3 presents statistics on IPO returns in excess of the index benchmark. The mean 
values for all datasets indicate negative abnormal returns, but statistically significant 
mean values are only present in the trimmed datasets. Both BHAR and CAR show that 
the long-run underperformance is severe, but the robustness of the observed means is 
reduced by the large standard deviation. The negative median values also support 
underperformance based on index matching. However, the median values are only 
statistically significant for the BHAR datasets.  
 
Skewness measures asymmetry in the distribution. A distribution with skewness means 
that one of the tails is longer than the other. The distribution will consequently have a 
majority of values on one of the sides of the center-value. Heavily skewed data can 
generate biased results, due to the nature of the distribution and existence of outliers. 
Figure 4.3 show that the trimmed data reduces this problem.  
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In light of the data presented, we have found evidence of IPO underperformance in 
excess of market indexes. According to the discussions of skewness and statistically 
significant results, we rely mostly on the 10% trimmed dataset, which indicates a buy 
and hold average abnormal return of -26.3%. A negative median value gives further 
evidence of underperformance. The CAR calculated returns yield higher returns (-
16.6%24), but is also supporting underperformance in excess of index.  
      BHAR – Index matched          CAR – Index matched 
 Raw 
data 
3% 
trimmed 
10% 
trimmed 
 Raw 
data 
3% 
trimmed 
10% 
trimmed 
Mean -0.132 -0.27* -0.263*  -0.217 -0.216* -0.166* 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.340* 0.555* 0.363*  1.168* 0.804* 0.572* 
Skewness 4.29 -0.0827 0.4787  0.073 -0.695 -0.57 
Median -0.326* -0.326* -0.326*  -0.126 -0.126 -0.126 
N 99 93 79  99 93 79 
Figure 4.3: Descriptive statistics for index adjusted returns. *Statistically significant on a 95% confidence 
interval. **Statistically significant on a 90% confidence interval. 
 
4.3.2 Results from peer company matching 
Statistics for IPO return benchmarked against peer companies are shown in figure 4.4. 
They prove that IPOs underperform when matched against peers. This is evident 
through negative mean values for both the full data sample and the trimmed data. The 
mean values are statistically significant for all data samples, except for the BHAR raw 
dataset. The CAR yield a lower excess return compared to BHAR. This is in contrast to 
the index adjusted return calculated, which gave the opposite result. Despite high 
standard deviation for the average returns, statistically significant median and most 
mean values support the case of negative peer adjusted returns. 
 
The skewness of the distributions is less severe for these datasets compared to the index 
matched datasets. The skewness for the raw BHAR dataset is high, but is significantly 
reduced in the trimmed datasets. Note that trimming from 3% to 10% trimmed data 
                                                          
24 Based on the 10% trimmed mean from CAR-Index matched return. 
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gives a higher trimmed mean. This argues the case of how outliers can adversely affect a 
statistical result. Since the 10% trimmed dataset gives the lowest skewness, we will 
again rely on this result in our analysis. 
 
The BHAR is on average higher for the peer adjusted dataset compared to the index 
matched set, but the result is the opposite for the CAR calculations. The difference in 
results between that the two calculation methods, provides evidence of the calculation 
biases we have discussed earlier and is an example of why one calculation method is not 
preferred over the other. 
 
Based on the discussed results, we can conclude that IPOs yield negative returns when 
benchmarked against peers. The 10% trimmed BHAR datasets state that the average 
BHAR for IPOs is -21.5% lower than their peers. For the CAR calculated return, IPO 
underperformance is more severe; with an average adjusted return on -29.2% based on 
the 10% trimmed dataset. Despite statistically significant result, the standard deviations 
are still high which means that the IPO returns are very volatile.  
 
         BHAR – Peers matched      CAR – Peers matched 
 Raw 
data 
3% 
trimmed 
10% 
trimmed 
 Raw 
data 
3% 
trimmed 
10% 
trimmed 
Mean -0.16 -0.22* -0.215*  -0.312* -0.318* -0.292* 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.6* 0.82* 0.49*  1.374* 0.996* 0.694* 
Skewness 2.08 -0.452 0.429  0.037 -0.291 -0.276 
Median -0.3* -0.3* -0.3*  -0.311* -0.311* -0.311* 
N  99 93 79  99 93 79 
Figure 4.4 - Descriptive statistics for peer company adjusted returns. *Statistically significant on a 95% 
confidence interval. **Statistically significant on a 90% confidence interval. 
 
4.3.3 Results from sector matching 
The statistics for sector-adjusted IPO returns are shown in figure 4.5. Apart from the 
BHAR raw data, negative mean values are evident in both calculation methods. However, 
statistically significantly means are only evident for the trimmed datasets for BHAR and 
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the 3% trimmed CAR dataset. The mean values yield average abnormal return of -14.6% 
for 10% trimmed BHAR and -15.4% for 3% trimmed CAR. The median for the 10% 
trimmed BHAR is -14.7%. The CAR medians are substantially higher, though still 
negative, but none of them are statistically significant. Consequently, sector adjusted 
returns yield the highest long-term return, compared to the other benchmarks. 
 
The few statistically significant median and mean values casts doubt over the robustness 
of this analysis. This argument is strengthened by the large standard deviations. We 
have previously explained several weaknesses with the sector matching technique, such 
as the rebalancing bias problem and the use of broad sectors, rather than narrow 
industry indexes. We have also discussed that this matching technique may not be 
adequate, because each sample IPO is most likely also included in the sector index which 
the IPO is matched against. This is possibly an explanation for why the results from 
sector matching are less statistically significant. Despite the weak robustness of the 
results, this matching technique also proves that long-term underperformance exists, 
but the analysis indicates that the underperformance is less severe than depicted from 
the other benchmark analyses.  
 
       BHAR – Sector matched      CAR – Sector matched 
 Raw 
data 
3% 
trimmed 
10% 
trimmed 
 Raw 
data 
3% 
trimmed 
10% 
trimmed 
Mean 0.048 -0.106** -0.146*  -0.132 -0.154** -0.096 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.27* 0.526* 0.37*  1.17* 0.82* 0.55* 
Skewness 4.64 0.797 0.326  0.093 -0.73 -0.796 
Median -0.147* -0.147* -0.147*  -0.025 -0.038 -0.025 
N 99 93 79  99 93 79 
Figure 4.5: Descriptive statistics for sector adjusted returns. *Statistically significant on 95% confidence 
interval. **Statistically significant on 90% confidence interval. 
 
4.3.4  Key findings of the descriptive statistics 
In general, the 10% trimmed datasets produce the results that are the least affected by 
outliers, have the least skewness and the lowest standard deviation. We have therefore 
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chosen to focus on the results from these datasets. Based on statistically significant 
negative mean and median values, we can conclude that IPOs yield negative long-term 
returns across all benchmarks. However, the robustness of our analysis is mitigated by 
high standard deviation, and we cannot therefore conclude that IPOs underperform with 
a definite percentage number. We can instead infer that IPOs are most likely to yield an 
abnormal return within the interval; -10% to -30% on average. We can thus conclude 
that the IPO anomaly of long-term underperformance is present in the Norwegian stock 
market.  
 
Our results concur with most other foreign studies, as for instance Ritter’s (1991) 
findings of long-term underperformance from -27.4% to -29.1% and Barber & Lyon’s 
(1997) finding of -5.27% return. We have seen that the calculation method is decisive 
for the results, and that the choice of observation period is also playing a big role in the 
results observed.  
 
The effect of using CAR and BHAR to measure aftermarket performance demonstrates 
the calculation biases discussed in other studies. The CAR is on average lower than the 
BHAR for all three benchmarks25, indicating that CAR is a negatively biased predictor of 
BHAR. This result coincides with the results found by Conrad & Kaul (1993). 
Nevertheless, this conclusion does not explain the index-adjusted returns, where the 
average CAR trimmed mean is higher than the BHAR return. Despite the differences in 
calculation methods, both CAR and BHAR supports the conclusion of long-term 
underperformance.  
 
The fact that the IPOs in our dataset underperform relative to their benchmarks can 
prove that the lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970) exists in the Norwegian stock market.  
The rationale is that low quality firms yield lower long-term returns than high quality 
firms. In most cases, investors have an information disadvantage as compared to the 
firm owners. This supports the notion that investors could be unaware of the true 
quality of the firm, and that IPO underperformance is a sign of low quality for a firm. The 
                                                          
25For the peer and sector adjusted return, CAR yields a lower average return than buy-and-hold return. 
The peer adjusted return is -8.75% lower using CAR compared to BHAR, and for sector the CAR yields -
4.8% lower return. The differences in average return are based on the average of the statistically 
significant trimmed means found for Peer and Sector adjusted returns from the 10% trimmed dataset. In 
the case of sector matching, this is based on the 3% trimmed datasets.  
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underperformance of IPOs can be related to other factors than the quality of a firm. For 
instance, differences in risk (Schultz, 2003), over-optimism and fads (Ritter, 2001) or 
other factors can explain the negative aftermarket returns.  
 
4.3.5 Monthly development of abnormal returns 
 
Figure 4.6 
 
Figure 4.6 illustrates average monthly abnormal returns compared to all benchmarks, 
based on the 10% trimmed dataset. Underperformance is evident since all the abnormal 
returns are located below the pure IPO returns. The 10% trimmed datasets indicate that 
IPOs yield a three-year abnormal return between -10% to -30%, depending on the 
benchmark used and the calculation method.  
 
The graph indicates that underperformance begins in the first month and declines until 
the 34th month. Although the overall three-year trend shows a negative price 
development, there are signs of a recovery. In the 34th month the negative abnormal 
returns trend ends, and returns seem to rise or stabilize at the current level. This is 
evident across all abnormal return calculations. The recovery in the 34th month can be 
an indication that IPO underperformance is isolated to the three-year aftermarket 
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period. This result would be in line with studies by Ritter (1991) and Rao (1991), who 
reached the same conclusion. The fact that we have used a three-year aftermarket 
period does not permit us to examine the price development further. Hence, there is not 
enough evidence to conclude whether this recovery is a temporary market correction or 
a long-term price development. Nevertheless, there is an indication that IPO 
underperformance is isolated to a three-year aftermarket period.  
 
4.3.6  IPO listing cyclicality 
 
Figure 4.7 
 
Berk & DeMarzo (2007) assert that the number of IPO listings tends to follow market 
cycles. Listing cyclicality is explained by Ritter (1991), who argued that managers and 
issuers “time” equity listings to periods when the stock prices are rising. We have tried 
to illustrate this market anomaly in figure 4.7, which shows the price development of the 
OSEBX index and the OBX index for the period January 2000 to December 2009 together 
with the number of new listings each year. The figure illustrates that there is a 
correlation between the market price development and the number of new issues.  
  
The majority of the IPOs in our study were issued before 2008. In fact, 98 of the 99 IPOs 
in the full sample were listed before the financial crises in 2008. The “golden years” for 
new listings were 2005 (28 IPOs), 2006 (23 IPOs) and 2007 (21 IPOs). This coincides 
with a period where Oslo Børs rallied. This result corresponds with the market anomaly 
of IPO listing cyclicality discussed by Berk & DeMarzo (2007) which states that IPO 
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listings tend to follow a cyclical pattern. Schultz (2003) explained that most issuers will 
raise equity during good market conditions, which coincides with this result. 
 
Although we have found evidence of the cyclicality in a number of new issues, this is not 
an anomaly that an investor can exploit in order to earn extraordinary profits. This is 
therefore not a departure from market efficiency. In chapter 5, we will try to examine if 
there is any connection between the long-term IPO return and market cycles. 
 
4.4 Obstacles for exploiting the long-run underperformance anomaly 
Ibbotson (1975) claim that a market anomaly is only market inefficient if an investor is 
able to make profit from it after transaction costs are incurred. He argued that the 
aftermarket of IPOs is market efficient if long-run performance of IPOs is not 
significantly different from zero. Although he found evidence of positive performance 
the first year and negative performance the next three-years for IPOs, he concluded that 
his results indicate few, if any, departures form market efficiency. The reason for not 
discarding market efficiency, despite finding significant results, is that there were 
substantial transaction costs associated with stock trading at the time Ibbotson studied 
IPOs. He claimed that it was it was impossible to exploit the aftermarket trends in IPOs, 
due to high transaction costs, included bid-ask spreads from 6%-7%.  
 
Today, the transaction costs for trading in stocks are remarkably lower than they were 
in the 1970s. After the introduction of stock trading through the internet, the bid-ask 
spreads have decreased and are now down to 0.01% for the most liquid stocks, and 1%-
2% for more illiquid stocks. Along with brokerage commission, which currently typically 
stands at about 0.05%, it is evident that the transaction costs are, in total, much lower 
than for forty years ago.  
 
The long-run degree of underperformance is, on the other hand, larger; -10% to -30% as 
we have found. At first sight, it seems easy to make a profit on the long-term 
underpricing anomaly, but a stock has to be shorted in order to exploit this anomaly. 
Shorting a stock means that you sell a stock you do not own, and thereafter buy it back 
for delivery at a later point in time. This way, an investor will make a profit if the stock 
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price falls because he is able to buy back the stock at a lower price than he borrowed it 
for.  
 
Taking short positions in stocks has been increasingly restricted since the financial crisis 
began in 2008. There have been periods in later years where short selling has been 
forbidden and naked shorting26 is now completely forbidden in Norway. Even though 
short selling is presently legal in Norway, most stock brokers only allow for a limited 
standardized list27 of companies to be shorted. The stocks that are normally allowed to 
be shorted are typically the most liquid stocks at Oslo Børs. IPOs are usually not among 
these stocks during their first years of listing. If an investor wants to short a stock 
outside the standardized list, this has to be done through customized trades.  
 
In order to be able to short most IPOs, the stock broker usually has to borrow the stock 
you wish to short from one of the current stockholders. This arrangement is possible to 
accomplish, but it will most likely imply very high transaction costs and may not be easy 
to complete. First of all, the current stockholders may not be willing to lend you the 
stocks, because they will then lose their voting rights and dividend payments during the 
period you borrow the stocks. If you are allowed to borrow the stocks you want, most 
shorting agreements contain a clause that the owner has a call provision in the 
borrowing period. The borrower can, in other words, call back the stock at any point in 
time, and this makes this strategy highly uncertain. It is possible to borrow a stock 
without a call provision, but it comes at a cost.  
 
This leads us to the second problem with the shorting of IPOs – the transaction costs will 
most likely exceed the possible gains. There are several reasons for why the costs 
connected with a short position in an IPO may be high. One cost is the interest you have 
to pay to the stock lender. Pareto Securities operates with a yearly interest on securities 
loans from 4.5% per year28. The interest you will have to pay will most likely exceed 
regular securities loans. This is because IPOs are highly volatile, and are therefore a 
                                                          
26 A form of short selling; where the stock is not borrowed in advance or ensured that the stock can be 
borrowed. 
27 Nordnet stock broker allow 13 stocks to be shorted, while Pareto Securities allow 31 stocks to be 
shorted (as of May 2012). 
28 Information found on Pareto Securities’ website (Pareto Securities, 2012). 
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risky investment.  In addition, you will most likely have to pay a premium on the interest 
rate to convince a stockholder to lend you the stocks.  
 
In a short sale, there is also a margin requirement because you potentially have an 
unlimited loss. The margin requirement is usually the inverse of the leverage degree, 
with a minimum requirement. The minimum requirement is 20% in Pareto Securities29, 
but we have reason to believe that this will be higher for most IPOs as we have found 
such a high standard deviation in their aftermarket performance. Since the margin 
requirement will be inaccessible for the investor, the funds tied up cannot be invested. 
In contrast, since it is common with high leverage in short positions, there is an 
advantage of tying up less funds compared to a regular long position in stocks. 
 
The brokerage commission is usually the same for short sales as regular purchases. We 
will later show that most companies go public when they are young, and that they have a 
relatively low market capitalization compared to the most traded firms at Oslo Børs. 
This means that most Norwegian IPOs are less liquid than the companies at OBX, and the 
bid-ask spread is therefore usually higher for IPOs than the most liquid stocks. 
 
4.5 Conclusion long-term performance 
In sum, the costs associated with shorting an IPO the first three years are: brokerage 
commission, bid-ask spread, margin requirement, a premium to avoid call provision and 
yearly interests for borrowing the stock. Despite lower bid-ask spreads and lower 
brokerage commission in later years, the costs that will occur by this strategy will most 
likely exceed the possible gains from shorting an IPO. In addition to the high costs 
associated with shorting an IPO, we have described that it may be difficult to borrow IPO 
stocks and to hold them for three consecutive years. Professor Thore Johnsen and Tore 
Leite at NHH both concur that it is impossible to exploit this anomaly in order to make a 
profit30. 
 
Irrespective of the mentioned issues with shorting IPOs, it is still a risky strategy to do 
so. This is because we have found that Norwegian IPOs have an extremely volatile 
                                                          
29 Information found on Pareto Securities’ website (Pareto Securities, 2012). 
30
 Based on conversations with the professors at NHH in May 2012. 
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aftermarket performance, measured in standard deviation. Since few companies are 
listed on Oslo Børs each year, “the law of large numbers” will most likely not occur after 
many years by this strategy. This law states that the average result obtained from a 
series of trials should be closer to the expected value as more trials are performed (Hsu 
& Robbins, 1947). The final result of following a strategy by shorting Norwegian IPOs is 
therefore highly uncertain.  
 
The high costs, the difficulties with borrowing stocks and the uncertain outcome of 
shorting IPOs for three years subsequent listing, makes the long-term IPO performance 
anomaly very difficult to exploit. According to Ibbotson’s definition of market efficiency, 
this anomaly is therefore not market inefficient. 
 
  
59 
 
5  Cross-sectional regression 
 
5.1 Regression background 
The analysis of long-term performance concluded that IPOs yield an abnormally low 
return the first three years after going public. Now we want to examine which factors 
can explain this abnormal return. Previous studies have examined the performance of 
IPOs and found that some variables can explain the phenomenon (Ritter, 1991). We have 
therefore chosen to study how these variables affect the abnormal returns. In addition, 
we have relied on economic theory and examined if these theories fit our data sample. 
The previous studies mainly stem from the American stock market. Since we will 
examine the Norwegian market, we have chosen to include Brent Crude oil as one of the 
explanatory variables in addition. Each variable will be explained in depth.  
 
5.2 Methodology 
In order to examine how these variables affect the return on IPO companies, we have 
chosen to run cross-sectional regressions. Regression analysis is used to predict the 
value of one variable, the abnormal IPO return in our case, on the basis of other 
variables. This type of analysis generate a mathematical equation with the variable to be 
forecasted on one side of the equation (the dependent variable) and other variables you 
think can explain the dependent variable (independent variables) on the other side of 
the equation (Keller, 2005). The generated equation is a so-called ordinary least squares 
(OLS) approximation. OLS approximations estimate a linear approximation that fits the 
data sample in such a way that the sum of squared vertical distances between the 
observations and the predicted linear approximation is minimized (Bretscher, 1995). 
The equation is in the following format: 
 
                
 
Yi = Dependent variable, xi = Independent variables, β0 = y-intercept, βj = Slope 
coefficients of the line and the εi’s are independent statistical noise terms with a zero 
mean value and standard deviation σ. The subscription scheme is done so that Xij is the 
value of the jth independent variable Xj for data point i.  
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We will not explain the statistical methods used in depth, as we expect readers of this 
thesis to be general economists. For those who would like to investigate further, books 
on these topics are enclosed in the bibliography (see, for example, Keller (2005) and 
Woolridge (2009)).  
 
In order to develop as strong a model as possible, we have applied the Gauss-Markov 
theorem for OLS models. In order to develop the best model as possible, the following 
assumptions must hold true for the OLS regression (Woolridge, 2009):  
 
1. Linearity 
– The model must be linear in its parameters. 
2. Sample Variation 
– The independent variables cannot all have the same value. 
3. Random Sampling 
– The n observations in the sample must be random. 
4. Zero Conditional Mean 
– The mean of the error terms of the independent variable xi is zero.  
5. No Multicollinearity 
– Multicollinearity refers to a situation in which two or more 
explanatory variables in a multiple regression model are highly 
linearly related.  
6. No Heteroskedasticity 
– The variance of the error terms is constant. This means that the 
variance of the error term does not depend on the value of xi. If this 
is the case, the error terms are called homoscedastic. 
7. No Serial Correlation/auto correlation 
– The error terms are independently distributed so that their 
covariance is 0. Serial correlation occurs in time-series studies 
when the errors associated with a given time period carry over into 
future time periods. 
8. Normally Distributed Errors 
– The error terms are normally distributed.  
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If the first five assumptions are satisfied, the OLS estimator is unbiased, meaning that 
the mean value of the estimator equals the true value of the underlying quantity it is 
estimating. If there is no additional heteroskedasticity, the OLS model has the minimum 
variance of all unbiased estimators. The theorem states that if all the assumptions for 
the OLS model hold, the OLS model is the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). This 
means that out of all possible linear unbiased estimators, OLS gives the most precise 
estimates of the regression. If the assumptions of no heteroskedasticity, no serial 
correlation and no multicollinearity are not satisfied, then the OLS is still unbiased, but 
is no longer BLUE. Because we have cross-sectional data, and not time-series data, we do 
not have to concern ourselves with serial correlation in this thesis.  
 
We have used the same dataset in our calculations as the one used to examine abnormal 
long-term performance of IPOs. Thus, we started with 99 companies, but ended up with 
94 companies in our final dataset due to problems with finding data for all our 
companies. The five excluded companies were excluded mainly because of missing data 
for the market-to-book values from Thomson Reuters Datastream (although we 
managed to calculate some of the missing data manually based on public information). 
We have chosen to only analyze the BHAR and not the CAR, because we expect that the 
two analyses will produce approximately the same results, and it would require too 
much space in this thesis to do both. Initially, we had three BHAR dependent variables to 
examine; the abnormal IPO return matched against market indexes, peer companies and 
GSCI sectors. We have included seven sectors as explanatory independent variables in 
our regression - therefore it would be meaningless to run a regression with sector as 
dependent variable while sectors are included as independent variables. We have thus 
chosen to only analyze what can explain BHAR with index and peer matching.  
 
5.3 Explanation of the chosen independent variables 
 
5.3.1 Age 
Ritter (1991) claims that there is a strong relationship between how old a company is 
before going public and its aftermarket performance. We have therefore chosen to 
include the variable “ageyears” in our cross-sectional regressions. This variable 
measures how old a company is before going public, and is computed by subtracting the 
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year when the company was founded from the year when the company went public. We 
found the date each company was founded by using Brønnøysundregistrene (Brreg.no, 
2012) and the companies’ respective webpages. Age can be an approximation of risk 
because young startup firms usually have an uncertain destiny. Therefore investors 
usually require an initially higher return when such firms are going public compared to 
older firms with more certain prospects. Because age has an effect on the issue price of 
an IPO, we expect the independent variable to have an effect on the long run return as 
well as the initial return. 
 
Ritter (1991) and Speiss & Affleck-Graves (1995) have found that younger firms 
underperform relative to older firms in the long run after an equity issue. Ritter (1991) 
explains this with the rationale that younger firms often have a higher market-to-book 
ratio than older firms because of the over-optimism and fads effect. This argument 
stems from Fama & French (1993), who found a relationship between return and book 
equity (B) over market capitalization (M). They found abnormally high returns for B/M 
ratio (value stocks) and abnormally low returns for low B/M ratio (growth stocks). The 
inverse ratio is equivalent to Ritter’s argument about low return on high M/B ratio.  
 
Young companies usually have a high risk premium at the IPO date and it is reasonable 
to assume that this risk premium will decrease as the company ages. As a young 
company grows older and its future prospects become more certain, investors are 
willing to pay more for their stocks (assuming that they believe the company will 
succeed). This is because the beta will be lower which ultimately results in a lower 
WACC and a higher valuation of the company (Ibbotson, 1975). If this happens, young 
companies will perform better than old companies in the long run (three-years). For 
instance, a pharmaceutical company with an uncertain idea is likely to be traded at a 
discount in the startup phase when they choose to go public to finance their idea. 
Investors are surely not willing to pay a stock price that implicitly infers that the idea is 
100% likely to succeed, they will price the stock at a discount based on the uncertainty 
(and other factors). If the overall chance for a startup company to succeed increases as 
they mature, their stock price will increase over time. Thus, young companies will 
probably perform better than older companies.  
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Another theory about the performance of companies in relation to their firm age is the 
“value effect theory” (Basu, 1977). Proponents of this theory claims that low 
price/earnings (P/E) securities will tend to outperform high P/E stocks. Young 
companies tend to have a high P/E ratio, and this theory thus supports Fama & French 
and Ritter’s arguments about underperformance of younger companies. 
 
Young companies usually have lower market capitalization as compared to more 
established companies. Few young companies have truly reached their full market 
potential, and it is reasonable to say that most companies increase in value as they age 
(figure 3.1). Blume & Stambaugh (1983) have examined the effect on firm size and 
return. They concluded that risk-adjusted returns on small firms exceed the return on 
large firms. This reasoning implies that young companies are expected to have lower 
market capitalization than older companies; the stock return is thus expected to be 
lower for older companies than younger companies.   
 
Theories about company age at the time of listing infer that this independent variable 
should have an effect on aftermarket performance, but the theories are inconsistent in 
terms of which direction they affect the abnormal IPO long-run return. Thus, it is 
difficult to determine the sign character31 that the independent variable “ageyears” will 
have in our regression. The average company age at the IPO date in our data sample is 
14.6 years, but from figure 5.1, we can see that most of the companies went public 
before that. Based on a median of 6 years, we can conclude that the companies in our 
data sample are relatively young.  
 
                                                          
31 Positive or negative coefficient 
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Figure 5.1 
 
There are a lot of theories attached to firm age, and we are therefore expecting high 
multicollinearity between the variables “mbook”, “age” and “mcap”. We will examine this 
in chapter 5.4. 
 
5.3.2 Brent  
Oil production accounts for a large part of the Norwegian GDP. Hence, the Norwegian 
economy and Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) are highly sensitive to fluctuations in the oil 
price (Brent Crude oil). Gjerde & Sættem (1997) found that the Norwegian stock market 
responds accurately to oil price changes. Since the Norwegian stock market is highly 
dependent on the oil price, we would like to examine if and how the oil price impacts the 
abnormal return on IPO companies. In order to study this phenomenon, we have found 
the prices32 for the Brent Crude oil and its return for the three-year period for each 
company in our data sample. We believe that the oil price increases when the market 
conditions are favorable. Since the price of Brent Crude oil follows market cycles, we 
expect the “brent” variable to have the same sign coefficient as the market condition 
                                                          
32 Prices are found on Thompson Reuters Datastream. 
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variable. Based on the discussion of the market condition variable in chapter 5.3.3, we 
expect both variables to have a negative sign coefficient.  
 
5.3.3 Market conditions  
The aftermarket performance of our sample firms varies considerably between years 
and market cycles. As explained in chapter 3, companies choose to go public when 
financing is needed, but they try to time the IPO to a so-called bull market (Maheu & 
McCurdy, 2000), when the market conditions are favorable. Companies try to seize 
“windows of opportunity”, as explained in chapter 3. The timing of the listing is 
therefore an important factor. As seen in figure 5.2, there are large fluctuations in the 
number of IPOs per year. On average, 10.6 companies went public each year in our 
sample period. Based on figure 5.2, we find no clear link between the number of IPOs 
per year and the three-year BHAR. Even though the BHAR varies substantially, there is 
only one year (2005) where the average BHAR is higher than the general market.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 
 
The number of listings per year does not necessarily give us a good picture of how the 
market conditions truly are because the market conditions can change dramatically 
within a year. For example, in 2008, we had a bull market in the spring, which turned 
into a severe recession in the fall. To better capture the market conditions, we have 
therefore chosen to measure the conditions based on months instead of years, as did 
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Helwege & Liang (2004). Although the market conditions may change drastically within 
a year, they are usually the same over several consecutive months. We have therefore 
chosen to measure how many IPOs there are within three months and have calculated a 
three months centered moving average for each month in the sample. We have 
measured market conditions in three categories; “hot”, “neutral” and “cold”, where hot 
periods are months with more than two IPOs, neutral periods are months with from one 
to two IPOs and cold periods are months with fewer than one IPO33. By using a centered 
moving average, we are avoiding to classify months as cold when they are followed by a 
hot month and will thus give a more accurate representation than a pure moving 
average. In our OLS cross-sectional regression, we have merged the hot and neutral 
groups together, which we then define as hot market conditions, because they are both 
probably issued during a favorable market cycle. We now have an independent dummy 
variable, where 1 is hot market conditions, and 0 is cold conditions. A dummy variable is 
an indicator variable that takes on the values 0 or 1, where the value of 1 represents that 
the observation is hot, and the value 0 represents that the observation is cold. 
 
As discussed in chapter 4.3.6, there is a relationship between increasing stock prices and 
the number of new issues. Despite that, our way of measuring market conditions is not 
taking into account the valuation of the stocks. The independent variable “marcond” is 
therefore not exactly measuring “windows of opportunities” (Ritter, 1991) or “pseudo 
market timing” (Schultz, 2002), but it should be a fairly well approximation. It is 
important to note that this variable is not examining whether companies are trying to 
exploit windows of opportunities or not - it is measuring if market conditions have an 
impact on abnormal IPO return.  
 
Ritter (1991) suggests that companies that went public in years with high IPO activity 
will suffer from greater underperformance than those listed in years with low IPO 
activity. Based on this result, we expect the sign character for the dummy variable 
“marcond” to be negative.  
 
                                                          
33
 This classification gives us 50 IPOs in hot periods, 23 in neutral periods and 21 in cold periods. 
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5.3.4 Market capitalization 
Market capitalization is included in our analysis as an independent variable in order to 
analyze the effect of market size on long-term performance. Market capitalization is 
defined as the number of outstanding stocks multiplied with the stock price at the end of 
the first month of trading. Because the stock price is more volatile in the first period of 
trading (Ritter, 1991), especially during the first few days, we have chosen to measure 
market capitalization for each company at the end of the first month of trading instead 
of the first day of trading. The market capitalization34 is measured by million Norwegian 
kroners, and the coefficient for the independent variable “mcap” will therefore show the 
change in abnormal IPO return for an increase in market capitalization of 1 million NOK. 
 
Spiess & Affleck-Graves (1995) found that underperformance is concentrated among the 
smallest companies. On the other hand, Reinganum (1982) found that companies in the 
lowest market capitalization decile exceed the average return for companies in the 
highest decile. Blume & Stambaugh (1983) also found that the average risk-adjusted 
returns on small firms exceed those of larger sized firms. Some of the best-known 
research on this topic is the study by Fama & French (1993), where they suggest an 
alternative to the CAPM-model called the “three factor model”. One of the explanatory 
variables for stock return is the “Small Minus Big” (SMB) variable, which indicates that 
small firms tend to outperform larger ones. Previous studies are, in other words, 
inconclusive about which sign character our independent variable “mcap” should have, 
and we therefore do not have any specific expectations about the sign character. 
 
5.3.5 Market-to-book ratio  
Fama & French (1993) found that book-to-market ratio (B/M) can explain much of the 
average returns. If the B/M ratio can explain average returns, it is fair to assume that 
there is a link between abnormal returns and market to book value as well.  We have 
therefore included “mbook” as an independent explanatory variable. Since we could only 
find market-to-book (M/B) values35, we chose not to invert the ratio36, as it would not 
provide any further explanatory power. Using the M/B ratio is also consistent with 
                                                          
34 Found on Thompson Reuters Datastream. 
35 From Thompson Reuters Datastream. 
36 Could have simply inverted the ratio by taking 1 divided by M/B. 
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Ritter’s (1991) study. We have used the M/B ratio at the end of the first month of trading 
based on the same rationale as described for the market capitalization variable.  
 
The results from Fama & French’s (1993) study show that companies with high B/M-
ratios perform better than companies with low B/M-ratios. With our interpretation of 
the inverted ratio, we should expect companies with low M/B-ratio to perform better 
than companies with high M/B-ratio. In other words; we expect the sign character for 
“mbook” to be negative.  
 
5.3.6 Sector  
The last set of independent variables we have included in our regression is GICS sectors. 
Ritter (1991) found that the long-run performance of IPOs in different industries varies 
widely, and we will therefore examine if this is true for our data sample. We have used 
the seven GICS sectors explained in chapter 4.2.3 and converted them to dummy 
variables. The seven sectors included are: Industry “Ind”, Health Care “Health”, Finance 
“Fin”, Consumer Staples “Costap”, Consumer Discretionary “Cos”, “IT” and Energy “Nrg”. 
In order to avoid a situation with perfect multicollinearity between the seven dummy 
variables (a situation with an exact linear relationship between the variables), we had to 
omit one sector and use this sector as the benchmark sector. Since approximately half of 
the total market capitalization on OSE is represented by companies within the energy 
sector37 and our sample is dominated by companies within the energy sector (table 4.1), 
we found energy to be a natural candidate as a benchmark sector. The coefficients in the 
regression for the remaining dummy variables represent how much the mean value of 
the relevant sector differs from the mean value of the energy sector.  
 
 
 
                                                          
37 Information found on Oslo Børs’ website (Oslo Børs, 2012).  
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Figure 5.3 
 
Ritter (1991) classified the sectors into 14 industry groups, and found that all but three 
industry groups underperformed in the market. Financial institutions had the best long-
run performance, while oil and gas firms substantially underperformed the market. Most 
of the oil and gas companies in Ritter’s study went public in 1981 to 1983 - this was a 
period with a large decline in the oil prices. In our sample period, the Brent Crude oil 
price rose by 457%, which indicates that we should expect the energy sector to have 
performed better than the other sectors. In other words, we expect the sign character 
for the sector dummy variables to be negative.  
 
5.4 Regression analysis 
In this section, we will run cross-sectional regressions to find out if the abnormal long-
run IPO return can be explained by the independent variables we have described in 
chapter 5.3. As we will analyze the BHAR for IPOs matched against both indexes and 
peers, we will present a more thorough analysis for the index matching than for peers in 
order to not repeat ourselves. To analyze the data, we have mainly used a statistical 
software program called Eviews, supplemented with another program named Minitab 
because of different features of the various packages. We will present a thorough 
analysis of the underlying assumptions of an OLS regression (discussed in chapter 5.2) 
for the first presented regression, but for the rest, we will only comment on the most 
interesting findings. Complete results for all our analyses are enclosed in appendix 9.3. 
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5.4.1 Regression diagnostics for BHAR index raw, included all independent variables 
The first analysis we did was a cross-sectional regression on the BHAR, matched against 
market indexes with the entire dataset (named “raw”), which included all the 
independent variables (see appendix 9.3.1). To find out if it is appropriate to apply an 
OLS regression, we have to investigate if the underlying assumptions hold.  
 
The first assumption is that the model has to be linear in the parameters. This means 
that the coefficients for the independent variables, like           in the equation 
described in chapter 5.2, are linear (   and not exponential (   , for example. This 
would violate the assumption, but this is not the case in our model.  
 
The second assumption about sample variation, that the independent variables cannot 
all have the same value, is not an issue here because the variables all have different 
values.  
 
The third assumption about random sampling, that the data can be used to estimate the 
independent variables and that the data have been chosen from a representative sample 
of the population, should not prove problematic either. We have used the data material 
available to us, and we have no reason to believe that the sample should be biased in any 
direction from a representative sample. The only objection to random sampling is that 
our sample period could be biased by market cycles. Our last observation is exempli 
gratia just before the recession in 2008, and we have no observations from that period 
or after. This could bias our analysis from future projections, but we have no reason to 
believe that the data from our sample period is non-random. Assumptions number one, 
two and three are fulfilled in all our regressions and will therefore not be mentioned 
again in this thesis. 
 
The fourth assumption about zero conditional mean states that the standard error of 
estimate (    should be a random variable with a mean of zero. The standard error of 
estimate is defined as: 
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SSE is the sum of squared errors which is:     ∑     ̂ 
  (Keller, 2005).  When SSE 
equals zero, all the points in the data sample fall on the regression line, and the model 
fits perfectly. We do not expect the    to be zero, but the    should not be too large. When 
the    is very large, it is an indication that the model has a poor fit, and should either be 
rejected or improved (Keller, 2005). Our regression output from the first regression 
gives us a    on 1.29 while the mean of dependent variable is -0.15. The    is in other 
words large compared to the sample mean for the dependent variable, and is an 
indication that the model is somewhat poor. Despite the fact that we have a relatively 
large standard error, we have no reason to believe that the mean should be anything 
else than zero, so we treat this assumption as satisfied.  
 
Assumption number five states that we should have no correlation between two 
independent variables. There will always be some correlation, so the question is rather 
how much correlation we can accept. As discussed in the previous chapter, we expect 
the variables to correlate to a certain extent. Whilst moderate multicollinearity is not a 
problem, severe multicollinearity can increase the variance of the regression coefficients 
and make them unstable and difficult to interpret. In the case of severe multicollinearity, 
the solution is to remove one of the highly correlated variables. Correlations of close to 1 
or -1 are considered highly correlated. We have made a correlation matrix to examine 
whether we have severe correlation (appendix 9.3.1), in order to determine whether we 
have to remove some of the independent variables. With correlation coefficients no 
higher than 0.30, we see no sign of severe multicollinearity.  
 
A more formal way of testing for multicollinearity, is to use the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF)38. The VIF ranks how correlated variables are, where values of 5 to 10 indicates 
high correlation. Values greater than 10 may indicate that multicollinearity is 
influencing the regression, and that unimportant variables should be removed. With the 
                                                          
38 Produced by Minitab 
72 
 
highest VIF of 1.4 (appendix 9.3.1), there is no sign of multicollinearity, and we are 
therefore keeping all the variables in the regression. 
 
As the most crucial assumptions for an OLS regression seem to be satisfied, we know 
that we can make an unbiased OLS regression, but it remains to be seen if we have a 
BLUE model.  
 
To examine the efficiency of the OLS model, 
the next step is to check for 
heteroskedasticity. To check for 
heteroskedasticity, the basic test is to 
examine the residuals versus the fitted 
values, and to determine if they form any 
kind of a pattern. A normal sign of 
heteroskedasticity is when the variance for 
the residuals is increasing with increasing 
values for the dependent and the independent variables. From the residual plot in figure 
5.4, we can see that there is a sign of increasing variance, but this is mainly because of 
three outliers in the top right corner.  
 
A more formal test to check for heteroskedasticity is the White test (White, 1980). The 
White test for this data sample gives a P-value of 0.0014 (appendix 9.3.1), which means 
that we have to reject the null hypothesis about no heteroskedasticity. This means that 
the OLS no longer gives the “best” estimator and that inference39 is not valid, but the 
estimates are still unbiased. There is actually no way to remove heteroskedasticity; we 
simply have to accept that it is present. Despite not being able to remove 
heteroskedasticity, Eviews has an attribute when estimating a regression; it can include 
a White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance-term, which takes 
the heteroskedasticity into consideration when calculating the regression output. This 
does not mean that heteroskedasticity is removed - the model does not provide further 
explanatory power, but it does provide a better model with respect to the coefficients. 
                                                          
39 That we can draw absolute conclusions from our dataset 
Figure 5.4: Residual plot versus fits 
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We will therefore include the White-term in our other regressions where 
heteroskedasticity is present.  
 
The seventh step is to check for serial/auto-correlation. Since we have cross-sectional 
data and not time-series data, we can ignore this step in all our regressions.  
 
The last step in the examination of the efficiency of the OLS regression is to check if the 
error terms are normally distributed. The first diagnostic is to look at the residual plots 
and see if they follow the normal distribution. For the errors to be normally distributed, 
the plots in figure 5.5 should follow the red straight line. We have at least three 
influential observations which make the line more elastic than it would have been 
without them, which leads to that the blue plots do not follow the red line very 
accurately. This is the first sign of non-normally distributed errors. Figure 5.6 shows a 
histogram of the residuals, and this is intended to be bell-shaped in order for the 
residuals to be normally distributed. The histogram does not appear to be perfectly bell-
shaped with its relatively fat tails, and this is therefore another sign that the assumption 
of normally distributed errors is violated.  
  
 
The assumption of normally distributed errors can be tested more formally with a 
Jarque-Bera test (Bera & Jarque, 1981). The test is a goodness-of-fit measure of 
normality, based on the sample kurtosis and skewness. With a P-value of 0.0000 
Figure 5.5: Normal probability plot Figure 5.6: Histogram of residuals 
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(appendix 9.3.1), we can, with confidence, reject the null hypothesis about normally 
distributed errors.  
 
In small samples, statistical inference is not valid when this assumption is not satisfied, 
but in large samples, if the deviation from a normal distribution is not too large, 
statistical inference may be valid (Kelley & Maxwell, 2003). The “Central Limit Theorem” 
states that the sum of independent variables, with the same probability distribution, will 
reach a  normal distribution if the sample is large enough (Rosenblatt, 1955). With our 
sample consisting of 94 observations, we have a relatively small sample size compared 
to some of the American studies40, but since the sample is well above 40 observations, it 
should be large enough to approximate a normal distribution, despite the existence of 
few outliers (as discussed in chapter 4.2.5). Since we cannot formally conclude that the 
error terms are normally distributed, we have to treat our results from this regression 
with some skepticism. Even if the error terms are not normally distributed, the OLS is 
still unbiased and can be used as an efficient estimator (Møen, 2009).  
 
Since it does not appear that the normal distribution fits perfectly, we have checked if 
another distribution could fit better. Student’s t-distribution (Gosset, 1908), can be a 
natural alternative to the normal distribution. This distribution is very similar to the 
normal distribution, it is symmetric and bell-shaped, but it has heavier tails. Because it 
has heavier tails, the distribution fits better to a dataset with observations that fall far 
from its mean.  
 
Figure 5.7 shows how our data fit the Student’s 
t-distribution. As for the normal distribution, 
the blue dots should be located close to the red 
straight line for a good fit. We still have a lot 
deviation from the straight line, so we cannot 
positively say that the model has a better fit 
than the normal distribution. In our data 
sample, we have some observations at some 
                                                          
40 Ritter 1991 had 1526 observations. 
Figure 5.7: Probability plot of Student’s t- 
distribution  
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distance from the mean, but mostly to the right of the mean. This implies that we have 
positive skewness and the distribution is not symmetric around the mean. Since we do 
not have symmetry in the tails, the Student’s t-distribution will not produce a 
significantly better model, so we will proceed with the normal distribution. The 
difference of fit between the Student’s t-distribution and the normal distribution is even 
smaller for most of our other regressions (see printouts in appendix 9.3), which further 
supports our choice of using the normal distribution. 
 
To summarize the assumptions of the first analyzed OLS regression, the first five 
assumptions are reasonably satisfied, and we therefore have an unbiased estimator. 
Unfortunately we have heteroskedasticity, and we cannot therefore formally say that the 
error terms are normally distributed, so the model is not BLUE. This means that the OLS 
makes unbiased estimates, but statistical inference is not valid and we have to be 
cautious when making any strongly held conclusions based on the results.  
 
The F-statistic shows that the model is about twice as good as no model, and it is 
statistically significant at a 5 % significance level. The adjusted R-squared value of 
0.1315 indicates that our model can explain approximately 13% of the abnormal long-
run return for Norwegian IPOs in our sample period. As 13% is not a high value, this 
implies that our model is not providing much explanatory power on abnormal IPO 
return.  
 
The estimated regression from abnormal IPO returns matched against indexes, with all 
observations included, are as follows (the other regression outputs are presented in 
table 5.8): 
 
                                                             
                                               
                                       
 
Since the criterion of a BLUE model is not met, inference is not valid. We can however 
investigate if the regression is giving us reasonable outputs (sign coefficients), as well as 
determining whether the results are statistically significant.  
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The first independent variable, “ageyears”, is significant at a 10 % significance level (see 
table 5.8), meaning that we can reject the null hypothesis about age having no influence 
on abnormal long-run IPO return. The coefficient is -0.015, meaning that our regression 
suggests that an increase in age by one year results in a decrease in three-year abnormal 
IPO return  by 1.5 percentage points. It is important to note that the change is not just a 
pure percentage change, but a change in percentage points. A change in IPO return from 
0.01 to 0.02 is a 100% change, but only one percentage point change.  
 
The next variable, Brent Crude oil, is not statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot 
say that that it has influence on the abnormal IPO return. A coefficient of -0.36 means 
that an increase in the three-year Brent return on 100 percentage point gives a decrease 
in abnormal IPO return on 36 percentage points.  
 
The independent variables that are dummy variables, like the “cod” (Consumer 
Discretionary), are interpreted as if an IPO observation is in the Consumer Discretionary 
sector, the IPO will have a 55 percentage point lower long-term return relative to the 
base category (energy). It is statistically significant that this variable explains some of 
the abnormal IPO return. In order to not take up too much of the reader’s time, we will 
not interpret the rest variables, and the reader can instead study the regression output 
(table 5.8) for further investigation on this regression.  
 
5.4.2 Influential observations 
Minitab produces a list of influential observations for each regression. This can be 
leverage points (extreme in the x-direction), outliers (extreme in the y-direction relative 
to the predicted regression line) or both. We have investigated these points because 
they have potential to do great harm to the regression. If high leverage points are 
omitted, the regression coefficients could be very different compared to if they are 
included. We see that this is true in our case, because the coefficients are changing 
substantially from the raw data to the trimmed data. Influential observations are 
especially important to investigate with a small sample size, because they will have 
much more influence on the regression line than with a large sample size. Before one 
decide whether to remove influential observations or not, one should examine if the 
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observations could be data entry or measurement errors. If they are not, removing 
influential observations is a trade-off between improvement of the regression model 
and data-manipulation. Simon (2003) recommends that high leverage points should be 
removed in general and that this is most important in data samples with below 400 
observations, but that is a subjective decision. 
 
From the regression outputs for both index and peer matching (appendix 9.3.1-9.3.6), 
we can see that almost all of the influential observations are within the three highest and 
three lowest observations for the abnormal three-year IPO return. We have therefore 
chosen to trim the data on a 3 % and a 10 % level41. When we trim our data, with a 3 % 
trim, most of the influential observations will therefore be removed. EMGS and REC are 
high leverage observations42. REC is removed after data trimming while EMGS remains. 
We have examined the values for EMGS particularly thoroughly, and cannot find 
anything incorrect with the data. The reason why the EMGS is a high leverage point is 
probably because of the high market-to-book ratio of 19, which is by far the highest in 
our sample. We have nevertheless chosen to keep the observation in our data samples 
because we see nothing wrong with the value43.  
 
We have run OLS regressions measuring abnormal return based on peers in the same 
way as for the market indexes. These findings are presented below in table 5.8 together 
with our key findings from all the regressions:  
 
  
                                                          
41 The trimming is not exactly 3 % and 10 %, because we have removed three and ten observations out of 
94 observations on each side, but we have chosen to use the same notation and technique as before. 
3/94=3.2% and 10/94=10.6 % 
42
respectively observation 48 and 3 in the index raw regression, marked with an X in Minitab 
43 Such high values are not unusual, and the same company has had higher ratios later in the observation 
period.  
78 
 
Cross sectional regression summary included all independent variables      
        
           Index raw          Peers raw Index 3% trimmed Peers 3% trimmed Index 10% trimmed Peers 10% trimmed 
Assumptions 1-5 satisfied  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Homoskedastic  no yes no yes no yes 
Normally distributed errors  no no no no no yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0,1315 0,0224 0,4304 0,1241 0,7675 0,1082 
F-statistic  2,2667 1,1914 6,9070 2,1081 22,6017 1,7939 
Probability F-statistic  0,0182 0,3063 0,0000 0,0297 0,0000 0,0747 
 Expected coefficient       
C - 0,993951 -0,089216 -0,118749 -0,380094 -0,372465 -0,560942 
AGEYEARS ? -0.014457 (0.0872) -0.001508 (0.8502) -0.002889 (0.3418) 0.003461 (0.3710) 0.000708 (0.2941) 0.000712 (0.7679) 
BRENT - -0.365567 (0.3235) 0.717941 (0.0534) -0.010683 (0.9029) 0.215339 (0.2774) 0.038785 (0.4836) 0.085576 (0.4954) 
COD - -0.547177 (0.0582) -1.632277 (0.0294) -0.167006 (0.3588) -0.315593 (0.4119) -0.316317 (0.0000) 0.077711 (0.7510) 
COSTAP - 0.419725 (0.7062) 0.169998 (0.7995) -0.707662 (0.0000) 0.486104 (0.1324) -0.521019 (0.0000) 0.614491 (0.0043) 
FIN - 0.524344 (0.4457) -0.80019 (0.2065) 0.088981 (0.6418) -0.413246 (0.1746) 0.317169 (0.0006) -0.185852  (0.3187) 
IND - -0.316974 (0.2692) -1.086373 (0.0478) -0.103375 (0.6139) -0.659132 (0.0175) -0.294527 (0.0000) -0.011945 (0.9466) 
IT - 0.329478 (0.1671) -0.532698 (0.3105) 0.58152 (0.0000) 0.321131 (0.2253) 0.54238 (0.0000) 0.327577 (0.0592) 
MARCOND - -0.908879 (0.0594) 0.204049 (0.6267) -0.214513 (0.1529) 0.207536 (0.3073) -0.019259 (0.6877) 0.245009  (0.0753) 
MBOOK - -0.01719 (0.6547) -0.012806 (0.8644) -0.007838 (0.6087) -0.043631 (0.2261) 0.006146 (0.4686) -0.015075 (0.4796) 
MCAP ? -0.0000503 (0.0038) -0.000000888 (0.9809) 0.000000148 (0.9943) 0.000000608 (0.9726) -0.00000335 (0.7275) -0.00000307  (0.7665) 
HEALTH - -0.003406 (0.9888) -0.396588 (0.5410) 0.313408 (0.0319) 0.106276 (0.7330) 0.135035 (0.1772) 0.289447 (0.1277) 
Table 5.8 Statistically significant results are marked in red. 
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In general, the regressions with index matching are giving models that explain the 
abnormal long-run IPO return better than with peer-company matching. The adjusted R-
squared for peers, ranging from 2% to 12%, indicates that the peer models are 
explaining very little of the abnormal IPO returns. F-statistics for peers ranging from 1.2 
to 2.1 validate this finding. The P-value for “Peers raw” is not even significant, which 
means that the model is not better than any model. The regressions with index matching 
produce much higher adjusted R-squared and F-statistics and are therefore explaining 
the IPO return better. Despite higher explanatory power in the index regressions, they 
are not BLUE and we cannot make inferences from the output. The only model we have 
which is BLUE is the 10% trimmed regression with peers, but this model has a low 
adjusted R-squared and F-statistic. We can therefore not rely on this model in order to 
explain the abnormal IPO return either. The rest of the models are not BLUE, and we 
cannot therefore make statistical inferences from these models either. A consequence of 
our models not being BLUE is that the sign coefficients on the independent variables are 
not the same for all our regressions - they change from plus to minus from one 
regression to another for every independent variable except one. We can therefore not 
see a clear pattern. The same problem is present for the independent variables which 
shift from being significant to insignificant without any clear pattern.  
 
5.5 Best subset regression 
We started with a comprehensive regression model which included all conceivable 
independent variables that could have an influence on IPOs. Clearly, we have not found 
any good model for explaining abnormal IPO return - we have simply tested variables 
we believed would have an influence. Many of the tested independent variables do not 
have much influence on the abnormal IPO return (because they are insignificant), and 
we therefore need to find a model that can explain our dependent variable in a better 
way. A common way of finding a better model is to test less comprehensive sub-models 
and see if they adequately explain the dependent variable. The simplest of the adequate 
models is then chosen to be the “best” model (Hill & Lewiciki, 2007). 
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A useful way of finding the best sub-model is to use “stepwise regression” or “best 
subset regression”44. These tools, provided by Minitab, use an automated technique to 
identify the most significant variables and remove the least significant variables in order 
to reach the regression which produces the highest adjusted R-squared. These tools may 
also generate models with smaller variance than models with all conceivable variables, 
and are often easier to understand because they are less complex. The drawback to this 
technique is that there is often not a unique best subset. If there are two important 
independent variables that is highly correlated, one of the variables may end up with 
being removed from the best subset. Stepwise regression is an automated process, and 
will therefore not account for any special knowledge the analyst may have about the 
data. Because of these potential pitfalls, the best subset regressions may not actually be 
the best practical model. Despite this, we have reason to believe that we will find a 
model that explains the abnormal long-run IPO returns with a best subset regression. 
We have found best subset regressions for all our datasets, and presented a summary 
with our key findings in table 5.9 below: 
                                                          
44 Both techniques end up with the same final set of independent variables, so we will therefore use both 
terms about the same result. 
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Best subset regressions       
        
    Index raw Peers raw Index 3% trimmed Peers 3% trimmed Index 10% trimmed Peers 10% trimmed 
Assumptions 1-5 satisfied  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Homoskedastic  yes no no yes no yes 
Normally distributed errors  no no no no no yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0,1607 0,0764 0,4573 0,1471 0,7786 0,1659 
F-statistic  3,9677 2,9219 13,2175 2,8534 37,6837 3,9046 
Probability F-statistic  0,0015 0,0254 0,0000 0,0078 0,0000 0,0036 
 Expected coefficient       
C - 1,126666 -0,143612 -0,203979 0,326093 -0,374845 -0,552602 
AGEYEARS ? -0.012675 (0.0115)  -0.002947 (0.2829)    
BRENT - -0.362507 (0.3363) 0.654744 (0.2287)  0.234705 (0.2199) 0.039662 (0.4519)  
COD - -0.710416 (0.0121) -1.45694 (0.0928)  -0.368695 (0.3188) -0.316481 (0.0000)  
COSTAP -   -0.647896 (0.0000) 0.548953 (0.0620) -0.487442 (0.0000) 0.622107 (0.0009) 
FIN -  -0.594639(0.0052) 0.150075 (0.4398) -0.422458 (0.1481) 0.309519 (0.0003) -0.182255 (0.2807) 
IND - -0.5301 (0.0316) -0.8959 (0.1122)  -0.643304 (0.0123) -0.278742 (0.0000)  
IT -   0.627816 (0.0000) 0.289435 (0.2389) 0.556422 (0.0000) 0.319979 (0.0371) 
MARCOND - -0.918807 (0.0664)  -0.201324 (0.1708) 0.203238 (0.2389)  0.232693 (0.0740) 
MBOOK -    -0.041145 (0.2219)   
MCAP ? -0.0000562(0.0025)      
HEALTH -   0.338883 (0.0205)  0.161643 (0.0582) 0.205717 (0.1879) 
Table 5.9 Statistically significant results are marked in red. 
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From table 5.9, we can state that we now generally have improved models that explain 
the dependent variable better than the models with all independent variables included. 
The problem with almost all of them not being BLUE is still present, but the adjusted R-
squared and F-statistics have increased across all models.  
 
The 10 % trimmed regression with index matching stands out. This is by far the model 
which explains the abnormal long-run IPO returns best, with respect to the adjusted R-
squared and the F-statistic and it is also the model with the most significant independent 
variables. As this is the best model for explaining the abnormal long-run IPO return, we 
will rely mostly on the results from this model, but we still have to be cautious before 
drawing any absolute conclusions because of the non-BLUE regression. 
 
What is interesting to note about this regression is that all the significant variables are 
sectors. There are three sectors which performed better than the Energy sector: the 
Finance sector, the Health Care and Equipment sector, and the IT sector. There are also 
three sectors that performed worse: the Consumer Discretionary sector, the Consumer 
Staples sector, and the Industry sector. We cannot explain why these sectors are 
performing better or worse than the energy sector, but that the finance sector is 
performing better than the energy sector is at least in line with the findings in Ritter 
(1991). All these results are significant at a 1% significance level (except Health which is 
significant at a 10 % level), which means that these independent variables can partly 
explain the abnormal long-run IPO return. When studying the sector results, we have to 
keep in mind that the energy sector performed especially well during our sample period. 
A possible explanation can be the huge increase in the Brent Crude oil price and the 
Norwegian stock market dependency on the oil price. Since the “brent” variable is 
included in this regression, the oil price has some explanatory power in regards to IPO 
returns, but the variable is not significant.  
 
For the other independent variables, we cannot draw any absolute conclusions about 
the variables’ effect on long-run IPO return. Since our data sample contains many 
relatively young companies, we may not have enough observations of old companies to 
make statistical inference from our data sample about the age variable. We can therefore 
not conclude if Ritter’s findings (1991), that young companies underperform relative to 
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older companies, are correct or not. We had a suspicion that companies which went 
public in periods with low IPO activity would perform better than those in high activity 
periods. From our regression results, we cannot confirm, nor can we discard, this 
hypothesis. Our suspicions that the market-to-book ratio and the firm size could explain 
the abnormal long-run IPO return is not statistically supported.  
 
In general, we have few observations in our regressions and each independent variable 
can therefore lack observations across the whole specter to produce significant results. 
The companies in our data sample are for instance dominated by companies with 
relatively low market capitalization and we have few large capitalized companies. The 
median market capitalization is approximately 700 million NOK and we only have two 
companies with market capitalization over 10 000 million NOK. With few observations 
in some parts of the specter for a variable, just a few (or one) observation can make an 
independent variable insignificant. This problem is perhaps the explanation for why the 
sign coefficients and the significant level change for many of the independent variables 
when we trim the data. This may be the reason why we cannot draw more absolute 
conclusions on the influence of the independent variables and how they affect the long-
run IPO return. 
 
5.6 Summary cross-sectional regressions 
In order discover what could affect the abnormal long-run IPO return, we started with 
cross-sectional regressions that included all conceivable independent variables from 
theory and own suspicions. These models did not give us any clear answers to our 
hypothesis with respect to sign coefficients and significance level. As mentioned, our 
data sample is relatively small, and single observations can therefore heavily influence 
our analysis. We observed that there were some outliers in our regression and decided 
to trim our data according to advice from Simon (2003). Even then, we were not able to 
draw any clear conclusions from the regression outputs.  
 
The results from the regressions with all conceivable independent variables included 
did not show any clear pattern of how the independent variables affect the long-run 
performance of IPOs. The fact that the sign coefficients for the same variable changed 
between models and that the independent variables changed from being statistically 
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significant to insignificant across different models, made us realize that the set of 
variables was not a good fit for explaining IPO underperformance. To find which 
variables were redundant, we ran best subset regressions.      
 
From the best subset regressions, we found that the independent variables of age, 
market conditions, market-to-book and market capitalization were redundant in most of 
the regressions. This proves that the variables we have chosen to include based on 
empirical studies do not explain Norwegian IPO underperformance. The independent 
variables which were included still changed sign coefficient and changed from being 
statistically significant to statistically insignificant across the different models. Due to 
these problems and the fact that many models provide low explanatory power, we have 
used the results from the model with the highest adjusted R-squared and most 
significant independent variables as the basis for the cross-sectional regression, namely 
the 10% trimmed index adjusted model. This model explains 78% of the long-run IPO 
underperformance, but it is still not BLUE, which should be taken into consideration 
when reading the results.  
 
The 10% index adjusted model included all the sector variables and the Brent oil 
variable, but only the five sector variables were statistically significant. This model 
shows that IPOs issued in Finance, Health Care and Equipment and IT sectors yield 
higher long-term return than the Energy sector, while IPOs issued in the Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples and the Industry sectors perform worse than Energy 
IPOs. 
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6  Analysis of the initial return 
As shown in table 3.2, underpricing is a well-known phenomenon. Since underpricing is 
a thoroughly discussed subject, both internationally and in Norway, we will not focus 
extensively on this in our thesis. However, we have run descriptive statistics summaries 
to determine whether underpricing is present in Norwegian IPOs. 
 
6.1 Methodology 
In order to measure underpricing, we have collected information about IPOs issued on 
Oslo Børs from 2000 to 2011. To be consistent with our long-term performance analysis, 
we have used the same observation period to measure short term performance. 
However, since we do not need a three-year observation period in the short-term 
analysis, we extended the period from 2008 to 2011. This was done in order to include 
more observations and to produce analysis that is as up-to-date as possible. 
 
Based on 192 IPOs, we cleaned our data according to the same criteria’s as for the long-
term analysis (chapter 4.1), where we removed spin offs, previously listed companies et 
cetera. Some of the offer prices were not publicly available through our accessible 
terminals45 - these IPOs were therefore not included. Due to difficulties with obtaining 
offer prices for some companies and after extensive filtering of the data, our final data 
sample consists of 100 IPOs.  
 
Based on the data sample, we have calculated return based on the percentage difference 
from the offer price to the close price on the initial day of trading. The formula is 
described below: 
 
     (
         
    
) 
 
     denotes the price of stock i at time t - the closing price on the first day of trading.      
denotes the offer price. Thus,        is the percentage change for stock i at the end of day 
one. Note that in the case where      is positive, a stock is underpriced. When a stock was 
                                                          
45 Thompson Reuters Datastream, Amadeus, Factset and Bloomberg terminals 
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not traded on the listing day, we have used the closing price obtained on the first day of 
trading in order to calculate the return.  
 
We have measured the initial return in excess of market indexes (abnormal return). 
Since we have chosen not to emphasize on the underpricing phenomenon in this thesis, 
we have chosen to only calculate abnormal returns against one benchmark. We have 
matched IPOs against market indexes based on market capitalization. We have used 
OBX, OSEBX and OSESX to adjust the initial returns for large cap, mid cap and small cap 
companies respectively. To find the abnormal return, we have calculated the relevant 
benchmark return46 for each IPO and then subtracted it from each respective IPO return. 
We thereafter found the average abnormal return for the whole sample. This was done 
by the following formulas: 
 
               
 
             (
 
 
)∑    
 
   
 
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics – short term analysis 
We will only present the most relevant results from the analysis in the text – the 
complete results are enclosed in appendix 9.4. 
 
6.2.1 Trimming of data 
Before we performed the descriptive statistics analysis, we wanted to check the 
robustness of our data. Our prime concern was the existence of outliers, which could 
skew our data. We therefore chose to trim our data, and trimmed 3% and 10%, as we 
did for the long-term data. To get an overview of the data and to see if we have a 
normally bell shaped distributions, we generated boxplots through Minitab:  
 
                                                          
46 With the same formula as for the initial IPO return 
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Figure 6.1 
 
The boxplots47 in figure 6.1 show the distributions for all our data samples. The diagram 
shows the distribution for raw data, 3% trimmed data and 10% trimmed data. 
 
The raw data has the distribution with most observations centered together, indicated 
by the grey boxes. The tails indicate a slightly longer positive tail, compared to the 
corresponding negative tail. In terms of extreme observations, we see that we have four 
positive outliers and three negative outliers. To neutralize the effect of outliers, we 
chose to trim our dataset by 3%. This means that we removed the three highest and 
lowest observations from our sample. Thus, the 3% trimmed data sample consists of 94 
observations. The result is that our 3% trimmed dataset is marginally positively skewed, 
shown by a longer positive tail. Despite trimming, the 3% data still had a few outliers. 
The outliers are mostly positive observations, so the distribution is positively skewed. 
We trimmed further, and trimmed the ten highest and lowest observations from the full 
sample. The 10% trimmed dataset seems to be normally distributed, with even tails. 
However, the dataset has one positive outlier, but since this is not an extreme 
                                                          
47
 For a detailed explanation of the makeup of the boxplot, see the descriptive statistics discussed under 
the long-term analysis in chapter 4.2.5. 
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observation we believe that it would not adversely affect the trimmed mean. The 10% 
trimmed dataset consists of 80 observations. 
 
The effects and plausibility of using trimmed datasets is discussed earlier in chapter 
4.2.5. The usage of a trimmed dataset, which is cleansed of extreme values, provides 
valuable information about the central tendencies of a dataset. Based on this, we will put 
more emphasis on the trimmed datasets, rather than the raw data.  
 
6.2.2 Descriptive statistics results 
Table 6.2 shows the output of the descriptive statistics for all three datasets. The mean 
abnormal initial return varied from 1% to 1.6% depending on the trimming. The results 
are all significant at a 5% significance level. We can therefore conclude that the 
underpricing anomaly is still present for Norwegian IPOs. 
 
The data is positively skewed for all three datasets, but the degree of skewness is not 
large compared to Høiseth (2004) and the skewness we found on the raw data for our 
long-term return. Positive skewness is consistent with the conclusion reached from the 
boxplot analysis and is a result of a longer positive tail. Despite positive skewness, the 
median is still positive.  This shows an initial return of approximately 0.5% for all three 
datasets. The effect of positively skewed data is that it tends to cause a measurement 
bias, indicating positive means. However, the existence of skewness is normal for most 
datasets, and since the skewness is not very high, we will not put too much emphasis on 
this. Our results are in line with Ibbotson’s study (1975), where the author found that 
the distribution of initial returns were highly skewed with a positive mean and a median 
near zero. 
 Raw data 3% trimmed 10% trimmed 
Mean 0.0155 0.0144 0.0103 
St.dev. 0.123 0.077 0.0472 
Skewness 0.313 0.747 0.486 
Median 0.0046 0.0046 0.0046 
N 100 94 80 
P-value 0.0244 0.0158 0.0105 
Table 6.2 - Descriptive statistics for short term return. All results are significant at a 95% confidence level. 
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Despite finding statistically significant mean values, we see that the standard deviation 
is relatively high. This indicates that we cannot expect each IPO to perform in line with 
the means or the medians we have found, but that the returns are highly volatile. As 
Schwert (2002) asserted, no investor has been able to completely exploit the 
underpricing anomaly. With information asymmetry and underwriter’s power of 
allocating stocks, it is not certain that most investors are able to exploit this anomaly.  
 
6.3 Obstacles for exploiting the underpricing anomaly 
Even though we can confirm that underpricing is present in Norway, the degree of 
underpricing is relatively low compared to most other countries48.  It is also interesting 
to note that our results seem to be considerably lower than comparable studies 
performed on the Norwegian stock market. This may be an indication that underpricing 
is not as prominent as it was before. It would be interesting to examine if the trend of 
underpricing has declined over time. However, since the focus in this study is on the 
long-term return, we will not discuss this further.  
 
A possible explanation for our finding of relatively low underpricing could be that most 
of the other studies performed on this area have measured pure return in a generally 
increasing stock market, while we have measured abnormal return. Another explanation 
can be that investors have been more aware of the underpricing phenomenon and thus 
try to exploit the market inefficiency.  
 
In U.S. IPOs especially, we have seen some very extreme initial returns. For instance, the 
listing of LinkedIn in 2011 had an initial return on 106.87% (Baldwin & Selyukh, 2011). 
This might be an example of Welch’ (1992) theory - that there is a sheep mentality 
among investors. Such events are contributing to the high standard deviation we have 
found in our data sample.  
 
We have shown that there are several theories for why underpricing is present for IPOs. 
Theories like “leaving money on the table” and other underwriters’ incentives will 
always be possible explanations. A newer phenomenon is that Exchange Traded Funds 
                                                          
48 See table 3.2. Average initial returns for 36 countries (Ritter, 1991). 
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(ETFs) have been introduced to the public and have become popular amongst many 
retail investors. ETFs, like XACT Derivat BULL/BEAR49, were introduced in 2008, and 
are compiled to mimic entire market indexes (OBX). In order for ETFs to meet their 
requirements, they need to be positioned in all the new companies that go public. This 
will put extra pressure on the new listings, which can boost their initial return. If these 
derivatives are becoming increasingly popular and the managers of these instruments 
are not able to buy into the IPOs during the subscription period, this will advocate that 
the underpricing will be more severe in the years to come. This argument is weakened 
because the owners of ETFs are institutional investors, who are more likely to be 
allocated stocks in the book-building process (Stoughton & Zechner, 1989). If all 
managers of ETFs are able to buy stocks at the offer price, this will lead to a lower 
degree of underpricing. The reason is that it is impossible to short stocks before they are 
listed on the exchange, and managers of ETFs who bet against an index (XACT Derivat 
BEAR) will thus be forced to short IPOs the first day of trading.  
 
Since initial IPO returns are not the main focus of this thesis, we have not examined the 
cyclicality of the initial return; if the initial returns tend to follow market cycles. We can 
therefore not prove if this market anomaly is present for Norwegian IPOs. 
 
No matter what the explanations are for the Norwegian underpricing, we can conclude 
that the underpricing anomaly is present in the Norwegian stock market. The abnormal 
initial return found is not higher than between 0.5% and 1.5%, so underpricing in 
Norway is therefore not severe. The extent of IPO underpricing is weakened by the high 
standard deviation found in this study. Since the average initial return is only marginally 
positive coupled with high standard deviation, it is highly uncertain that a sample IPO 
will generate initial positive return. This makes it difficult to exploit this anomaly. We 
must therefore be cautious of this fact, even though we have concluded that Norwegian 
IPOs are underpriced.  
 
Since the average initial return is low, transaction costs might exceed the possible gains 
from this anomaly. We have found that most of the companies that go public are 
relatively young and small capitalized companies. IPOs are therefore not likely among 
                                                          
49 Information found on Nordnet ETF website (Nordnet, 2012) 
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the most liquid stocks at the exchange in the initial period they are listed. This indicates 
that the bid-ask spread could be as high as 1%-2% for many companies the first trading 
day. The high bid-ask spread combined with brokerage commission, may result in 
higher transaction costs than the potential profit from the initial return for many IPOs.  
 
6.4 Conclusion short-term performance 
Despite finding evidence of IPO underpricing in Norway, the often relatively high 
transaction costs, accompanied with high standard deviation and the low average 
return, make it difficult for investors to exploit the underpricing anomaly. Since an 
investor has to be able to make a profit on an anomaly for a market to be inefficient, we 
cannot positively say that this anomaly is a departure from market efficiency.  
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7 Final summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate IPO anomalies and to find out whether 
Norwegian IPOs are traded in an efficient market or not. To determine this, we have 
studied the short- and long-term aftermarket performance of IPOs.  
  
7.1 Long-term performance 
We have found that Norwegian IPOs yield three-year abnormal returns between -10% 
and -30%, depending on benchmark and calculation method used. These results are 
based on the 10% trimmed datasets since it is less sensitive to outliers and produces a 
better estimate of the mean and the median than the entire dataset (Bloch, 1966). Based 
on our results, the negative trend of abnormal returns seems to be limited to 34 months 
post-listing. Since we limited the observation period to a three-year aftermarket 
horizon, we cannot prove that the negative trend ends after 34 months. However, Ritter 
(1991) and Rao (1991) found that the long-run underperformance of American IPOs is 
limited to three years, which is in line with our results. We have also found that the 
majority of IPOs are issued when share prices are increasing. We have thus proven that 
the market anomaly of IPO listing cyclicality is present in the Norwegian stock market. 
Ritter (1991) explains this phenomenon by companies using “windows of opportunity” 
to maximize the funds raised during a public offering (as explained in chapter 3.6.2).  
 
In order to examine if the long-run underperformance is a result of specific firm 
characteristics or simply bad luck, we ran cross-sectional regressions. We found that 
most of the explanatory variables that we thought could have an impact on IPOs were 
not significant. Despite finding significant variables, some variables change sign 
coefficient in different regression models, which reduces the statistical robustness of the 
results derived. Therefore one must be cautious of making any strongly-held statistical 
or economical conclusions about which factors that influence the abnormal IPO returns. 
Based on our best regression model, we found differences in IPO performance among 
certain industry sectors. Relative to the energy sector, three sectors perform 
significantly better while the remaining three sectors yield lower abnormal returns in 
excess of market indexes. 
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Most empirical studies explain long-term IPO underperformance by specific firm 
characteristics, such as younger firms tending to underperform (Ritter, 1991) and 
through firm-specific risk. For instance, Schultz (2003) argued that the majority of new 
listings are low risk firms that yield low long-term returns. The results from the cross-
sectional analysis reveal that few firm characteristics or external factors can explain the 
negative abnormal returns found. Although there are statistical weaknesses, we have 
found support for differences in long-term returns across different sectors. We have 
found that IPOs issued in Finance, Health Care and Equipment and IT sectors yield 
higher long-term return than the Energy sector, while IPOs issued in the Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples and the Industry sectors perform worse than Energy 
IPOs. 
 
We have discussed the difficulties investors face when trying to exploit the 
underperformance anomaly. We conclude that the transaction costs of holding a short 
position for three years will exceed the potential returns. In addition, we have showed 
that it can be difficult to borrow an IPO stock for three consecutive years. Consequently, 
investors cannot make a profit by exploiting the long-term underperformance. This 
anomaly is therefore not in conflict with market efficiency (Ibbotson, 1975).  
 
7.2 Short-term performance  
We have found evidence of underpricing for IPOs in Norway during our sample period 
from 2000 to 2011. The magnitude of the underpricing is not severe, with abnormal 
returns ranging from 0.5% to 1.5%. Despite positive skewness and high standard 
deviation, the results are statistically significant.  
 
Possible explanations for underpricing could relate to theories as “leaving money on the 
table” and other underwriter’s incentives, such as underwriters setting a lower price to 
sell out a listing. Since this thesis focuses more on the long-term performance, we have 
not studied reasons for the underpricing extensively. Regardless of the explanations, 
positive initial returns indicate that there is a market anomaly present in the Norwegian 
stock market.  
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The findings of this study support the well-documented IPO anomaly of underpricing. 
The results are lower than previous studies of underpricing done internationally and in 
Norway. For instance, the initial returns found in the U.S. are on average 18.3%50. In 
comparison, Emilsen et al. (1997) found average initial returns of 12.5% for Norwegian 
IPOs issued from 1989 to 1996. This indicates that the underpricing phenomenon is less 
pervasive in Norway than it is in the U.S. and that the magnitude of the Norwegian 
underpricing seems to have declined over time. We have not tested if the initial returns 
tend to follow market cycles and we can therefore not prove if this market anomaly is 
present for Norwegian IPOs. 
 
Since the abnormal initial returns are low, with a median of only 0.5%, it is possible that 
transaction costs might be greater than the initial returns. Since an investor has to be 
able to make a profit on a market anomaly for a market to be inefficient (Ibbotson, 
1975), we cannot positively say that this anomaly is a departure from market efficiency. 
  
7.3 Conclusion on market efficiency in the Norwegian IPO market 
To answer the research question, we have found evidence that the anomalies of short-
term underpricing and long-term underperformance exist for Norwegian IPOs. Since 
there are obstacles to exploit these anomalies (for instance high transaction costs), we 
find it highly unlikely that investors are able to make a profit on IPO underpricing and 
long-term underperformance. Therefore, we have found few, if any, departures from 
market efficiency for Norwegian IPOs.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
50 From 1960 to 2003 (Loughran, et al., 1994) 
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9 Appendix 
9.1 Appendix A: GICS sector description 
This appendix includes descriptions of the seven Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) used in this study: 
 
-Industry: The GICS Industrials Sector includes companies whose businesses are 
dominated by one of the following activities: The manufacture and distribution of capital 
goods, including aerospace & defense, construction, engineering & building products, 
electrical equipment and industrial machinery. The provision of commercial services 
and supplies, include printing, data processing, employment, environmental and office 
services. The provision of transportation services, include airlines, couriers, marine, 
road & rail and transportation infrastructure. 
 
-Health Care: The GICS Health Care Sector encompasses two main industry groups. The 
first includes companies who manufacture health care equipment and supplies or 
provide health care related services, including distributors of health care products, 
providers of basic health-care services, and owners and operators of health care 
facilities and organizations. The second regroups companies primarily involved in the 
research, development, production and marketing of pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology products. 
 
-Finance: The GICS Financial Sector contains companies involved in activities such as 
banking, consumer finance, investment banking and brokerage, asset management, 
insurance and investment, and real estate, including REITs. 
 
-Consumer Staples: The GICS Consumer Staples Sector comprises companies whose 
businesses are less sensitive to economic cycles. It includes manufacturers and 
distributors of food, beverages and tobacco and producers of nondurable household 
goods and personal products. It also includes food & drug retailing companies.  
 
-Consumer Discretionary: The GICS Consumer Discretionary Sector encompasses 
those industries that tend to be the most sensitive to economic cycles. Its manufacturing 
segment includes automotive, household durable goods, textiles & apparel and leisure 
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equipment. The services segment includes hotels, restaurants and other leisure facilities, 
media production and services and consumer retailing. 
 
-IT: The GICS Information Technology Sector covers the following general areas: firstly, 
Technology Software & Services, including companies that primarily develop software in 
various fields such as the Internet, applications, systems and/or databases management 
and companies that provide information technology consulting and services; secondly 
Technology Hardware & Equipment, including manufacturers and distributors of 
communications equipment, computers & peripherals, electronic equipment & related 
instruments, semiconductor equipment and products. 
 
-Energy: The GICS Energy Sector comprises companies whose businesses are 
dominated by either of the following activities: The construction or provision of oil rigs, 
drilling equipment and other Energy related service and equipment, including seismic 
data collection. Companies engaged in the exploration, production, marketing, refining 
and/or transportation of oil and gas products. 
 
Source: (Oslo Børs, 2012) 
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9.2 Appendix B: Long-term abnormal return analysis 
This appendix includes summaries of descriptive statistics for three-year abnormal 
return in excess of benchmark (index, peers and sector).  
 
 
9.2.1 Long-term abnormal return in excess of index 
Minitab printouts of descriptive statistics summaries for abnormal return, using Buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for full 
sample, 3%-trimmed and 10% trimmed datasets.  
 
8642-0-2
Median
Mean
0,20,10,0-0,1-0,2-0,3-0,4
1st Q uartile -0,57659
Median -0,32575
3rd Q uartile 0,10765
Maximum 9,23623
-0,40078 0,13594
-0,42467 -0,20578
1,18066 1,56436
A -Squared 9,86
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean -0,13242
StDev 1,34553
V ariance 1,81046
Skewness 4,2902
Kurtosis 26,3517
N 99
Minimum -2,81328
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Index BHAR
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1,00,50,0-0,5-1,0-1,5
Median
Mean
-0,15-0,20-0,25-0,30-0,35-0,40-0,45
1st Q uartile -0,57381
Median -0,32575
3rd Q uartile 0,08273
Maximum 1,11505
-0,38468 -0,15605
-0,42267 -0,20645
0,48517 0,64873
A -Squared 0,78
P-V alue 0,042
Mean -0,27036
StDev 0,55508
V ariance 0,30812
Skewness -0,083257
Kurtosis 0,599744
N 93
Minimum -1,78042
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Index BHAR 3%
 
 
0,60,30,0-0,3-0,6
Median
Mean
-0,20-0,25-0,30-0,35-0,40-0,45
1st Q uartile -0,55312
Median -0,32575
3rd Q uartile -0,01711
Maximum 0,57887
-0,34468 -0,18211
-0,41736 -0,21173
0,31380 0,43035
A -Squared 0,87
P-V alue 0,024
Mean -0,26340
StDev 0,36290
V ariance 0,13169
Skewness 0,478767
Kurtosis -0,579979
N 79
Minimum -0,84981
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Index BHAR 10%
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42-0-2-4
Median
Mean
0,0-0,1-0,2-0,3-0,4-0,5
1st Q uartile -0,60622
Median -0,12593
3rd Q uartile 0,33410
Maximum 5,01979
-0,45035 0,01575
-0,29941 0,03418
1,02531 1,35853
A -Squared 2,60
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean -0,21730
StDev 1,16849
V ariance 1,36538
Skewness 0,07312
Kurtosis 5,22117
N 99
Minimum -4,46503
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Index CAR
 
 
0,750,00-0,75-1,50-2,25
Median
Mean
0,0-0,1-0,2-0,3-0,4
1st Q uartile -0,59447
Median -0,12593
3rd Q uartile 0,32673
Maximum 1,35437
-0,38134 -0,05011
-0,29787 0,03017
0,70288 0,93985
A -Squared 1,34
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean -0,21573
StDev 0,80418
V ariance 0,64670
Skewness -0,695026
Kurtosis 0,264556
N 93
Minimum -2,23259
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Index CAR 3%
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0,80,40,0-0,4-0,8-1,2-1,6
Median
Mean
0,00-0,05-0,10-0,15-0,20-0,25-0,30
1st Q uartile -0,54608
Median -0,12593
3rd Q uartile 0,24322
Maximum 0,88381
-0,29385 -0,03776
-0,28961 0,02409
0,49433 0,67793
A -Squared 0,49
P-V alue 0,216
Mean -0,16581
StDev 0,57167
V ariance 0,32681
Skewness -0,570167
Kurtosis 0,324336
N 79
Minimum -1,69898
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Index CAR 10%
 
 
 
9.2.2 Long-term abnormal return in excess of peers 
Minitab printouts of descriptive statistics summaries for abnormal return, using Buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for full 
sample, 3%-trimmed and 10% trimmed datasets.  
 
 
9630-3
Median
Mean
0,10,0-0,1-0,2-0,3-0,4-0,5
1st Q uartile -0,71767
Median -0,30494
3rd Q uartile 0,33699
Maximum 9,59864
-0,47923 0,15908
-0,48253 -0,11532
1,40412 1,86044
A -Squared 7,10
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean -0,16007
StDev 1,60020
V ariance 2,56065
Skewness 2,0819
Kurtosis 15,3480
N 99
Minimum -5,14521
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Peers BHAR
 
109 
 
210-1-2-3
Median
Mean
0,0-0,1-0,2-0,3-0,4-0,5
1st Q uartile -0,68102
Median -0,30494
3rd Q uartile 0,31990
Maximum 2,13697
-0,39012 -0,05193
-0,48166 -0,12569
0,71763 0,95957
A -Squared 1,30
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean -0,22103
StDev 0,82105
V ariance 0,67412
Skewness -0,45207
Kurtosis 3,24442
N 93
Minimum -3,64346
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Peers BHAR 3%
 
 
0,80,40,0-0,4-0,8
Median
Mean
-0,1-0,2-0,3-0,4-0,5
1st Q uartile -0,58371
Median -0,30494
3rd Q uartile 0,21721
Maximum 0,78828
-0,32543 -0,10488
-0,47769 -0,14078
0,42572 0,58383
A -Squared 1,28
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean -0,21516
StDev 0,49232
V ariance 0,24238
Skewness 0,428693
Kurtosis -0,931294
N 79
Minimum -0,97772
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Peers BHAR 10%
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420-2-4
Median
Mean
0,0-0,1-0,2-0,3-0,4-0,5-0,6
1st Q uartile -0,91741
Median -0,31107
3rd Q uartile 0,43115
Maximum 4,64922
-0,58575 -0,03733
-0,54103 -0,05003
1,20639 1,59845
A -Squared 1,46
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean -0,31154
StDev 1,37486
V ariance 1,89023
Skewness 0,03689
Kurtosis 2,66631
N 99
Minimum -4,76776
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Peers CAR
 
 
210-1-2-3
Median
Mean
0,0-0,1-0,2-0,3-0,4-0,5-0,6
1st Q uartile -0,88992
Median -0,31107
3rd Q uartile 0,38731
Maximum 1,97451
-0,52357 -0,11350
-0,53224 -0,05931
0,87015 1,16351
A -Squared 0,40
P-V alue 0,347
Mean -0,31853
StDev 0,99555
V ariance 0,99112
Skewness -0,291482
Kurtosis 0,077569
N 93
Minimum -2,80007
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Peers CAR 3%
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0,60,0-0,6-1,2-1,8
Median
Mean
-0,1-0,2-0,3-0,4-0,5
1st Q uartile -0,75010
Median -0,31107
3rd Q uartile 0,31748
Maximum 0,89618
-0,44775 -0,13678
-0,51836 -0,07372
0,60026 0,82319
A -Squared 0,40
P-V alue 0,364
Mean -0,29226
StDev 0,69417
V ariance 0,48187
Skewness -0,275599
Kurtosis -0,526779
N 79
Minimum -1,99903
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Peers CAR 10%
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9.2.3 Long-term abnormal return in excess of sector 
Minitab printouts of descriptive statistics summaries for abnormal return, using Buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for full 
sample, 3%-trimmed and 10% trimmed datasets.  
 
86420-2
Median
Mean
0,30,20,10,0-0,1-0,2-0,3
1st Q uartile -0,54179
Median -0,14700
3rd Q uartile 0,18071
Maximum 8,90109
-0,20449 0,30039
-0,29831 -0,04384
1,11060 1,47153
A -Squared 10,47
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean 0,04795
StDev 1,26569
V ariance 1,60198
Skewness 4,6361
Kurtosis 27,4560
N 99
Minimum -1,56628
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Sector BHAR
 
 
1,20,80,40,0-0,4-0,8
Median
Mean
0,00-0,05-0,10-0,15-0,20-0,25-0,30
1st Q uartile -0,51903
Median -0,14700
3rd Q uartile 0,17172
Maximum 1,39710
-0,21466 0,00205
-0,29829 -0,04923
0,45985 0,61488
A -Squared 1,02
P-V alue 0,011
Mean -0,10630
StDev 0,52612
V ariance 0,27680
Skewness 0,797079
Kurtosis 0,495572
N 93
Minimum -1,04061
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Sector BHAR 3%
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0,60,30,0-0,3-0,6
Median
Mean
-0,05-0,10-0,15-0,20-0,25-0,30
1st Q uartile -0,44134
Median -0,14700
3rd Q uartile 0,10330
Maximum 0,63655
-0,22892 -0,06311
-0,29211 -0,05757
0,32006 0,43893
A -Squared 0,55
P-V alue 0,149
Mean -0,14601
StDev 0,37014
V ariance 0,13700
Skewness 0,325557
Kurtosis -0,686089
N 79
Minimum -0,75208
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Sector BHAR 10%
 
 
1,500,750,00-0,75-1,50-2,25
Median
Mean
0,10,0-0,1-0,2-0,3
1st Q uartile -0,42968
Median -0,02534
3rd Q uartile 0,36976
Maximum 1,67247
-0,30735 0,03804
-0,20688 0,12592
0,73294 0,98003
A -Squared 1,63
P-V alue < 0,005
Mean -0,13465
StDev 0,83856
V ariance 0,70318
Skewness -0,632193
Kurtosis 0,638467
N 93
Minimum -2,37004
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Sector 3% CAR
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0,50,0-0,5-1,0-1,5
Median
Mean
0,100,050,00-0,05-0,10-0,15-0,20
1st Q uartile -0,39522
Median -0,02534
3rd Q uartile 0,28030
Maximum 0,80360
-0,22007 0,02813
-0,19815 0,10612
0,47910 0,65704
A -Squared 0,84
P-V alue 0,029
Mean -0,09597
StDev 0,55406
V ariance 0,30698
Skewness -0,796295
Kurtosis 0,697972
N 79
Minimum -1,60892
A nderson-Darling Normality  Test
95% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
95% C onfidence Interv al for Median
95% C onfidence Interv al for StDev
95% Confidence Intervals
Summary for Sector 10% CAR
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9.3 Appendix C: Cross-sectional regression output 
All the outputs from the cross-sectional regressions are presented below together with 
tests of all the relevant OLS assumptions for a BLUE model.   
 
9.3.1 Regression matched against index with raw data: 
 
Regression Analysis: Index versus Mcap; mbook; ...  
The regression equation is: 
Index = 0.993 - 0.000050 Mcap - 0.0170 mbook - 0.0145 Ageyears - 0.909 marcond 
        - 0.364 Brent - 0.316 Ind - 0.006 Health + 0.527 Fin + 0.419 Costap 
        - 0.547 cod + 0.330 it 
 
93 cases used, 1 cases contain missing values 
 
Predictor         Coef     SE Coef      T      P    VIF 
Constant        0.9927      0.4221   2.35  0.021 
Mcap       -0.00005003  0.00002923  -1.71  0.091  1.183 
mbook         -0.01701     0.05920  -0.29  0.775  1.179 
Ageyears     -0.014457    0.006303  -2.29  0.024  1.220 
marcond        -0.9094      0.3309  -2.75  0.007  1.077 
Brent          -0.3638      0.2900  -1.25  0.213  1.112 
Ind            -0.3157      0.4281  -0.74  0.463  1.395 
Health         -0.0059      0.5115  -0.01  0.991  1.412 
Fin             0.5266      0.4975   1.06  0.293  1.217 
Costap          0.4195      0.5281   0.79  0.429  1.371 
cod            -0.5465      0.5828  -0.94  0.351  1.153 
it              0.3300      0.4132   0.80  0.427  1.368 
 
S = 1.28575   R-Sq = 23.5%   R-Sq(adj) = 13.1% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Source          DF       SS     MS     F      P 
Regression      11   41.152  3.741  2.26  0.018 
Residual Error  81  133.905  1.653 
Total           92  175.057 
 
Source    DF  Seq SS 
Mcap       1   3.960 
mbook      1   0.005 
Ageyears   1  11.637 
marcond    1  13.734 
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Brent      1   3.151 
Ind        1   2.784 
Health     1   0.155 
Fin        1   1.432 
Costap     1   0.932 
cod        1   2.308 
it         1   1.054 
 
Unusual Observations 
 
Obs   Mcap   Index     Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  3  46197  -1.796  -2.333   1.229     0.537      1.42 X 
 48  10687  -0.326  -0.919   1.016     0.593      0.75 X 
 92   1230   4.381   1.016   0.439     3.364      2.78R 
 93    573   4.963   0.126   0.487     4.837      4.06R 
 94    538   9.236   1.492   0.561     7.744      6.69R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
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Probability plot of the normal- and Student’s t-distribution: 
  
Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
Multi-correlation matrix: 
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Skewness   3.703377
Kurtosis   22.48393
Jarque-Bera  1683.624
Probability  0.000000
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White test for heteroskedasticity:  
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 43.85860    Prob. F(55,37) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 91.59506    Prob. Chi-Square(55) 0.0014 
Scaled explained SS 746.3800    Prob. Chi-Square(55) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/06/12   Time: 17:45   
Sample: 1 94    
Included observations: 93   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 12.97152 1.641633 7.901599 0.0000 
AGEYEARS -0.697379 0.090629 -7.694889 0.0000 
AGEYEARS^2 0.001040 0.000328 3.168325 0.0031 
AGEYEARS*BRENT -0.043485 0.032736 -1.328350 0.1922 
AGEYEARS*COD 0.195812 3.313384 0.059097 0.9532 
AGEYEARS*COSSNX -0.171336 0.044269 -3.870327 0.0004 
AGEYEARS*FIN -0.136665 0.046320 -2.950438 0.0055 
AGEYEARS*IND -0.077599 0.045698 -1.698070 0.0979 
AGEYEARS*IT 0.004791 0.047672 0.100502 0.9205 
AGEYEARS*MARCOND 0.622679 0.063353 9.828776 0.0000 
AGEYEARS*MBOOK 0.040174 0.018691 2.149348 0.0382 
AGEYEARS*MCAP 5.93E-06 1.94E-05 0.306021 0.7613 
AGEYEARS*HEALTH 0.025827 0.148657 0.173734 0.8630 
BRENT 2.294779 2.353929 0.974872 0.3360 
BRENT^2 0.780672 0.860096 0.907657 0.3699 
BRENT*COD -0.063678 13.79654 -0.004615 0.9963 
BRENT*COSSNX -8.899075 2.941345 -3.025512 0.0045 
BRENT*FIN 37.19200 3.294203 11.29014 0.0000 
BRENT*IND 4.590747 1.510635 3.038952 0.0043 
BRENT*IT -0.081857 1.079268 -0.075845 0.9400 
BRENT*MARCOND -2.006661 1.520847 -1.319436 0.1951 
BRENT*MBOOK -0.572208 0.328813 -1.740222 0.0901 
BRENT*MCAP 0.000220 0.000409 0.536252 0.5950 
BRENT*HEALTH -0.072070 2.415809 -0.029832 0.9764 
COD -12.24222 2.600552 -4.707548 0.0000 
COD*MARCOND 11.92232 3.751201 3.178267 0.0030 
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COD*MBOOK -0.549527 6.657357 -0.082544 0.9347 
COD*MCAP 0.000714 0.006217 0.114810 0.9092 
COSSNX 45.31021 1.830707 24.75012 0.0000 
COSSNX*MARCOND -38.32146 2.595173 -14.76644 0.0000 
COSSNX*MBOOK -1.020027 0.937848 -1.087626 0.2838 
COSSNX*MCAP 0.000508 0.000378 1.345431 0.1867 
FIN -17.09231 6.374513 -2.681352 0.0109 
FIN*MARCOND 18.96896 5.246596 3.615479 0.0009 
FIN*MBOOK -3.745171 0.930111 -4.026587 0.0003 
FIN*MCAP 0.001333 0.000980 1.360396 0.1819 
IND -8.808019 2.329054 -3.781801 0.0006 
IND*MARCOND 7.006638 2.192334 3.195972 0.0028 
IND*MBOOK -0.091291 0.574543 -0.158893 0.8746 
IND*MCAP 0.002254 0.001526 1.476945 0.1482 
IT -13.63153 2.663580 -5.117748 0.0000 
IT*MARCOND 14.06807 2.576203 5.460776 0.0000 
IT*MBOOK -0.524108 0.633908 -0.826788 0.4137 
IT*MCAP 0.002369 0.000787 3.009416 0.0047 
MARCOND -13.18242 1.681179 -7.841175 0.0000 
MARCOND*MBOOK -1.176702 0.474934 -2.477612 0.0179 
MARCOND*MCAP 0.001905 0.000613 3.105675 0.0036 
MARCOND*HEALTH 14.23296 3.946935 3.606079 0.0009 
MBOOK 1.262864 0.613010 2.060105 0.0465 
MBOOK^2 0.008461 0.068248 0.123973 0.9020 
MBOOK*MCAP -6.65E-06 0.000122 -0.054563 0.9568 
MBOOK*HEALTH -0.645596 0.882711 -0.731379 0.4692 
MCAP -0.001889 0.000559 -3.380976 0.0017 
MCAP^2 -4.60E-08 2.38E-08 -1.935079 0.0607 
MCAP*HEALTH 0.002158 0.001048 2.058354 0.0467 
HEALTH -13.99378 4.866078 -2.875782 0.0066 
     
     R-squared 0.984893    Mean dependent var 1.439657 
Adjusted R-squared 0.962437    S.D. dependent var 6.709087 
S.E. of regression 1.300299    Akaike info criterion 3.645685 
Sum squared resid 62.55876    Schwarz criterion 5.170691 
Log likelihood -113.5243    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.261439 
F-statistic 43.85860    Durbin-Watson stat 2.615528 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
 
 
    
     
 
Regression analysis included White heteroskedasticity term: Index versus Mcap; Mbook; ...  
Dependent Variable: INDEX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/07/12   Time: 10:40   
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Sample: 1 94    
Included observations: 93   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & 
Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.993951 0.713670 1.392732 0.1675 
AGEYEARS -0.014457 0.008350 -1.731454 0.0872 
BRENT -0.365567 0.368002 -0.993383 0.3235 
COD -0.547177 0.284737 -1.921696 0.0582 
COSTAP 0.419725 1.109593 0.378270 0.7062 
FIN 0.524344 0.684145 0.766422 0.4457 
IND -0.316974 0.284898 -1.112586 0.2692 
IT 0.329478 0.236352 1.394016 0.1671 
MARCOND -0.908879 0.475341 -1.912056 0.0594 
MBOOK -0.017190 0.038290 -0.448937 0.6547 
MCAP -5.03E-05 1.68E-05 -2.982422 0.0038 
HEALTH -0.003406 0.242239 -0.014059 0.9888 
     
     R-squared 0.235369    Mean dependent var -0.148817 
Adjusted R-squared 0.131530    S.D. dependent var 1.379593 
S.E. of regression 1.285667    Akaike info criterion 3.460346 
Sum squared resid 133.8881    Schwarz criterion 3.787133 
Log likelihood -148.9061    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.592294 
F-statistic 2.266678    Durbin-Watson stat 0.469614 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.018242    
     
     
 
 
Best subset regression index raw-data: 
Summary over the adjusted R-squared effects from different regression models: 
                                            A 
                                            g m 
                                            e a     H   C 
                                          m y r B   e   o 
                                        M b e c r   a   s 
                                        c o a o e I l F t c 
                       Mallows          a o r n n n t i a o i 
Vars  R-Sq  R-Sq(adj)       Cp       S  p k s d t d h n p d t 
   1   8.3        7.3      8.1  1.3279        X 
   1   6.2        5.1     10.4  1.3435      X 
   2  14.0       12.1      4.0  1.2932      X X 
   2  11.0        9.0      7.3  1.3161        X   X 
   3  16.5       13.7      3.4  1.2814  X   X X 
   3  15.8       12.9      4.2  1.2870      X X       X 
   4  18.4       14.7      3.4  1.2743  X   X X X 
   4  18.3       14.6      3.5  1.2746  X   X X   X 
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   5  20.0       15.4      3.7  1.2689  X   X X X X 
   5  19.9       15.3      3.8  1.2695  X   X X   X       X 
   6  21.6       16.1      4.0  1.2634  X   X X X X       X 
   6  20.9       15.4      4.7  1.2687  X   X X X X   X 
   7  22.3       15.9      5.3  1.2649  X   X X X X   X   X 
   7  22.3       15.9      5.3  1.2654  X   X X X     X X   X 
   8  22.9       15.5      6.7  1.2677  X   X X X     X X X X 
   8  22.8       15.4      6.8  1.2686  X   X X X X   X X X 
   9  23.4       15.1      8.1  1.2709  X   X X X X   X X X X 
   9  23.0       14.6      8.6  1.2747  X X X X X     X X X X 
  10  23.5       14.2     10.0  1.2779  X X X X X X   X X X X 
  10  23.4       14.1     10.1  1.2785  X   X X X X X X X X X 
  11  23.5       13.1     12.0  1.2857  X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Regression Analysis included White Heteroskedasticity term: Best subset regression  
Dependent Variable: INDEX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/12   Time: 17:37   
Sample: 1 94    
Included observations: 94   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.126666 0.660595 1.705533 0.0917 
MCAP -5.62E-05 1.80E-05 -3.116629 0.0025 
AGEYEARS -0.012675 0.004909 -2.581728 0.0115 
MARCOND -0.918807 0.494197 -1.859190 0.0664 
BRENT -0.362507 0.374951 -0.966812 0.3363 
IND -0.530100 0.242609 -2.184997 0.0316 
COD -0.710416 0.277233 -2.562520 0.0121 
     
     R-squared 0.214847    Mean dependent var -0.149149 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160698    S.D. dependent var 1.372160 
S.E. of regression 1.257082    Akaike info criterion 3.367014 
Sum squared resid 137.4823    Schwarz criterion 3.556408 
Log likelihood -151.2496    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.443515 
F-statistic 3.967734    Durbin-Watson stat 0.428638 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001483    
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Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
White test for heteroskedasticity: 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 1.522293    Prob. F(23,70) 0.0922 
Obs*R-squared 31.34093    Prob. Chi-Square(23) 0.1146 
Scaled explained SS 321.2275    Prob. Chi-Square(23) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/12   Time: 17:43   
Sample: 1 94    
Included observations: 94   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 18.23582 12.21464 1.492947 0.1399 
MCAP -0.003087 0.002256 -1.368007 0.1757 
MCAP^2 1.80E-08 1.70E-08 1.058591 0.2934 
MCAP*AGEYEARS 1.77E-05 2.02E-05 0.877730 0.3831 
MCAP*MARCOND 0.002418 0.001868 1.294453 0.1998 
MCAP*BRENT 0.001167 0.001359 0.858691 0.3934 
MCAP*IND 0.002276 0.003385 0.672424 0.5035 
MCAP*COD 2.40E-05 0.000536 0.044718 0.9645 
AGEYEARS -0.178113 0.152136 -1.170747 0.2457 
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Series: RESID
Sample 1 94
Observations 94
Mean       1.51e-16
Median  -0.138496
Maximum  8.022117
Minimum -1.597380
Std. Dev.   1.215855
Skewness   4.043770
Kurtosis   24.93030
Jarque-Bera  2139.856
Probability  0.000000
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AGEYEARS^2 0.000306 0.000434 0.704960 0.4832 
AGEYEARS*MARCOND 0.110480 0.107196 1.030632 0.3063 
AGEYEARS*BRENT 0.088708 0.108103 0.820588 0.4147 
AGEYEARS*IND -0.042397 0.086400 -0.490703 0.6252 
AGEYEARS*COD -0.227442 0.308120 -0.738159 0.4629 
MARCOND -16.66886 11.77804 -1.415249 0.1614 
MARCOND*BRENT 14.88487 9.628902 1.545853 0.1266 
MARCOND*IND 3.321173 7.197675 0.461423 0.6459 
MARCOND*COD 7.017694 5.659786 1.239922 0.2191 
BRENT -19.58462 14.64735 -1.337076 0.1855 
BRENT^2 3.258423 3.830084 0.850744 0.3978 
BRENT*IND 2.048902 4.898748 0.418250 0.6770 
BRENT*COD 2.367392 3.699678 0.639891 0.5243 
IND -4.968597 8.530471 -0.582453 0.5621 
COD -7.510645 4.991726 -1.504619 0.1369 
     
     R-squared 0.333414    Mean dependent var 1.462578 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114393    S.D. dependent var 7.193089 
S.E. of regression 6.769178    Akaike info criterion 6.878475 
Sum squared resid 3207.524    Schwarz criterion 7.527827 
Log likelihood -299.2883    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.140766 
F-statistic 1.522293    Durbin-Watson stat 0.928549 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.092198    
     
     
 
 
9.3.2 Regression matched against index with 3% trimmed data: 
 
Regression Analysis: Index versus Mcap; mbook; ...  
The regression equation is: 
Index = - 0.121 + 0.000001 Mcap - 0.0077 mbook - 0.00288 Ageyears 
        - 0.215 marcond - 0.0090 Brent - 0.101 Ind + 0.312 Health + 0.091 Fin 
        - 0.708 Costap - 0.167 cod + 0.582 it 
 
87 cases used, 1 cases contain missing values 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef      T      P    VIF 
Constant      -0.1209      0.1596  -0.76  0.451 
Mcap       0.00000070  0.00003046   0.02  0.982  1.681 
mbook        -0.00774     0.02186  -0.35  0.724  1.545 
Ageyears    -0.002879    0.002106  -1.37  0.176  1.220 
marcond       -0.2146      0.1134  -1.89  0.062  1.134 
Brent        -0.00896     0.09976  -0.09  0.929  1.123 
Ind           -0.1013      0.1479  -0.68  0.496  1.436 
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Health         0.3122      0.1749   1.78  0.078  1.465 
Fin            0.0914      0.1687   0.54  0.590  1.227 
Costap        -0.7082      0.1806  -3.92  0.000  1.407 
cod           -0.1666      0.1880  -0.89  0.378  1.171 
it             0.5821      0.1415   4.11  0.000  1.552 
 
S = 0.410480   R-Sq = 50.3%   R-Sq(adj) = 43.0% 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
Source          DF       SS      MS     F      P 
Regression      11  12.7738  1.1613  6.89  0.000 
Residual Error  75  12.6371  0.1685 
Total           86  25.4109 
 
Source    DF  Seq SS 
Mcap       1  0.4480 
mbook      1  0.9772 
Ageyears   1  2.0200 
marcond    1  1.3391 
Brent      1  0.0000 
Ind        1  0.5865 
Health     1  0.1040 
Fin        1  0.0911 
Costap     1  3.6234 
cod        1  0.7343 
it         1  2.8502 
 
Unusual Observations: 
Obs   Mcap    Index      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1    125  -1.7804  -0.4995  0.2079   -1.2809     -3.62R 
  2    643  -1.7157  -0.3108  0.1586   -1.4048     -3.71R 
 45  10687  -0.3257  -0.4932  0.3340    0.1674      0.70 X 
 84   1688   0.6297  -0.2970  0.1860    0.9266      2.53R 
 87    109   0.8459  -0.4536  0.1247    1.2995      3.32R 
 88    404   0.8948  -0.2485  0.1579    1.1433      3.02R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
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Residual Plots for Index 
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Regression Analysis included White Heteroskedasticity term: Index versus Mcap; mbook; ...  
Dependent Variable: INDEX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 12:41   
Sample (adjusted): 1 88   
Included observations: 87 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.118749 0.159498 -0.744513 0.4589 
AGEYEARS -0.002889 0.002105 -1.372803 0.1739 
BRENT -0.010683 0.099800 -0.107046 0.9150 
COD -0.167006 0.187847 -0.889057 0.3768 
COSTAP -0.707662 0.180500 -3.920556 0.0002 
FIN 0.088981 0.168563 0.527884 0.5991 
IND -0.103375 0.147824 -0.699316 0.4865 
IT 0.581520 0.141430 4.111710 0.0001 
MARCOND -0.214513 0.113326 -1.892884 0.0622 
MBOOK -0.007838 0.021845 -0.358792 0.7208 
MCAP 1.48E-07 3.04E-05 0.004862 0.9961 
HEALTH 0.313408 0.174784 1.793115 0.0770 
     
     R-squared 0.503236    Mean dependent var -0.297356 
Adjusted R-squared 0.430378    S.D. dependent var 0.543517 
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S.E. of regression 0.410210    Akaike info criterion 1.183148 
Sum squared resid 12.62043    Schwarz criterion 1.523273 
Log likelihood -39.46692    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.320106 
F-statistic 6.907020    Durbin-Watson stat 0.457027 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Probability plot of the normal- and Student’s t-distribution: 
  
Check for normality in the residuals: 
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Skewness  -0.079186
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Probability  0.000000
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Multi-correlation matrix: 
 
 
White test for heteroskedasticity:  
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 3.857659    Prob. F(55,31) 0.0001 
Obs*R-squared 75.90905    Prob. Chi-Square(55) 0.0324 
Scaled explained SS 172.9758    Prob. Chi-Square(55) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 12:41   
Sample: 1 88    
Included observations: 87   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.909303 0.578763 -1.571116 0.1263 
AGEYEARS 0.051901 0.031438 1.650905 0.1089 
AGEYEARS^2 -6.35E-05 8.19E-05 -0.775890 0.4437 
AGEYEARS*BRENT 0.005591 0.007460 0.749381 0.4593 
AGEYEARS*COD 0.053931 0.549658 0.098118 0.9225 
AGEYEARS*COSTAP 0.009208 0.010955 0.840526 0.4071 
AGEYEARS*FIN 0.031954 0.010369 3.081756 0.0043 
AGEYEARS*IND -0.000894 0.008296 -0.107756 0.9149 
AGEYEARS*IT 0.004665 0.008383 0.556433 0.5819 
AGEYEARS*MARCOND -0.049761 0.027540 -1.806863 0.0805 
AGEYEARS*MBOOK -0.002890 0.004228 -0.683430 0.4994 
AGEYEARS*MCAP 8.81E-07 3.68E-06 0.239197 0.8125 
AGEYEARS*HEALTH 0.023036 0.025231 0.913027 0.3683 
BRENT 0.212283 0.470986 0.450720 0.6553 
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BRENT^2 0.069555 0.182009 0.382151 0.7050 
BRENT*COD -0.162533 2.300764 -0.070643 0.9441 
BRENT*COSTAP -0.144899 0.650458 -0.222765 0.8252 
BRENT*FIN -2.242440 1.876492 -1.195017 0.2411 
BRENT*IND 0.020831 0.334480 0.062280 0.9507 
BRENT*IT -0.244991 0.181820 -1.347434 0.1876 
BRENT*MARCOND -0.342775 0.278395 -1.231252 0.2275 
BRENT*MBOOK -0.004165 0.060907 -0.068382 0.9459 
BRENT*MCAP 2.83E-05 7.81E-05 0.362904 0.7191 
BRENT*HEALTH 0.214114 0.407897 0.524922 0.6034 
COD 1.589539 0.624115 2.546867 0.0161 
COD*MARCOND -1.224802 0.770602 -1.589408 0.1221 
COD*MBOOK -0.316838 1.105420 -0.286623 0.7763 
COD*MCAP 0.000145 0.001031 0.140499 0.8892 
COSTAP -2.898058 1.714629 -1.690195 0.1010 
COSTAP*MARCOND 3.103157 1.576110 1.968871 0.0580 
COSTAP*MBOOK -0.045966 0.182871 -0.251358 0.8032 
COSTAP*MCAP -3.22E-05 8.19E-05 -0.392513 0.6974 
FIN 0.127055 1.372577 0.092567 0.9268 
FIN*MARCOND -0.494311 1.274375 -0.387885 0.7008 
FIN*MBOOK 0.257606 0.238321 1.080922 0.2881 
FIN*MCAP 4.02E-05 0.000179 0.224948 0.8235 
IND 2.509742 0.530272 4.732928 0.0000 
IND*MARCOND -1.302944 0.478113 -2.725182 0.0105 
IND*MBOOK -0.074693 0.104092 -0.717569 0.4784 
IND*MCAP -0.001273 0.000293 -4.339600 0.0001 
IT 0.717803 0.677715 1.059152 0.2977 
IT*MARCOND -0.702126 0.681517 -1.030240 0.3109 
IT*MBOOK 0.115281 0.114390 1.007787 0.3214 
IT*MCAP -0.000207 0.000168 -1.234106 0.2264 
MARCOND 1.004943 0.584919 1.718087 0.0958 
MARCOND*MBOOK 0.085920 0.096379 0.891485 0.3795 
MARCOND*MCAP -0.000206 0.000140 -1.475451 0.1502 
MARCOND*HEALTH -1.833846 0.911182 -2.012601 0.0529 
MBOOK -0.078924 0.122786 -0.642778 0.5251 
MBOOK^2 -0.011502 0.012656 -0.908809 0.3705 
MBOOK*MCAP 2.28E-05 2.30E-05 0.988950 0.3303 
MBOOK*HEALTH -0.099574 0.172986 -0.575619 0.5690 
MCAP 0.000134 0.000150 0.895029 0.3777 
MCAP^2 2.99E-09 2.14E-08 0.139958 0.8896 
MCAP*HEALTH -0.000303 0.000217 -1.397675 0.1721 
HEALTH 2.170813 1.062485 2.043147 0.0496 
     
     R-squared 0.872518    Mean dependent var 0.145062 
Adjusted R-squared 0.646340    S.D. dependent var 0.361313 
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S.E. of regression 0.214871    Akaike info criterion 0.017875 
Sum squared resid 1.431252    Schwarz criterion 1.605126 
Log likelihood 55.22244    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.657012 
F-statistic 3.857659    Durbin-Watson stat 2.125790 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000062    
     
     
 
Regression Analysis included White Heteroskedasticity term: Index versus Mcap; mbook; ... 
Dependent Variable: INDEX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 12:42   
Sample (adjusted): 1 88   
Included observations: 87 after adjustments  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.118749 0.155185 -0.765205 0.4466 
AGEYEARS -0.002889 0.003020 -0.956724 0.3418 
BRENT -0.010683 0.087285 -0.122395 0.9029 
COD -0.167006 0.180858 -0.923412 0.3588 
COSTAP -0.707662 0.143798 -4.921219 0.0000 
FIN 0.088981 0.190496 0.467105 0.6418 
IND -0.103375 0.204024 -0.506683 0.6139 
IT 0.581520 0.102967 5.647613 0.0000 
MARCOND -0.214513 0.148552 -1.444030 0.1529 
MBOOK -0.007838 0.015245 -0.514107 0.6087 
MCAP 1.48E-07 2.06E-05 0.007170 0.9943 
HEALTH 0.313408 0.143298 2.187110 0.0319 
     
     R-squared 0.503236    Mean dependent var -0.297356 
Adjusted R-squared 0.430378    S.D. dependent var 0.543517 
S.E. of regression 0.410210    Akaike info criterion 1.183148 
Sum squared resid 12.62043    Schwarz criterion 1.523273 
Log likelihood -39.46692    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.320106 
F-statistic 6.907020    Durbin-Watson stat 0.457027 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Best subset index 3% trimmed data:  
Summary over the adjusted R-squared effects from different regression models: 
                                             A 
                                             g m 
                                             e a     H    C 
                                           m y r B   e   o 
                                         M b e c r   a   s 
                                         c o a o e I l F t c 
                       Mallows           a o r n n n t i a o i 
Vars  R-Sq  R-Sq(adj)       Cp        S  p k s d t d h n p d t 
   1  23.5       22.6     32.4  0.47829                  X 
   1  23.4       22.5     32.5  0.47846                      X 
   2  40.7       39.3      8.4  0.42338                  X   X 
   2  30.8       29.1     23.4  0.45764              X       X 
   3  45.4       43.5      3.3  0.40873              X   X   X 
   3  44.3       42.3      5.0  0.41300        X         X   X 
   4  47.5       45.0      2.1  0.40321        X     X   X   X 
   4  46.7       44.1      3.4  0.40637      X       X   X   X 
   5  48.8       45.7      2.2  0.40062      X X     X   X   X 
   5  48.2       45.0      3.1  0.40306        X   X X   X   X 
   6  49.5       45.7      3.2  0.40070      X X     X X X   X 
   6  49.3       45.5      3.4  0.40119      X X     X   X X X 
   7  49.9       45.5      4.5  0.40137      X X   X X   X X X 
   7  49.8       45.4      4.7  0.40181      X X     X X X X X 
   8  50.2       45.0      6.2  0.40295      X X   X X X X X X 
   8  50.1       44.9      6.3  0.40338    X X X   X X   X X X 
   9  50.3       44.4      8.0  0.40514    X X X   X X X X X X 
   9  50.2       44.4      8.1  0.40549  X   X X   X X X X X X 
  10  50.3       43.7     10.0  0.40777    X X X X X X X X X X 
  10  50.3       43.7     10.0  0.40779  X X X X   X X X X X X 
  11  50.3       43.0     12.0  0.41048  X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Regression analysis included White heteroskedasticity term: Best subset regression  
Dependent Variable: INDEX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 12:45   
Sample (adjusted): 1 88   
Included observations: 88 after adjustments  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.203979 0.172476 -1.182651 0.2404 
IT 0.627816 0.111067 5.652569 0.0000 
COSTAP -0.647896 0.149013 -4.347919 0.0000 
FIN 0.150075 0.193328 0.776271 0.4398 
HEALTH 0.338883 0.143353 2.363975 0.0205 
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MARCOND -0.201324 0.145668 -1.382069 0.1708 
AGEYEARS -0.002947 0.002726 -1.081107 0.2829 
     
     R-squared 0.494712    Mean dependent var -0.296023 
Adjusted R-squared 0.457283    S.D. dependent var 0.540529 
S.E. of regression 0.398204    Akaike info criterion 1.072497 
Sum squared resid 12.84386    Schwarz criterion 1.269558 
Log likelihood -40.18988    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.151888 
F-statistic 13.21745    Durbin-Watson stat 0.406269 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
White test for heteroskedasticity: 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 2.640646    Prob. F(16,71) 0.0027 
Obs*R-squared 32.83018    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 0.0078 
Scaled explained SS 81.44033    Prob. Chi-Square(16) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 12:45   
Sample: 1 88    
Included observations: 88   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
0
4
8
12
16
20
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Series: RESID
Sample 1 90
Observations 88
Mean      -6.06e-17
Median   0.008460
Maximum  1.258250
Minimum -1.454140
Std. Dev.   0.384227
Skewness  -0.261339
Kurtosis   6.855872
Jarque-Bera  55.51677
Probability  0.000000
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     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.549196 0.292040 1.880549 0.0641 
IT -0.524647 0.233126 -2.250490 0.0275 
IT*MARCOND 0.523883 0.243614 2.150466 0.0349 
IT*AGEYEARS 0.003171 0.002899 1.093680 0.2778 
COSTAP -1.019145 2.183949 -0.466652 0.6422 
COSTAP*MARCOND 1.032903 2.188462 0.471977 0.6384 
COSTAP*AGEYEARS 0.001390 0.000624 2.226209 0.0292 
FIN -0.548625 0.292040 -1.878592 0.0644 
FIN*MARCOND 0.439702 0.296594 1.482503 0.1426 
FIN*AGEYEARS 0.020157 0.001535 13.13129 0.0000 
HEALTH -0.427210 0.275811 -1.548925 0.1258 
HEALTH*MARCOND 0.339872 0.295143 1.151551 0.2534 
HEALTH*AGEYEARS 0.008469 0.013631 0.621318 0.5364 
MARCOND -0.455302 0.293567 -1.550931 0.1254 
MARCOND*AGEYEARS -0.007456 0.033653 -0.221562 0.8253 
AGEYEARS 0.004611 0.034707 0.132852 0.8947 
AGEYEARS^2 2.05E-05 2.63E-05 0.779685 0.4382 
     
     R-squared 0.373070    Mean dependent var 0.145953 
Adjusted R-squared 0.231790    S.D. dependent var 0.355214 
S.E. of regression 0.311337    Akaike info criterion 0.675823 
Sum squared resid 6.882071    Schwarz criterion 1.154400 
Log likelihood -12.73623    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.868630 
F-statistic 2.640646    Durbin-Watson stat 1.366279 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002688    
     
     
9.3.3 Regression matched against index with 10% trimmed data: 
 
Regression Analysis: Index versus Mcap; mbook; ...  
The regression equation is: 
Index = - 0.375 - 0.000003 Mcap + 0.00626 mbook + 0.00070 Ageyears 
        - 0.0191 marcond + 0.0405 Brent - 0.292 Ind + 0.134 Health + 0.320 Fin 
        - 0.521 Costap - 0.316 cod + 0.542 it 
 
73 cases used, 1 cases contain missing values 
 
Predictor         Coef     SE Coef      T      P    VIF 
Constant      -0.37463     0.07125  -5.26  0.000 
Mcap       -0.00000287  0.00001340  -0.21  0.831  1.672 
mbook         0.006259    0.009192   0.68  0.499  1.525 
Ageyears      0.000705    0.001157   0.61  0.545  1.354 
marcond       -0.01909     0.05472  -0.35  0.728  1.217 
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Brent          0.04049     0.04366   0.93  0.357  1.172 
Ind           -0.29245     0.06800  -4.30  0.000  1.434 
Health         0.13378     0.07640   1.75  0.085  1.327 
Fin            0.31981     0.07227   4.43  0.000  1.187 
Costap         -0.5214      0.1154  -4.52  0.000  1.375 
cod           -0.31602     0.08182  -3.86  0.000  1.120 
it             0.54245     0.06143   8.83  0.000  1.534 
 
S = 0.166846   R-Sq = 80.2%   R-Sq(adj) = 76.6% 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
Source          DF       SS       MS      F      P 
Regression      11  6.88134  0.62558  22.47  0.000 
Residual Error  61  1.69809  0.02784 
Total           72  8.57943 
 
Source    DF   Seq SS 
Mcap       1  0.06438 
mbook      1  0.19085 
Ageyears   1  0.30167 
marcond    1  0.25269 
Brent      1  0.07741 
Ind        1  1.26033 
Health     1  0.01262 
Fin        1  0.45272 
Costap     1  1.04656 
cod        1  1.05136 
it         1  2.17075 
 
Unusual Observations: 
Obs   Mcap    Index      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  3   4570  -0.8232  -0.8832  0.1184    0.0600      0.51 X 
  7    200  -0.7132  -0.1918  0.0698   -0.5214     -3.44R 
 14    263  -0.5889  -0.5485  0.1233   -0.0404     -0.36 X 
 17    604  -0.5610   0.1668  0.0586   -0.7278     -4.66R 
 21   1540  -0.5230  -0.0482  0.0660   -0.4748     -3.10R 
 38  10687  -0.3257  -0.2928  0.1394   -0.0330     -0.36 X 
 74    479   0.5222   0.2064  0.0841    0.3159      2.19R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
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Residual Plots for Index:  
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Regression Analysis included White Heteroskedasticity term: Index versus Mcap; mbook; ...  
Dependent Variable: INDEX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/07/12   Time: 11:17   
Sample: 1 74    
Included observations: 73   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.372465 0.048496 -7.680384 0.0000 
AGEYEARS 0.000708 0.000669 1.058197 0.2941 
BRENT 0.038785 0.055030 0.704789 0.4836 
COD -0.316317 0.053910 -5.867520 0.0000 
COSTAP -0.521019 0.053831 -9.678780 0.0000 
FIN 0.317169 0.087551 3.622658 0.0006 
IND -0.294527 0.039882 -7.384900 0.0000 
IT 0.542380 0.084085 6.450394 0.0000 
MARCOND -0.019259 0.047680 -0.403914 0.6877 
MBOOK 0.006146 0.008428 0.729268 0.4686 
MCAP -3.35E-06 9.56E-06 -0.350103 0.7275 
HEALTH 0.135035 0.098922 1.365071 0.1772 
     
     R-squared 0.802983    Mean dependent var -0.287534 
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Probability plot of the normal- and Student’s t-distribution: 
  
Check for normality in the residuals: 
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Series: RESID
Sample 1 74
Observations 73
Mean       2.21e-17
Median   0.025014
Maximum  0.313024
Minimum -0.728557
Std. Dev.   0.153176
Skewness  -2.243580
Kurtosis   10.81833
Jarque-Bera  247.1685
Probability  0.000000
Adjusted R-squared 0.767456    S.D. dependent var 0.345096 
S.E. of regression 0.166415    Akaike info criterion -0.599484 
Sum squared resid 1.689329    Schwarz criterion -0.222970 
Log likelihood 33.88116    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.449436 
F-statistic 22.60170    Durbin-Watson stat 1.488264 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Multi-correlation matrix: 
 
 
White test for heteroskedasticity:  
Manually computed White test where not all independent variables are included. The test shows that 
we have several significant White variables, and that is therefore a sign of heteroskedasticity. 
 
Dependent Variable: RESID2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/12   Time: 16:20   
Sample: 1 74    
Included observations: 73   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.040318 0.022395 1.800304 0.0790 
AGEYEARS 0.001378 0.004141 0.332839 0.7409 
AGE2 2.14E-05 2.51E-05 0.854341 0.3978 
AGEBOOK -0.000724 0.001063 -0.681060 0.4996 
AGEBRENT -0.000958 0.002467 -0.388337 0.6997 
AGECAP -4.54E-07 9.37E-07 -0.485026 0.6302 
AGECOD 0.015457 0.141138 0.109514 0.9133 
AGECOS 0.001745 0.003888 0.448829 0.6559 
AGEFIN 0.010441 0.005713 1.827553 0.0747 
AGEIT 0.006846 0.002361 2.899847 0.0059 
AGEMAR -0.000938 0.003219 -0.291261 0.7723 
AGEHEAL 0.006993 0.006065 1.152992 0.2554 
BOOK2 0.007814 0.001075 7.271000 0.0000 
BOOKCAP -1.74E-05 2.81E-06 -6.186304 0.0000 
BOOKHEAL -0.029183 0.017436 -1.673770 0.1016 
BREBOOK -0.031431 0.017249 -1.822227 0.0755 
BRECAP -7.24E-06 2.50E-05 -0.289480 0.7736 
BRECOD -0.068125 0.612795 -0.111172 0.9120 
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BRECOS 0.091386 0.151675 0.602509 0.5501 
BREFIN -0.164495 0.278390 -0.590880 0.5578 
BREIND -0.089487 0.095838 -0.933732 0.3558 
BREIT 0.376663 0.058935 6.391127 0.0000 
BREMAR 0.092325 0.064361 1.434483 0.1588 
BRENT 0.051983 0.122686 0.423704 0.6739 
BRENT2 -0.075345 0.059564 -1.264949 0.2129 
BREHEAL -0.003758 0.145775 -0.025782 0.9796 
CAP2 7.47E-09 3.29E-09 2.274817 0.0281 
CAPHEAL 5.55E-05 2.92E-05 1.900671 0.0642 
COD 0.274990 0.249247 1.103281 0.2762 
CODBOOK -0.120957 0.220237 -0.549212 0.5858 
CODCAP 4.36E-05 0.000237 0.184340 0.8546 
     
     R-squared 0.856467    Mean dependent var 0.125522 
Adjusted R-squared 0.753944    S.D. dependent var 0.169909 
S.E. of regression 0.084282    Akaike info criterion -1.812775 
Sum squared resid 0.298344    Schwarz criterion -0.840115 
Log likelihood 97.16630    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.425153 
F-statistic 8.353875    Durbin-Watson stat 1.609675 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Best subset index 10% trimmed data:  
Summary over the adjusted R-squared effects from different regression models: 
                                             A 
                                             g m 
                                             e a     H    C 
                                           m y r B   e   o 
                                         M b e c r   a   s 
                                         c o a o e I l F t c 
                       Mallows           a o r n n n t i a o i 
Vars  R-Sq  R-Sq(adj)       Cp        S  p k s d t d h n p d t 
   1  49.1       48.3     88.0  0.24810                      X 
   1  16.5       15.3    188.4  0.31768            X 
   2  60.2       59.0     55.8  0.22095                X     X 
   2  56.6       55.4     66.6  0.23053            X         X 
   3  65.6       64.1     41.0  0.20682                X X   X 
   3  65.5       64.0     41.3  0.20712              X X     X 
   4  73.2       71.6     19.6  0.18389            X     X X X 
   4  72.0       70.4     23.3  0.18794            X   X X   X 
   5  78.2       76.5      6.3  0.16716            X   X X X X 
   5  74.6       72.7     17.4  0.18045            X X X X   X 
   6  79.6       77.7      4.0  0.16300            X X X X X X 
   6  78.5       76.5      7.3  0.16718    X       X   X X X X 
   7  79.9       77.7      5.0  0.16290          X X X X X X X 
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   7  79.7       77.5      5.5  0.16362      X     X X X X X X 
   8  80.0       77.5      6.5  0.16362    X     X X X X X X X 
   8  80.0       77.5      6.6  0.16372      X   X X X X X X X 
   9  80.2       77.3      8.1  0.16437    X X   X X X X X X X 
   9  80.1       77.2      8.4  0.16474    X   X X X X X X X X 
  10  80.2       77.0     10.0  0.16556    X X X X X X X X X X 
  10  80.2       77.0     10.1  0.16566  X X X   X X X X X X X 
  11  80.2       76.6     12.0  0.16685  X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
 
Regression analysis included White heteroskedasticity term: Best subset regression  
Dependent Variable: INDEX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/12   Time: 18:05   
Sample: 1 74    
Included observations: 74   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.374845 0.026539 -14.12449 0.0000 
BRENT 0.039662 0.052409 0.756774 0.4519 
IND -0.278742 0.029387 -9.485247 0.0000 
HEALTH 0.161643 0.083855 1.927658 0.0582 
FIN 0.309519 0.081224 3.810679 0.0003 
COSTAP -0.487442 0.027924 -17.45586 0.0000 
COD -0.316481 0.053784 -5.884355 0.0000 
IT 0.556422 0.077803 7.151660 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.799870    Mean dependent var -0.286081 
Adjusted R-squared 0.778644    S.D. dependent var 0.342952 
S.E. of regression 0.161353    Akaike info criterion -0.708633 
Sum squared resid 1.718306    Schwarz criterion -0.459545 
Log likelihood 34.21941    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.609268 
F-statistic 37.68373    Durbin-Watson stat 1.412050 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
White test for heteroskedasticity: 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 2.583662    Prob. F(14,59) 0.0057 
Obs*R-squared 28.12481    Prob. Chi-Square(14) 0.0137 
Scaled explained SS 112.5400    Prob. Chi-Square(14) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/13/12   Time: 18:05   
Sample: 1 74    
Included observations: 74   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.004035 0.015082 0.267540 0.7900 
BRENT -0.094570 0.051088 -1.851132 0.0692 
BRENT^2 0.083311 0.039168 2.126990 0.0376 
BRENT*IND 0.003087 0.062593 0.049324 0.9608 
BRENT*HEALTH 0.190852 0.067421 2.830735 0.0063 
BRENT*FIN 0.198171 0.191143 1.036768 0.3041 
BRENT*COSTAP -0.025734 0.157362 -0.163532 0.8707 
BRENT*COD 0.060338 0.079564 0.758367 0.4513 
BRENT*IT -0.167636 0.044262 -3.787354 0.0004 
IND 0.013172 0.034683 0.379778 0.7055 
HEALTH 0.008367 0.028810 0.290415 0.7725 
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Series: RESID
Sample 1 74
Observations 74
Mean       1.20e-17
Median   0.019824
Maximum  0.342389
Minimum -0.736421
Std. Dev.   0.153422
Skewness  -2.247689
Kurtosis   11.06058
Jarque-Bera  262.6426
Probability  0.000000
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FIN 0.016724 0.038165 0.438207 0.6628 
COSTAP 0.034638 0.122140 0.283595 0.7777 
COD -0.003995 0.040864 -0.097763 0.9225 
IT 0.164268 0.033607 4.887916 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.380065    Mean dependent var 0.023220 
Adjusted R-squared 0.232962    S.D. dependent var 0.074154 
S.E. of regression 0.064945    Akaike info criterion -2.451685 
Sum squared resid 0.248851    Schwarz criterion -1.984645 
Log likelihood 105.7123    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.265377 
F-statistic 2.583662    Durbin-Watson stat 1.801837 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005714    
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9.3.4 Regression matched against peers with raw data: 
 
Regression Analysis: Peers versus Mcap; mbook; ...  
The regression equation is: 
Peers = - 0.087 - 0.000001 Mcap - 0.0128 mbook - 0.00152 Ageyears 
        + 0.203 marcond + 0.718 Brent - 1.09 Ind - 0.397 Health - 0.802 Fin 
        + 0.170 Costap - 1.63 cod - 0.534 it 
 
93 cases used, 1 cases contain missing values 
 
Predictor         Coef     SE Coef      T      P    VIF 
Constant       -0.0873      0.5331  -0.16  0.870 
Mcap       -0.00000097  0.00003692  -0.03  0.979  1.183 
mbook         -0.01282     0.07478  -0.17  0.864  1.179 
Ageyears     -0.001523    0.007961  -0.19  0.849  1.220 
marcond         0.2033      0.4179   0.49  0.628  1.077 
Brent           0.7175      0.3663   1.96  0.054  1.112 
Ind            -1.0866      0.5407  -2.01  0.048  1.395 
Health         -0.3969      0.6461  -0.61  0.541  1.412 
Fin            -0.8016      0.6284  -1.28  0.206  1.217 
Costap          0.1695      0.6671   0.25  0.800  1.371 
cod            -1.6320      0.7361  -2.22  0.029  1.153 
it             -0.5344      0.5219  -1.02  0.309  1.368 
 
S = 1.62403   R-Sq = 13.9%   R-Sq(adj) = 2.2% 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
Source          DF       SS     MS     F      P 
Regression      11   34.553  3.141  1.19  0.307 
Residual Error  81  213.634  2.637 
Total           92  248.187 
 
Source    DF  Seq SS 
Mcap       1   0.095 
mbook      1   0.138 
Ageyears   1   0.038 
marcond    1   0.435 
Brent      1   9.385 
Ind        1   6.858 
Health      1   0.011 
Fin        1   2.258 
Costap     1   1.785 
cod        1  10.785 
it         1   2.765 
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Unusual Observations: 
Obs   Mcap   Peers     Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1    320  -5.145  -0.894   0.710    -4.251     -2.91R 
  2    156  -4.224  -0.084   0.569    -4.140     -2.72R 
  3    169  -3.898  -0.635   0.520    -3.263     -2.12R 
  4    131  -3.643  -0.419   0.509    -3.225     -2.09R 
 23  10687  -0.741  -0.016   1.283    -0.725     -0.73 X 
 54  46197  -0.213  -0.632   1.552     0.419      0.88 X 
 92    376   3.883  -0.963   0.448     4.846      3.10R 
 93    609   4.494   1.110   0.514     3.385      2.20R 
 94     72   9.599   1.061   0.487     8.538      5.51R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
Residual Plots for Peers: 
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Probability plot of the normal- and Student’s t-distribution: 
  
Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
Multi-correlation matrix: 
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Series: RESID
Sample 1 94
Observations 93
Mean       3.82e-17
Median  -0.105722
Maximum  8.539410
Minimum -4.255070
Std. Dev.   1.523859
Skewness   1.732011
Kurtosis   14.10762
Jarque-Bera  524.5927
Probability  0.000000
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White test for heteroskedasticity:  
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 0.529362    Prob. F(55,37) 0.9842 
Obs*R-squared 40.95424    Prob. Chi-Square(55) 0.9206 
Scaled explained SS 203.6090    Prob. Chi-Square(55) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 11:14   
Sample: 1 94    
Included observations: 93   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.294433 12.45358 -0.103941 0.9178 
AGEYEARS 0.124691 0.686831 0.181545 0.8569 
AGEYEARS^2 -0.001855 0.002491 -0.744795 0.4611 
AGEYEARS*BRENT -0.162969 0.247454 -0.658582 0.5142 
AGEYEARS*COD 4.403420 24.69146 0.178338 0.8594 
AGEYEARS*COSTAP 0.090693 0.335595 0.270247 0.7885 
AGEYEARS*FIN 0.209377 0.351284 0.596035 0.5548 
AGEYEARS*IND 0.300286 0.346293 0.867144 0.3915 
AGEYEARS*IT 0.127290 0.361516 0.352099 0.7268 
AGEYEARS*MARCOND -0.043316 0.478406 -0.090542 0.9283 
AGEYEARS*MBOOK -0.040506 0.142204 -0.284844 0.7774 
AGEYEARS*MCAP 5.99E-05 0.000147 0.407468 0.6860 
AGEYEARS*HEALTH 0.004716 1.130109 0.004173 0.9967 
BRENT -1.622794 17.80863 -0.091124 0.9279 
BRENT^2 6.871782 6.484263 1.059763 0.2961 
BRENT*COD -10.83400 103.0558 -0.105127 0.9168 
BRENT*COSTAP 4.837471 22.32846 0.216650 0.8297 
BRENT*FIN -21.84785 24.97688 -0.874723 0.3874 
BRENT*IND -9.520576 11.44549 -0.831819 0.4108 
BRENT*IT -15.09169 8.155925 -1.850396 0.0723 
BRENT*MARCOND 4.010557 11.55307 0.347142 0.7305 
BRENT*MBOOK 2.841621 2.493233 1.139733 0.2617 
BRENT*MCAP -0.006178 0.003105 -1.989522 0.0541 
BRENT*HEALTH -8.723192 18.41275 -0.473758 0.6385 
COD -1.513020 19.50484 -0.077571 0.9386 
COD*MARCOND -1.580028 27.64511 -0.057154 0.9547 
COD*MBOOK -9.332405 49.55290 -0.188332 0.8516 
COD*MCAP 0.010790 0.046350 0.232787 0.8172 
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COSTAP 0.568681 13.87654 0.040982 0.9675 
COSTAP*MARCOND -0.569002 19.59298 -0.029041 0.9770 
COSTAP*MBOOK -0.905831 7.101961 -0.127547 0.8992 
COSTAP*MCAP 0.001334 0.002866 0.465340 0.6444 
FIN 13.11806 48.23995 0.271933 0.7872 
FIN*MARCOND -16.73845 39.67517 -0.421887 0.6755 
FIN*MBOOK 2.366936 7.037644 0.336325 0.7385 
FIN*MCAP 0.000324 0.007408 0.043776 0.9653 
IND 10.42459 17.69361 0.589173 0.5593 
IND*MARCOND 0.363762 16.66021 0.021834 0.9827 
IND*MBOOK -3.271062 4.359050 -0.750407 0.4578 
IND*MCAP -0.006441 0.011584 -0.556069 0.5815 
IT 13.20860 20.23530 0.652750 0.5180 
IT*MARCOND -5.275041 19.58048 -0.269403 0.7891 
IT*MBOOK -2.746704 4.811917 -0.570813 0.5716 
IT*MCAP 0.000499 0.005983 0.083392 0.9340 
MARCOND 1.503214 12.74424 0.117952 0.9067 
MARCOND*MBOOK 1.102096 3.603173 0.305868 0.7614 
MARCOND*MCAP -0.001258 0.004654 -0.270316 0.7884 
MARCOND*HEALTH -4.041293 29.93724 -0.134992 0.8933 
MBOOK -0.990888 4.648536 -0.213161 0.8324 
MBOOK^2 0.233585 0.517974 0.450958 0.6547 
MBOOK*MCAP -0.000362 0.000924 -0.391130 0.6979 
MBOOK*HEALTH -2.866623 6.698775 -0.427932 0.6712 
MCAP 0.001086 0.004237 0.256189 0.7992 
MCAP^2 -9.42E-08 1.80E-07 -0.522485 0.6044 
MCAP*HEALTH 0.003554 0.007947 0.447248 0.6573 
HEALTH 9.266673 36.91193 0.251048 0.8032 
     
     R-squared 0.440368    Mean dependent var 2.297177 
Adjusted R-squared -0.391517    S.D. dependent var 8.361881 
S.E. of regression 9.863891    Akaike info criterion 7.698258 
Sum squared resid 3599.965    Schwarz criterion 9.223264 
Log likelihood -301.9690    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.314012 
F-statistic 0.529362    Durbin-Watson stat 1.962922 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.984218    
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Best subset regression peers raw-data: 
Summary over the adjusted R-squared effects from different regression models: 
                                            A 
                                            g m 
                                            e a     H   C 
                                          m y r B   e   o 
                                        M b e c r   a   s 
                                        c o a o e I l F t c 
                       Mallows          a o r n n n t i a o i 
Vars  R-Sq  R-Sq(adj)       Cp       S  p k s d t d h n p d t 
   1   3.7        2.6      1.7  1.6210          X 
   1   3.6        2.6      1.7  1.6211                    X 
   2   7.1        5.1      0.4  1.6003          X         X 
   2   6.3        4.2      1.2  1.6073            X       X 
   3  10.5        7.5     -0.8  1.5798          X X       X 
   3   8.2        5.1      1.4  1.5998          X       X X 
   4  11.6        7.6      0.2  1.5790          X X   X   X 
   4  11.2        7.2      0.5  1.5823          X X       X X 
   5  12.8        7.7      1.1  1.5776          X X   X   X X 
   5  12.0        7.0      1.8  1.5840        X X X   X   X 
   6  13.6        7.5      2.3  1.5792          X X X X   X X 
   6  13.1        7.1      2.8  1.5835        X X X   X   X X 
   7  13.8        6.7      4.1  1.5865        X X X X X   X X 
   7  13.6        6.5      4.3  1.5881    X     X X X X   X X 
   8  13.9        5.6      6.1  1.5954        X X X X X X X X 
   8  13.8        5.6      6.1  1.5955    X   X X X X X   X X 
   9  13.9        4.6      8.0  1.6047      X X X X X X X X X 
   9  13.9        4.5      8.0  1.6047    X   X X X X X X X X 
  10  13.9        3.4     10.0  1.6141    X X X X X X X X X X 
  10  13.9        3.4     10.0  1.6144  X   X X X X X X X X X 
  11  13.9        2.2     12.0  1.6240  X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Regression Analysis included White Heteroskedasticity term: Best subset regression 
Dependent Variable: PEERS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/25/12   Time: 15:43   
Sample: 1 94    
Included observations: 94   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.043788 0.145037 -0.301908 0.7634 
BRENT 0.719272 0.578993 1.242281 0.2174 
COD -1.578994 0.879592 -1.795142 0.0761 
FIN -0.709622 0.241514 -2.938224 0.0042 
IT -0.495702 0.478877 -1.035134 0.3034 
IND -1.028068 0.597402 -1.720899 0.0888 
     
     R-squared 0.127587    Mean dependent var -0.188511 
Adjusted R-squared 0.078018    S.D. dependent var 1.633702 
S.E. of regression 1.568679    Akaike info criterion 3.800047 
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Sum squared resid 216.5464    Schwarz criterion 3.962384 
Log likelihood -172.6022    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.865619 
F-statistic 2.573929    Durbin-Watson stat 0.444057 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.031991    
     
     
Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
White test for heteroskedasticity: 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 2.319890    Prob. F(8,85) 0.0265 
Obs*R-squared 16.84600    Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.0318 
Scaled explained SS 107.1410    Prob. Chi-Square(8) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 11:18   
Sample: 1 94    
Included observations: 94   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.191504 1.289469 -0.148513 0.8823 
BRENT -6.278701 4.235281 -1.482476 0.1419 
BRENT^2 11.13174 3.692473 3.014710 0.0034 
BRENT*IND -4.668904 5.612579 -0.831864 0.4078 
BRENT*COD 10.49544 9.754568 1.075951 0.2850 
BRENT*FIN -3.068983 10.73827 -0.285799 0.7757 
0
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Series: RESID
Sample 1 94
Observations 94
Mean      -1.51e-16
Median  -0.105458
Maximum  8.842055
Minimum -4.152133
Std. Dev.   1.535959
Skewness   1.888505
Kurtosis   15.18941
Jarque-Bera  637.8198
Probability  0.000000
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IND 4.635697 3.733660 1.241596 0.2178 
COD -0.079282 4.882610 -0.016238 0.9871 
FIN 1.165530 3.969664 0.293609 0.7698 
     
     R-squared 0.179213    Mean dependent var 2.334072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.101962    S.D. dependent var 8.839323 
S.E. of regression 8.376572    Akaike info criterion 7.179600 
Sum squared resid 5964.191    Schwarz criterion 7.423107 
Log likelihood -328.4412    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.277959 
F-statistic 2.319890    Durbin-Watson stat 1.290470 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.026535    
     
     
 
 
9.3.5 Regression matched against peers with 3% trimmed data: 
 
Regression Analysis: Peers versus Mcap; mbook; ...  
The regression equation is: 
Peers = - 0.378 + 0.000001 Mcap - 0.0436 mbook + 0.00345 Ageyears 
        + 0.207 marcond + 0.215 Brent - 0.659 Ind + 0.106 Health - 0.415 Fin 
        + 0.486 Costap - 0.316 cod + 0.319 it 
 
87 cases used, 1 cases contain missing values 
 
Predictor        Coef     SE Coef      T      P    VIF 
Constant      -0.3783      0.2567  -1.47  0.145 
Mcap       0.00000054  0.00001764   0.03  0.976  1.177 
mbook        -0.04362     0.03575  -1.22  0.226  1.180 
Ageyears     0.003449    0.003845   0.90  0.373  1.191 
marcond        0.2066      0.2019   1.02  0.310  1.082 
Brent          0.2150      0.1968   1.09  0.278  1.156 
Ind           -0.6592      0.2713  -2.43  0.017  1.356 
Health         0.1059      0.3103   0.34  0.734  1.420 
Fin           -0.4145      0.3016  -1.37  0.173  1.223 
Costap         0.4856      0.3196   1.52  0.133  1.373 
cod           -0.3160      0.3825  -0.83  0.411  1.149 
it             0.3192      0.2627   1.22  0.228  1.427 
 
S = 0.774743   R-Sq = 23.6%   R-Sq(adj) = 12.4% 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
Source          DF       SS      MS     F      P 
Regression      11  13.8893  1.2627  2.10  0.030 
Residual Error  75  45.0170  0.6002 
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Total           86  58.9063 
 
Source    DF  Seq SS 
Mcap       1  0.0104 
mbook      1  0.8640 
Ageyears   1  0.9727 
marcond    1  0.0622 
Brent      1  1.0802 
Ind        1  5.8499 
Health     1  0.0078 
Fin        1  2.2197 
Costap     1  1.1441 
cod        1  0.7919 
it         1  0.8865 
 
Unusual Observations: 
Obs   Mcap    Peers      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
  1    131  -3.6435  -0.8340  0.2590   -2.8094     -3.85R 
  3    382  -2.1297   0.2444  0.2204   -2.3740     -3.20R 
 20  10687  -0.7409  -0.9489  0.6159    0.2080      0.44 X 
 51  46197  -0.2131  -0.2665  0.7415    0.0534      0.24 X 
 86    644   1.5128  -0.3800  0.2563    1.8927      2.59R 
 87    337   1.5832   0.0643  0.2261    1.5189      2.05R 
 88    360   2.1370   0.3270  0.2519    1.8099      2.47R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
 
150 
 
Residual Plots for Peers: 
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Probability plot of the normal- and Student’s t-distribution: 
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Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
Multi-correlation matrix: 
 
 
White test for heteroskedasticity:  
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 1.082968    Prob. F(54,32) 0.4117 
Obs*R-squared 56.23086    Prob. Chi-Square(54) 0.3914 
Scaled explained SS 105.5702    Prob. Chi-Square(54) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 11:29   
Sample: 1 88    
0
4
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24
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Series: RESID
Sample 1 90
Observations 87
Mean      -6.13e-17
Median  -0.036828
Maximum  1.891575
Minimum -2.805544
Std. Dev.   0.723443
Skewness  -0.528453
Kurtosis   6.052573
Jarque-Bera  37.82780
Probability  0.000000
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Included observations: 87   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.337880 1.481058 0.903328 0.3731 
AGEYEARS 0.098675 0.082230 1.199976 0.2390 
AGEYEARS^2 -0.000317 0.000408 -0.775576 0.4437 
AGEYEARS*BRENT 0.030138 0.035358 0.852354 0.4004 
AGEYEARS*COD 0.239826 0.364668 0.657655 0.5155 
AGEYEARS*COSTAP -0.003006 0.050017 -0.060095 0.9525 
AGEYEARS*FIN -0.028809 0.041929 -0.687097 0.4970 
AGEYEARS*IND -0.094498 0.043008 -2.197208 0.0354 
AGEYEARS*IT 0.003757 0.043095 0.087185 0.9311 
AGEYEARS*MARCOND -0.059448 0.055669 -1.067879 0.2936 
AGEYEARS*MBOOK 0.012338 0.017004 0.725632 0.4733 
AGEYEARS*MCAP -1.31E-05 1.93E-05 -0.679542 0.5017 
AGEYEARS*HEALTH -0.158384 0.136239 -1.162546 0.2536 
BRENT -3.800146 2.285019 -1.663069 0.1061 
BRENT^2 0.647482 0.878243 0.737247 0.4663 
BRENT*COD 1.007485 2.716219 0.370915 0.7131 
BRENT*COSTAP -1.669218 2.813037 -0.593387 0.5571 
BRENT*FIN -2.107228 3.021740 -0.697356 0.4906 
BRENT*IND 4.384643 1.592088 2.754021 0.0096 
BRENT*IT 1.738638 1.225784 1.418389 0.1657 
BRENT*MARCOND 2.537321 1.404851 1.806113 0.0803 
BRENT*MBOOK 0.363005 0.338985 1.070857 0.2922 
BRENT*MCAP -0.000131 0.000405 -0.324360 0.7478 
BRENT*HEALTH 0.144868 2.276905 0.063625 0.9497 
COD 0.910865 2.187339 0.416426 0.6799 
COD*MARCOND -0.832446 2.322786 -0.358382 0.7224 
COD*MBOOK -0.096402 0.963225 -0.100082 0.9209 
COSTAP -1.770978 1.670834 -1.059937 0.2971 
COSTAP*MARCOND 3.360788 2.492655 1.348276 0.1870 
COSTAP*MBOOK -0.727826 0.835901 -0.870709 0.3904 
COSTAP*MCAP 0.000169 0.000339 0.499511 0.6208 
FIN 1.709976 5.670499 0.301556 0.7649 
FIN*MARCOND -2.513678 4.685850 -0.536440 0.5954 
FIN*MBOOK 0.656670 0.823313 0.797595 0.4310 
FIN*MCAP 3.15E-05 0.000862 0.036600 0.9710 
IND 0.467906 2.116933 0.221030 0.8265 
IND*MARCOND 0.999130 1.948423 0.512789 0.6116 
IND*MBOOK -0.020476 0.565283 -0.036222 0.9713 
IND*MCAP -0.002380 0.001485 -1.602650 0.1188 
IT 1.071904 2.583152 0.414960 0.6809 
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IT*MARCOND -2.656220 2.290640 -1.159597 0.2548 
IT*MBOOK 0.288124 0.607396 0.474360 0.6385 
IT*MCAP 3.07E-05 0.000732 0.041976 0.9668 
MARCOND -1.197640 1.509048 -0.793640 0.4333 
MARCOND*MBOOK 0.817627 0.429533 1.903526 0.0660 
MARCOND*MCAP 0.000245 0.000554 0.442666 0.6610 
MARCOND*HEALTH -1.909990 3.562224 -0.536179 0.5955 
MBOOK -0.936168 0.549065 -1.705023 0.0979 
MBOOK^2 -0.005062 0.065081 -0.077779 0.9385 
MBOOK*MCAP 1.19E-05 0.000117 0.101746 0.9196 
MBOOK*HEALTH 0.743238 0.799164 0.930020 0.3593 
MCAP -0.000160 0.000508 -0.315741 0.7542 
MCAP^2 -7.38E-09 2.22E-08 -0.332710 0.7415 
MCAP*HEALTH 0.000283 0.000986 0.286965 0.7760 
HEALTH 0.452035 4.361805 0.103635 0.9181 
     
     R-squared 0.646332    Mean dependent var 0.517354 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049517    S.D. dependent var 1.169645 
S.E. of regression 1.140319    Akaike info criterion 3.364689 
Sum squared resid 41.61048    Schwarz criterion 4.923596 
Log likelihood -91.36397    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.992413 
F-statistic 1.082968    Durbin-Watson stat 1.421515 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.411670    
     
     
 
 
 
Best subset regression peers 3% trimmed data:  
 
Summary over the adjusted R-squared effects from different regression models: 
                                             A 
                                             g m 
                                             e a     H   C 
                                           m y r B   e   o 
                                         M b e c r   a   s 
                                         c o a o e I l F t c 
                       Mallows           a o r n n n t i a o i 
Vars  R-Sq  R-Sq(adj)       Cp        S  p k s d t d h n p d t 
   1   7.6        6.5      7.7  0.80037            X 
   1   6.5        5.4      8.8  0.80507                  X 
   2  12.4       10.3      5.0  0.78378                  X   X 
   2  12.3       10.2      5.1  0.78424            X     X 
   3  16.1       13.1      3.3  0.77157            X     X   X 
   3  15.3       12.3      4.1  0.77510          X X     X 
   4  17.7       13.7      3.8  0.76896          X X     X   X 
   4  17.4       13.4      4.0  0.77018      X     X     X   X 
   5  18.9       13.9      4.6  0.76789    X       X   X X   X 
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   5  18.9       13.9      4.6  0.76795        X X X     X   X 
   6  20.3       14.4      5.2  0.76593    X     X X   X X X 
   6  20.3       14.3      5.2  0.76594    X     X X   X X   X 
   7  21.6       14.7      5.9  0.76454    X   X X X   X X   X 
   7  21.6       14.6      6.0  0.76481    X     X X   X X X X 
   8  22.6       14.7      7.0  0.76450    X   X X X   X X X X 
   8  22.6       14.6      7.0  0.76466    X X X X X   X X   X 
   9  23.5       14.5      8.1  0.76525    X X X X X   X X X X 
   9  22.9       13.9      8.7  0.76809    X X X X X X X X   X 
  10  23.6       13.5     10.0  0.76963    X X X X X X X X X X 
  10  23.5       13.4     10.1  0.77023  X X X X X X   X X X X 
  11  23.6       12.4     12.0  0.77474  X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Regression Analysis: Best subset regression  
Dependent Variable: PEERS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 11:34   
Sample (adjusted): 1 88   
Included observations: 87 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.326093 0.238044 -1.369889 0.1747 
IT 0.289435 0.243881 1.186786 0.2389 
COD -0.368695 0.367481 -1.003305 0.3188 
COSTAP 0.548953 0.289949 1.893278 0.0620 
FIN -0.422458 0.289229 -1.460634 0.1481 
IND -0.643304 0.250888 -2.564107 0.0123 
BRENT 0.234705 0.189774 1.236761 0.2199 
MARCOND 0.203238 0.196129 1.036242 0.3033 
MBOOK -0.041145 0.033417 -1.231265 0.2219 
     
     R-squared 0.226401    Mean dependent var -0.254253 
Adjusted R-squared 0.147058    S.D. dependent var 0.827762 
S.E. of regression 0.764479    Akaike info criterion 2.398452 
Sum squared resid 45.58535    Schwarz criterion 2.653546 
Log likelihood -95.33265    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.501170 
F-statistic 2.853429    Durbin-Watson stat 0.558563 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007789    
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Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
White test for heteroskedasticity: 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 1.087984    Prob. F(28,58) 0.3833 
Obs*R-squared 29.95956    Prob. Chi-Square(28) 0.3652 
Scaled explained SS 60.26698    Prob. Chi-Square(28) 0.0004 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 11:34   
Sample: 1 88    
Included observations: 87   
Collinear test regressors dropped from specification 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.173188 0.740182 1.584998 0.1184 
IT -0.565986 1.237677 -0.457297 0.6492 
IT*BRENT 1.426775 0.904456 1.577495 0.1201 
IT*MARCOND 0.354157 0.981826 0.360713 0.7196 
IT*MBOOK 0.076420 0.184978 0.413130 0.6810 
COD 0.015097 1.724488 0.008754 0.9930 
COD*BRENT -0.212021 2.516412 -0.084255 0.9331 
COD*MARCOND -0.628064 1.497275 -0.419471 0.6764 
COD*MBOOK 0.227115 0.592861 0.383083 0.7031 
COSTAP -0.716311 1.315121 -0.544673 0.5881 
COSTAP*BRENT 1.347214 1.355373 0.993981 0.3244 
0
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12
16
20
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Series: RESID
Sample 1 90
Observations 87
Mean      -1.68e-16
Median  -0.043194
Maximum  1.903010
Minimum -2.866480
Std. Dev.   0.728054
Skewness  -0.549298
Kurtosis   6.005221
Jarque-Bera  37.11373
Probability  0.000000
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COSTAP*MARCOND -0.033042 1.079632 -0.030605 0.9757 
COSTAP*MBOOK 0.132208 0.581560 0.227333 0.8210 
FIN -0.332415 1.491276 -0.222906 0.8244 
FIN*BRENT -1.713494 2.326611 -0.736476 0.4644 
FIN*MARCOND -0.303492 1.648004 -0.184157 0.8545 
FIN*MBOOK 0.461226 0.719764 0.640802 0.5242 
IND -0.903555 1.412822 -0.639539 0.5250 
IND*BRENT 1.893786 1.026408 1.845063 0.0701 
IND*MARCOND -0.292556 1.323085 -0.221117 0.8258 
IND*MBOOK 0.394651 0.253019 1.559766 0.1243 
BRENT -2.367823 1.476037 -1.604177 0.1141 
BRENT^2 0.153338 0.726723 0.210999 0.8336 
BRENT*MARCOND 1.682779 0.898576 1.872718 0.0662 
BRENT*MBOOK 0.371177 0.195661 1.897046 0.0628 
MARCOND -0.793287 0.839089 -0.945415 0.3484 
MARCOND*MBOOK 0.112327 0.201689 0.556934 0.5797 
MBOOK -0.172624 0.198419 -0.870001 0.3879 
MBOOK^2 -0.000941 0.012253 -0.076806 0.9390 
     
     R-squared 0.344363    Mean dependent var 0.523970 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027848    S.D. dependent var 1.179039 
S.E. of regression 1.162506    Akaike info criterion 3.400234 
Sum squared resid 78.38234    Schwarz criterion 4.222204 
Log likelihood -118.9102    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.731216 
F-statistic 1.087984    Durbin-Watson stat 1.179610 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.383335    
     
     
 
 
9.3.6 Regression matched against peers with 10% trimmed data: 
 
Regression Analysis: Peers versus Mcap; mbook; ...  
The regression equation is: 
Peers = - 0.559 - 0.000003 Mcap - 0.0150 mbook + 0.00069 Ageyears 
        + 0.244 marcond + 0.085 Brent - 0.011 Ind + 0.289 Health - 0.186 Fin 
        + 0.615 Costap + 0.077 cod + 0.325 it 
 
73 cases used, 1 cases contain missing values 
 
Predictor         Coef     SE Coef      T      P    VIF 
Constant       -0.5593      0.1669  -3.35  0.001 
Mcap       -0.00000314  0.00001027  -0.31  0.761  1.173 
mbook         -0.01502     0.02117  -0.71  0.481  1.172 
Ageyears      0.000685    0.002399   0.29  0.776  1.247 
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marcond         0.2440      0.1352   1.80  0.076  1.086 
Brent           0.0855      0.1246   0.69  0.495  1.123 
Ind            -0.0111      0.1774  -0.06  0.950  1.353 
Health          0.2893      0.1872   1.55  0.127  1.378 
Fin            -0.1865      0.1847  -1.01  0.317  1.210 
Costap          0.6154      0.2068   2.97  0.004  1.349 
cod             0.0771      0.2435   0.32  0.753  1.117 
it              0.3253      0.1702   1.91  0.061  1.347 
 
S = 0.448072   R-Sq = 24.4%   R-Sq(adj) = 10.8% 
 
Analysis of Variance: 
Source          DF       SS      MS     F      P 
Regression      11   3.9605  0.3600  1.79  0.075 
Residual Error  61  12.2469  0.2008 
Total           72  16.2074 
 
Source    DF  Seq SS 
Mcap       1  0.0104 
mbook      1  0.0448 
Ageyears   1  0.2425 
marcond    1  0.1654 
Brent      1  0.0975 
Ind        1  0.2422 
Health     1  0.1414 
Fin        1  0.8925 
Costap     1  1.3891 
cod        1  0.0011 
it         1  0.7337 
 
Unusual Observations: 
Obs   Mcap    Peers      Fit  SE Fit  Residual  St Resid 
 13  10687  -0.7409  -0.6188  0.3638   -0.1221     -0.47 X 
 44  46197  -0.2131  -0.2574  0.4309    0.0443      0.36 X 
 64   1540   0.3370  -0.5323  0.1648    0.8693      2.09R 
 71    938   0.6755  -0.3381  0.1377    1.0136      2.38R 
 
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual. 
X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large leverage. 
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Residual Plots for Peers: 
1.00.50.0-0.5-1.0
99.9
99
90
50
10
1
0.1
Residual
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
0.50.0-0.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
Fitted Value
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
0.80.40.0-0.4-0.8
20
15
10
5
0
Residual
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
7065605550454035302520151051
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
Observation Order
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
Normal Probability Plot Versus Fits
Histogram Versus Order
Residual Plots for Peers
 
 
Probability plot of the normal- and Student’s t-distribution: 
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Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
Multi-correlation matrix: 
 
 
 
White test for heteroskedasticity without cross-check of variables: 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     F-statistic 0.306641    Prob. F(11,61) 0.9819 
Obs*R-squared 3.825095    Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.9748 
Scaled explained SS 1.947735    Prob. Chi-Square(11) 0.9987 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 11:38   
Sample: 1 74    
0
2
4
6
8
10
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Series: RESID
Sample 1 100
Observations 73
Mean       1.79e-16
Median  -0.079329
Maximum  1.017879
Minimum -0.832647
Std. Dev.   0.412870
Skewness   0.380637
Kurtosis   2.458491
Jarque-Bera  2.654677
Probability  0.265182
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Included observations: 73   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.135873 0.078164 1.738303 0.0872 
AGEYEARS^2 -4.33E-06 1.05E-05 -0.413351 0.6808 
BRENT^2 0.022992 0.055983 0.410703 0.6827 
COD^2 -0.040074 0.118281 -0.338805 0.7359 
COSTAP^2 0.043659 0.100485 0.434485 0.6655 
FIN^2 -0.021396 0.090158 -0.237312 0.8132 
IND^2 0.012160 0.084592 0.143746 0.8862 
IT^2 0.053430 0.080265 0.665673 0.5081 
MARCOND^2 0.041347 0.065778 0.628579 0.5320 
MBOOK^2 -0.000479 0.000572 -0.836794 0.4060 
MCAP^2 -6.91E-11 1.08E-10 -0.638076 0.5258 
HEALTH^2 -0.030675 0.089827 -0.341492 0.7339 
     
     R-squared 0.052399    Mean dependent var 0.168126 
Adjusted R-squared -0.118480    S.D. dependent var 0.204448 
S.E. of regression 0.216220    Akaike info criterion -0.075856 
Sum squared resid 2.851825    Schwarz criterion 0.300658 
Log likelihood 14.76875    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.074191 
F-statistic 0.306641    Durbin-Watson stat 1.512069 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.981916    
     
     
 
 
 
Best subset regression 10% trimmed data:  
 
Summary over the adjusted R-squared effects from different regression models: 
                                             A 
                                             g m 
                                             e a     H   C 
                                           m y r B   e   o 
                                         M b e c r   a   s 
                                         c o a o e I l F t c 
                       Mallows           a o r n n n t i a o i 
Vars  R-Sq  R-Sq(adj)       Cp        S  p k s d t d h n p d t 
   1  11.4       10.1      2.5  0.44976                  X 
   1   4.3        3.0      8.2  0.46729                X 
   2  15.2       12.8      1.4  0.44300                  X   X 
   2  14.3       11.9      2.2  0.44544                X X 
   3  18.1       14.6      1.1  0.43850        X         X   X 
   3  17.3       13.7      1.8  0.44073              X   X   X 
   4  21.2       16.5      0.6  0.43348        X     X   X   X 
   4  20.3       15.6      1.4  0.43591        X       X X   X 
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   5  22.5       16.8      1.5  0.43289        X     X X X   X 
   5  22.1       16.3      1.9  0.43414        X X   X   X   X 
   6  23.4       16.4      2.9  0.43381    X   X     X X X   X 
   6  23.4       16.4      2.9  0.43385        X X   X X X   X 
   7  24.1       15.9      4.3  0.43500    X   X X   X X X   X 
   7  23.6       15.4      4.7  0.43647  X X   X     X X X   X 
   8  24.2       14.7      6.2  0.43806  X X   X X   X X X   X 
   8  24.2       14.7      6.2  0.43807    X   X X   X X X X X 
   9  24.3       13.5      8.1  0.44120  X X   X X   X X X X X 
   9  24.3       13.5      8.1  0.44124    X X X X   X X X X X 
  10  24.4       12.2     10.0  0.44446  X X X X X   X X X X X 
  10  24.3       12.1     10.1  0.44474  X X   X X X X X X X X 
  11  24.4       10.8     12.0  0.44807  X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Regression Analysis: Best subset regression  
Dependent Variable: PEERS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 11:42   
Sample (adjusted): 1 74   
Included observations: 74 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.552602 0.131463 -4.203491 0.0001 
IT 0.319979 0.150480 2.126387 0.0371 
COSTAP 0.622107 0.178303 3.489039 0.0009 
FIN -0.182255 0.167593 -1.087480 0.2807 
HEALTH 0.205717 0.154637 1.330316 0.1879 
MARCOND 0.232693 0.128216 1.814856 0.0740 
     
     R-squared 0.223062    Mean dependent var -0.252568 
Adjusted R-squared 0.165934    S.D. dependent var 0.471747 
S.E. of regression 0.430834    Akaike info criterion 1.231415 
Sum squared resid 12.62199    Schwarz criterion 1.418231 
Log likelihood -39.56235    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.305938 
F-statistic 3.904610    Durbin-Watson stat 0.505420 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003597    
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Check for normality in the residuals: 
 
Manually computed White test for heteroskedasticity: 
Dependent Variable: RESID2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/14/12   Time: 14:30   
Sample (adjusted): 1 74   
Included observations: 73 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.127726 0.045123 2.830608 0.0068 
AGE2 -7.51E-05 5.56E-05 -1.350235 0.1834 
AGEBOOK -0.003451 0.002261 -1.526451 0.1336 
AGEBRE -0.000715 0.006721 -0.106453 0.9157 
AGECAP -1.01E-06 1.06E-06 -0.950795 0.3466 
AGECOD 0.039904 0.139707 0.285623 0.7764 
AGECOSTA -0.003306 0.006174 -0.535472 0.5948 
AGEFIN -0.008796 0.005704 -1.542077 0.1298 
AGEIND -0.003960 0.008060 -0.491274 0.6255 
AGEIT -0.001506 0.013751 -0.109521 0.9133 
AGEMAR -0.004690 0.006469 -0.725068 0.4720 
AGEPHAR -0.000207 0.012078 -0.017128 0.9864 
AGEYEARS 0.023867 0.008741 2.730391 0.0089 
BREBOOK 0.054431 0.044248 1.230137 0.2248 
BRECAP -1.69E-05 3.20E-05 -0.526655 0.6009 
BRECOD 0.337215 0.435511 0.774296 0.4426 
BRECOST -0.150396 0.295321 -0.509263 0.6130 
BREFIN -0.040538 0.244756 -0.165624 0.8692 
0
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-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Series: RESID
Sample 1 100
Observations 74
Mean       3.90e-17
Median  -0.076822
Maximum  0.999909
Minimum -0.790070
Std. Dev.   0.415817
Skewness   0.447856
Kurtosis   2.300562
Jarque-Bera  3.982166
Probability  0.136547
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BREIND 0.087770 0.248687 0.352932 0.7257 
BREIT 0.166919 0.194261 0.859255 0.3946 
BREMAR 0.278007 0.168541 1.649495 0.1057 
BRENT -0.402280 0.274821 -1.463793 0.1499 
BRENT2 0.066359 0.138299 0.479824 0.6336 
BREPHAR -0.137885 0.292552 -0.471319 0.6396 
COD 0.240188 0.339315 0.707861 0.4825 
CODBOOK -0.139723 0.117674 -1.187381 0.2410 
     
     R-squared 0.303113    Mean dependent var 0.168126 
Adjusted R-squared -0.067572    S.D. dependent var 0.204448 
S.E. of regression 0.211242    Akaike info criterion 0.000395 
Sum squared resid 2.097295    Schwarz criterion 0.816175 
Log likelihood 25.98559    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.325497 
F-statistic 0.817712    Durbin-Watson stat 1.463604 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.701497    
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9.4 Appendix D: Short-term abnormal return analysis 
This appendix includes summaries of descriptive statistics for BHAR calculated, initial abnormal return measured by the price change 
from the offering price to close price at the first day of trading. Descriptive statistic summaries for full sample, 3% trimmed and 10% 
trimmed data sets.  
 
9.4.1 Short-term abnormal return  
RAW  3% trimmed  10 % trimmed 
        
Mean 0,015486799  Mean 0,014413  Mean 0,010313 
Standard Error 0,012193545  Standard Error 0,007967  Standard Error 0,005281 
Median 0,004777735  Median 0,004603  Median 0,004603 
Mode #I/T  Mode #I/T  Mode #I/T 
Standard Deviation 0,122543608  Standard Deviation 0,077246  Standard Deviation 0,047238 
Sample Variance 0,015016936  Sample Variance 0,005967  Sample Variance 0,002231 
Kurtosis 9,246488489  Kurtosis 1,900559  Kurtosis -0,1901 
Skewness 0,314132152  Skewness 0,747203  Skewness 0,485907 
Range 1,161433018  Range 0,453649  Range 0,21213 
Minimum -0,56106223  Minimum -0,18553  Minimum -0,07804 
Maximum 0,600370791  Maximum 0,268121  Maximum 0,134094 
Sum 1,564166666  Sum 1,354863  Sum 0,825078 
Count 101  Count 94  Count 80 
P-value with 95.0% confidence 
level 
0,024191645  P-value with 95.0% confidence 
level 
0,015822  P-value with 95.0% confidence 
level 
0,010512 
165 
 
 
